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October 4, 1988 
Mary T. Noonan 
Clerk of Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Kathleen Hamby and 
the State of Utah v. 
Gail Jacobson, No.880026-A 
Dear Ms, Noonan: 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) Citation of Supplemental Authorites, I 
am submitting the following authorites: 
1. A copy of Rule 405-1-5, Name of Child, Utah Bureau of Vital 
Statistics, and a copy of a letter dated February 19, 1988 from 
John E. Brockert, Director, Bureau of Vital Records making reference 
to the same. 
The rules are discussed in the Appellant's Reply Brief, page 9a, 
and would be included in the Addendum of the same. The rules are 
also discussed in Ms. Hamby's Brief. The enclosed would have been 
included on page 4 of the same. The rules are discussed at page 41 
of Ms. Hambyfs Brief. The revised rules would have been included in 
the Addendum to the Appellant's principal brief. 
2. Nellis v. Pressman, 282 A. 2d 539 (D.C. App. 1971) 
Nellis v. Pressman is cited in the article, "The Right of Women 
To Name Their Children," which is included in the Addendum of Appellant's 
initial brief, but not in the text. At oral argument it was referred 
to with respect to the recognition of the custodial parent's right to 
select the name(s) of children when the custodial parent is the ex-
husband. On page 547 of the decision, it is written: 
"The impasses continued and on June 17, 1968 he brought an action 
in the Court of General Sessions asking that permanent custody Of 
the children be awarded to him...In this posture of the case it 
was scarcely necessary to put the mother on notice again that he 
was protesting her discontinuance of the use of his name by the 
children, for if he had succeeded in obtaining custody of them 
he obviously would have remedied the matter himself." (emphasis 
added). 
Also mentioned in oral argument was the passage in Nellis v. Pressman 
on page 545 wherein the Court said: 
"We can only doubt that what the father apparently hoped to 
achieve by way of an injunction—assurance of a good and 
lasting relationship with his children—is in the power of 
any court to give." 
3. On page A-ll of Ms. Hamby's Reply brief, the Respondent's 
attorney articulated his position with respect to the male right 
to name marital children: 
Mr. Taylor: The child before the Court, because the support for 
the child before the Court and the legitimacy of the child, I 
think the child has been legitimized by the parents and by 
acknowledgment of both parties, that the child is, at the child's 
age, in that event it's just as if the child was born and con-
ceived after wedlock. So if she chooses to call the child 
Hamby, I don't think that that would preclude the Court from 
ordering at this time that this is common law right to have the 
child to bear his name if he's going to be ordered to support and 
be determined to be the father of the child..." (emphasis added). 
Further, at page A-28 of the Addendum of Ms.v.Hamby's Reply brief, 
the transcriptof the lower court reads: 
"Mr. Taylor:. .. it' s generally recognized that the father who is 
ordinarily the objecting party has a protectable interest in 
having his child bear the paternal surname in accordance with 
the usual custom, even though the mother may have been awarded 
the custody of the child...11 
And, further, on page A-30 of the Addendum to the Reply brief, 
the Court articulated its acceptance of a paternal right: 
"The Court:...that is this man is going to be ordered to support 
the child, acknowledge paternity, accept the responsibility for 
the child, be given the right to visitation and all of the normal 
things that the father has, that merely because the child was 
born prior to wedlock should not preclude the Court from ordering 
that that child bear this man's surname, because he's going to 
have all of the burden of responsibility." (emphasis added) 
At page A-32, the Court again articulated its understanding of 
the "common law" as reason to name the child with the paternal name: 
"The Court...And the child to be born would have the, under the 
common law, would normally be known as Jacobson." 
The transcript came up in oral argument in connection with the 
reasons for the lower court's actions. 
4. In re Kidder, A. 2d (Me. 1988). 
This case discusses the issue of naming in a joint custody 
situation. Counsel for Respondent brought up the issue in oral 
argument. In the Addendum of Ms. Hamby's initial brief, at page 
147 (footnote 222) and at page 113 (footnote 59) the issue is 
addressed. 
5. Fla. Stat, sec. 382.013 (1987) and letter dated March 16, 1988 
to me from Richard T. Dowries, Vital Records Administrator for the 
State of Florida. 
This new statute was mentioned in oral argument with reference 
to the presumption that the custodial parent name children pursuant 
to their best interests. 
I am sending you an original and five copies of this letter and 
enclosures. By this letter I am certifying that I am also sending 
copies of the same to all counsel involved, Mssrs. Taylor, Wardle 
and Gamon, and the Corporon and Williams law firm. 
Thank you. 
cc: Kathleen Hamby 




^ « i 
Norman H. Bangerter 
Governor 
Suzanne Dandoy, M.D., M.RH. 
Executive Director 
February 19, 1988 
Priscilla Ruth MacDougall 
Attorney at Law 
346 Kent Lane 
Madison, Wisconsin 53713 
Dear Ms. MacDougall: 
This is in response to your letter of February 10, 1988. The proposed 
guideline regarding naming of children has been incorporated in the revised 
vital statistics rules, which became effective March 17, 1987. The rule reads 
as follows: "A newborn child's name should be recorded on the birth 
certificate as determined by it's parents. If the parents disagree on a 
child's name and they have never married each other or are separated or 
divorced, the custodial parent shall determine the child's name. If the 
parents are married to each other and cannot agree on a child's name, it may 
be left blank on the birth certificate and added later by an Affidavit to 
Amend a Record or by court order." 
When adding the name by affidavit, we try to obtain the affidavit of both 
parents. However, if one of the parents is deceased or has deserted the 
custodial parent, we do allow the affidavit to be signed by some other 
knowledgeable person. 
If I can be of further assistance, please let me know. 
Sincerely, 
John E. Brockert, Director 
Bureau of Vital Records 
(801) 538-6186 
Office of Administration and Planning 
288 North 1460 West • PO Box 16700 • Salt Lake City Utah 841)6-0700 • (801) 538-6125 
State Registrar shall delegate such duties and responsibilities for 
local registrars as is deemed necessary to insure the efficient 
1,0
 tfon
 Qf tfoe system of vital statistics. Ihese may include, but are not 
ffwlted tot the following: 
la) The receipt and processing of birth, death, and spontaneous fetal 
death records. This includes the receipt of these records from the person 
responsible for filing the record, checking it for accuracy and 
completeness, making a local copy, and forwarding the original to the State 
Registrar at least once a week. 
(b) Issuance of certified copies of birth, death, and fetal death 
certificates after receiving written authorization from the State 
Registrar. The records from which the certified copies aro issued shall be 
the local copy of the original certificate. A H forms and procedures used 
to issue the copies shall be provided or approved by the State Registrar. 
(c) Issuance of burial-transit and disinterment permits and other 
designated forms as prescribed by regulation or direction of the State 
Registrar. 
(d) Acting as the agent of the State Registrar in their designated area 
and providing assistance to physicians, hospitals, funeral directors, and 
others in matters related to the system of vital statistics. 
The State Registrar, with the approval of the Department, shall determine 
the responsibilities and duties of each office independently. 
R405-1-5 Name of Child 
A new born child's name should be recorded on the birth certificate as 
determined by its1 parents. If the parents disagree on the child's name and 
they have never married each other or ara separated or divorced, the 
custodial parent shall determine the child's name. If the parents are 
married to each other and cannot agree on the child's name, it may be left 
blank on the birth certificate and added later by an Affidavit to Amend a 
Record or by court order. 




R405-2 INFANTS OF UNKNOWN PARENTAGE; FOUNDLING REGISTRATION 
R405-2-1 Ihe report for an infant of unknown parentage shall be 
registered on a foundling certificate of live birth and shall, unless more 
definitive information is available: 
(a) Show the date and place of finding 
(b) Show the signature and title of the custodian in lieu of the 
attendant during delivery. 
If the child is identified and a certificate of birth is found or 
obtained, the foundling certificate shall be placed in a sealed file and 
shall not be open to inspection, except on the order of a court. 
KEY: Vital Statistics, Custody of Children 
1987 26-2-6 
STATE OF FLORIDA 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES 
March 16 , 1988 
Ms. Priscilla Ruth MacDougall 
Attorney at Law 
346 Kent Lane 
Madison, Wisconsin 53713 
Dear Ms. MacDougall: 
Mr. Boorde has asked me to reply to your letter of March 9. 
Enclosed are copies of 382.013 Florida Statutes and an excerpt 
from our handbook about disagreements on the naming of children 
on birth records. 
We will not accept a birth record without a surname except for 
foundlings, and we handle disagreements as specified in the 
enclosure. 
We enclose a printout of 1986 (our first) most popular given 
names, but we haven't done anything about surnames. 
Please let us know if we can be of further service. 
Sincerely, 
/e^t+ay*?^ ^ £ & * 2 £ — 
Richard T. Downes 
Vital Records Administrator 




P.O. BOX 21Q • JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA 32231 
BOB MARTINEZ, GOVERNOR GREGORY L. COLER, SECRETARY 
382 VITAL STATISTICS F.S. 1987 
382.013 Certificate of birth; registration.— 
(1) A certificate of birth for each live birth which oc-
curs in this state shall be registered within 5 days after 
such birth with the local registrar of the district in which 
the birth occurred and shall be filed by the state office 
if it has been completed and registered in accordance 
with this section. 
(2) If a birth occurs in an institution or en route there-
to, the physician, midwife, or person in attendance dur-
ing or immediately after the delivery shall provide the 
person in charge of the institution or his designated rep-
resentative the medical information required by the cer-
tificate, within 48 hours after the birth. The person in 
charge of the institution or his designated representa-
tive shall obtain the other information required by the 
certificate and shall prepare the certificate, certify to the 
facts of birth, and register the certificate with the local 
registrar. 
(3) If a birth occurs outside an institution and the 
child is not taken to an institution immediately after deliv-
ery, the certificate shall be prepared and registered 
within 5 days by one of the following persons in the indi-
cated order of priority: 
(a) The physician or midwife in attendance during or 
immediately after the birth or, in the absence of such a 
person; 
(b) Any other person in attendance during or imme-
diately after the birth or, in the absence of such a per-
son; 
(c) The father or the mother or, in the absence of the 
father and the inability of the mother, the person in 
charge of the premises where the birth occurred. 
(4) If a birth occurs on a moving conveyance and the 
child is first removed from the conveyance in this state, 
the birth shall be registered in this state, and the place 
to which the child is first removed shall be considered 
the place of birth. The birth certificate shall be registered 
in accordance with subsection (2) or subsection (3), 
whichever is applicable. 
(5)(a) If the mother is married at the time of birth, the 
mother and the father as entered on the birth certificate 
shall select the given names and surname of trie .Child 
If both parents will have custody of the child,'otherwise 
the parent who will have custody shall select the given 
names and surname of the child. 
(b) If the mother is not married at the time of birth", 
the person who will have custody of the child shall select 
the given names and surname of the child. . \ \ 
(6)(a) If the mother is married at the time of birth* the 
name of her husband shall be entered on the certificate 
as the father of the child unless paternity has been de-
termined otherwise by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
(b) If the mother is not married at the time of birth, 
the name of the father shall not be entered on the certifi-
cate of birth without the consenting affidavit of the moth-
er and the person to be named as the father, unless pa-
ternity is determined by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion. 
(c) In any case in which paternity of a child is deter-
mined by a court of competent jurisdiction, the name of 
the father and surname of the child shall be entered on 
the certificate of birth in accordance with the finding and 
order of the court. If the court fails to specify a surname 
for the child, then the surname shall be entered in ac-
cordance with paragraph (5)(a) or paragraph (5)(b), 
whichever is applicable. 
(d) If the father is not named on the certificate of 
birth, no other information about the father shall be en-
tered on the certificate. 
(7) At least one of the parents of the child shall at-
test to the accuracy of the personal data entered on the 
certificate in time to permiUhe registration of the certifi-
cate within the 5 days prescribed herein. 
History.—s. 13. eft. 689Z 1915: AGS 2083; CGI 3283; s. 1. ch. 77-319: j . 150. 
ch. 79-400: s. 11. ch. 87-387. 
Not*.—Former *. 382.16. 
In cases where the mother and father have joint custody of the 
hild and disagree on the selection of a surname, the surname 
elected by the father and surname selected by the mother shall 
oth be entered on the certificate, separated by a hyphen, with the 
elected names entered in alphabetic order. The surname so 
elected may be amended before the child's seventh birthday by 
ayment of the required fee and by a joint written agreement of 
oth parents submitted to the department listing the agreed upon 
urname, or upon request of a parent subsequently awarded sole 
arental responsibility of the child by a court of competent 
urisdiction. Changes of the surname after the seventh birthday 
ill require the same documentation as other surname changes. 
In cases where the mother and father have joint custody of the 
hild and disagree on the selection of given names, the given names 
n the certificate shall not be entered until a joint written 
greement between both parents is submitted to the department 
isting the agreed upon given names or selection of given names is 
ade by a parent who is awarded sole parental responsibility of the 
hild by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
Parties to the Proceeding in the Trial Court 
1. Kathleen Hamby. 
Known for a brief time by the name Jacobson, Appellant Kathleen 
Hamby!s divorce action in the trial court was entitled: Kathleen 
Jacobson, and the State of Utah, by and through Utah State Department 
of Social Services, Case No. 67,957 (Fourth Judicial District Court, 
Utah County). 
2. State of Utah Department of Social Services. 
The Utah Department of Social Services moved to become a party 
plaintiff in the trial court proceedings because the Respondent 
Gail Jacobson owed the State money for child support. The Department 
is named in the caption but has not as yet participated in the 
instant appeal. 
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control of children conferred by Title 30, 
Chapter 3 of the Utah Code, to resolve the 
dispute betweenKathleen Hamby and Gail Jacobson 
over the naming of the two children as part of 
the divorce action 29-32 
III. The selection of newborn, infant or very young 
children's surnames is a constitutionally pro-
tected childrearing decision which properly rests 
with the parent(s) entrusted with the care, 
custody and control of the child(ren) pursuant 
to an award of custody on the basis of the children's 
best interests 33-42 
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B. In a dispute between a custodial and noncustodial 
parent over the naming of newborn or very young 
children, the custodial parent's decision 
should be rebuttably presumed valid as being 
in the best interests of the children consistent 
with the concurring opinion of Justice Mosk 
in In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640, 620 P. 2d 
579, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1980) 38 
IV. The trial court should be reversed because its finding 
of fact and conclusions of law (Ruling and Order) are 
contrary to the evidence, assume facts not in evidence, 
and reflect a presumption for the paternal name and 
a superior right of men over women to name marital 
children irrespective of who is entrusted with the 
care, custody and control of the children, in violation 
of the Constitutions of the United States and Utah 
and Utah's statutory scheme to guarantee equal rights 
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Issues Presented for Review 
1. Whether the trial court had jurisdication pursuant to its 
authority over the care, custody and control of children con-
ferred by Title 30, Chapter 3 of the Utah Code (particularly 
U.C.A., 30-3-5 and 30-3-10) to determine the surnames of l)the 
child born prior to Ms. Hamby's marriage to Mr. Jacobson, and 
2) the child born subsequent to Ms. Hamby's divorce from Mr. 
Jacobson. 
The trial court's ruling on this issue is confusing. The 
court entertained jurisdiction in March, 1985 to determine the 
surname of the child not yet born at the time of divorce but 
declined at that time to change the surname of the child born 
prior to the marriage. The judge told the parties that he would 
entertain name change "applications" from both of them if filed 
within 30 days of the birth of the child to be born following 
the divorce. The applications thus filed, however, did not comply 
with the statutory requirements of Utah's name change statute, 
U.S.C. 42-1-1--42-1-3. In the case of the newborn child who had 
not been a resident of the county for a year as required by such 
statute, the name change statute could not be applicable. 
The Appellant Kathleen Hamby believes that the trial court had 
jurisdiction to determine the names of both her infant children 
in March, 1985 as well as after the birth of her child in April, 
1985 pursuant to its continuing jurisdiction over the care, custody 
and control of children pursuant to a divorce action. 
-6-
1. Whether the trial court erred in ordering that both of the 
children in Ms. Hambyrs custody should bear the paternal surname 
rather than the name Ms. Hamby, as custodial parent, determined 
to be in the children's best interests--her own--in view of the 
evidence of record, the legal rights, privileges and responsibilities 
of the custodial parent, and the mandates of equal protection and 
due process guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the State of 
Utah and the United States? 
Ms. Hamby appealed the decision of the trial court because she 
believes the trial court erred egregiously. 
-7-
Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Rules and Regulations 
Constitutional Provisions-Utah 
Article I, section 1[Inherent and inalienable rights] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and 
defend their lives and liberties: to acquire, possess and 
protest property; to worship according to the dictates of their 
consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and 
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that 
right. 
Article I, section 2 [All political power inherent in the people] 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free 
governments are founded on their authority for their equal 
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or 
reform their government as the public welfare may require. 
Article I, section 7 [Due process of law] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
Article I, section 27 [Fundamental Rights] 
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to 
the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free 
government. 
Constitutional Provision-United States 
Amendment XIV, section 1 [Citizenship defined; privileges of citizens] 
...No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
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Statutes 
U.C.A. 30-3-5. Disposition of property-Maintenance and health care 
of parties and children-Court to have continuing jurisdiction-
Custody and visitation-Termination of alimony. 
1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include 
in it such orders in relation to the children, property and 
parties, and the maintenance and health care of the parties, 
as may be equitable. The court shall include in every decree of 
divorce an order assigning responsibility for the payment 
of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of 
the dependent children. If coverage is available at a reasonable 
cost, the court may also include an order requiring the purchase 
and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental 
care insurance for those children. The court shall have con-
tinuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent changes or new 
orders with respect to the support and maintenance of the parties, 
the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, 
and health and dental care, or the distribution of the property 
as shall be reasonable and necessary. Visitation rights of 
parents, grandparents, and other relatives shall take into 
consideration the welfare of the child. 
U.C.A. 30-3-10. Custody of children. 
In any case of separation of husband and wife having minor 
children, or whenever a marriage is declared void or dissolved 
the court shall make such order for the future care and custody 
of the minor children as it may deem just and proper. In de-
termining custody, the court shall consider the best interests 
of the child and the past conduct and demonstrated moral 
standards of each of the parties. The court may inquire of the 
children and take into consideration the children's desires 
regarding the future custody; however, such expressed desires 
shall not be controlling and the court may, nevertheless, de-
termine the children's custody otherwise... 
U.C.A. 42-1-1 to 3. Chapter 1. Change of Name. 
U.C.A. 42-1-. By petition to district court-Contents. 
Any natural person, desiring to change his name, may file a 
petition therefor in the district court of the county where 
he resides, setting forth: 
1) The cause for whichthe change of name is sought. 
2) The name proposed. 
3) That he has been a bona fide resident of the county for the 
year immediately prior to the filing of the petition. 
42-1-2. Notice of hearing-Order of change. 
The court shall order whay, if any, notice shall be given of 
the hearing, and after the giving of such notice, if any, may 
order the change of name as requested, upon proof in open court 
of the allegations of the petition and that there exists proper 
cause for granting the same. 
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42-1-3. Effect of proceedings. 
Such proceedings shall in no manner affect any legal action 
or proceeding then pending, or any right, title or interest 
whatsoever. 
Rules and Regulations 
Guidelines for Reporting Name of Father and Surname of Child on 
the Birth Certificate (revised October 5, 1981) by the Bureau of 
Health Statistics, Utah Department of Health. 
Surname of Child. 
The surname to be given the child should be determined by the 
parents. 
A. When the mother is married it is usual for the child to 
receive the surname of the husband(father). However, some 
recent immigrants into the United States and some subcultures 
within the nation have customs of assigning surnames which vary 
from the standard American tradition. The surname given the 
child should be determined by both parents. It clearly is not 
mandatory that the child have the father's surname. When the 
parents disagree as to the child's surname, the sole consideration 
should be the best interests of the child. This may be best 
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
Therefore, if the parents (husband and wife) are in disagree-
ment regarding the surname of the child, it should be left blank 
on the birth certificate. It can be added later when the parents 
reach agreement by an affidavit to amend a record or if necessary, 
by court order. 
B. When the child's mother is not married, she has considerable 
latitude in the name she gives the child. Even if the father 
is not named on the birth certificate, the mother may give the 
child a surname different than her own surname. Additionally, 
the mother may name the father on the birth certificate (by 
Acknowledgment of Paternity) and give the child a surname 
different than the father's. 
C. The parents should be advised that by giving the child a 
different surname than that of the father, the birth certificate 
may appear to some persons as a birth which occurred out of 
wedlock. 
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Statement of the Case 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings and Disposition in 
the Trial Court 
This case involves the right of a divorced woman, awarded and 
entrusted with the sole custody of her two infant children of her 
dissolved marriage, to determine the names of her children con-
sistent with their best interests, and the right of the children 
to bear names which are in their best interests. 
It also involves the threshold jurisdictional question of 
whether a divorce court has jurisdiction to determine the names 
of children pursuant to its continuing jurisdiction over the care 
and custody of children. 
The case concerns the naming of two children, one born in 1983 
prior to Appellant Kathleen Hamby's brief marriage to Gail Jacobson, 
who was given her name, and one born in 1985, two days following 
her divorce from Mr. Jacobson on the grounds of mental cruelty. 
The stipulation between the parties respecting the various matters 
of child custody, property distribution, etc,,included a provision: 
The minor child of the parties, Kelly, does not currently 
bear defendant's last name, Jacobson. Plaintiff desires 
that status to continue for Kelly and also to apply to the 
expected minor child. Defendant desires that both children 
bear his name, Jacobson. This is the only issue remaining 
over which the parties are in dispute and over which a 
hearing in Open Court is desired." R. 31 (No. 10). 
A hearing was held on March 14, 1985 respecting this issue at 
which time former counsel for Ms. Hamby objected to the Court 
taking jurisdiction to change the name of the child born in 1983. 
The Fourth Judicial District Court, Judge J. Robert Bullock pre-
siding, assumed jurisdiction to determine the name of the child 
to be born and ordered that such child bear the name of the father 
because a marital child ITunder the common law, would normally 
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be known" by the father's surname. 
The Court further ordered that the child born prior to the 
marriage continue to bear the mother's surname unless and until 
the parties brought the issue of naming to him following the 
birth of the second child. The Court reserved jurisdiction to 
hear the names issue but otherwise issued a final divorce decree 
on April 11, 1985. In doing so he said he wojuld entertain "applications1 
for name changes from both parties following] the birth of the 
1985 child. 
Within 30 days of the birth of the child Ms. Hamby petitioned 
for a change of his name pursuant to this or^ ler, and her ex-
husband countered with a (late) application for a name change of 
the two year old. The Fourth Judicial District Court, Judge 
Ray M. Harding now presiding, ruled that both children should bear 
the father's surname. 
The case is before the Utah Supreme Court, on appeal by Ms. Hamby 
of that decision. 
1 
The terms "marital" and "nonmarital" are used herein instead 
of "legitimate" or "illegitimate" which denote good or base 
societal status as determined by males. See footnote No. l,p.91 
of MacDougall, "The Right of Women To Name Their Children," 3 
J. L. and Ineq. 91(1985) reproduced in the Addendum. 
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Statement of the Facts 
Approximately eleven years ago the Appellant Kathleen Hamby 
gave birth to her first child. She gave the child, a boy, the sur-
name which she shared with her husband, the Child's father, Hamby. 
She was later divorced from the father of her first child. The 
dates of her marriage to and divorce from her first husband do not 
appear in the Record of this case. Ms. Hamby has sole custody of 
her firstborn. 
On June 14, 1983 Ms. Hamby gave birth to a child fathered by 
the Respondent Gail Jacobson. She gave the c}iild the same surname 
as herself and her first child, Hamby. R. 12^. 
On November 29 of that year, 1983, Ms. Hainby married Mr. Jacobson. 
The following October she separated from him and filed for divorce 
by a complaint and amended complaint dated October 29, 1984 
against him on the grounds of mental crueltyI R. 7,10. 
By a Motion for Joinder of Party Plaintiff dated January 14, 1985 
(R. 13) the State of Utah, Department of Social Services, asked 
to become a party to the divorce action because Ms. Hamby had been 
receiving public assistance. The motion was granted on February 
7, 1985. R. 25. By date of February 13, 1985]the State of Utah 
filed a complaint in the case against Mr. Jacobson alleging that 
the defendant has failed to support his children as required by 
2 U.C.A. 78-45-3 and asking that the defendan-p be required to 
pay back and on-going child support. R. 27. 
The Record in this case also includes a Writ of Garnishment from 
the State of Utah to the Sunshine Mining Company dated July 29, 
198 5 and a Garnishee Writ of Execution from the State of Utah to 
2
 See Roberts v. Roberts, 592 P. 2d 597 (Utah 1979) and Mecham 
v. MecTTIm, 570 P. 2d 125 (Utah 1977) respecting the right of the 
Department to seek reimbursement of funds paid for child support 
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the Sheriff or Constable of Utah County respecting the Sunshine 
Mining Company dated August 8, 1985. R. 54, 58^ 
During the ten-eleven months that Ms. Hamby lived with Mr. 
Jacobson in marriage she used the surname Jacobson. Upon separating 
from her ex-husband she reverted to her pre-marriage name which 
she intends to use the rest of her natural lif^.3 
A divorce was granted to Ms. Hamby on the grounds of mental 
cruelty on April 11, 1985. R. 114. The decree provided for her to 
formally resume her pre-marriage name. R. 1161 
2 
In her Affidavit in Support of Motion for Change of Title of 
Action to the Supreme Court of Utah, Ms. Hamby stated that she used 
the surname Jacobson for less than a year. Since October 20, 1984 
when she separated from Mr. Jacobson, she has jised the surname 
Hamby which she intends to do for the remainder of her natural life. 
These facts are otherwise not part of the Record in the case. The 
parties stipulated to the change of title on the basis of Ms. Hamby's 
affidavit. 
In ordering that the child born following Ms. Hamby's divorce 
should bear the paternal name ,the trial court stated as a reason 
for his ruling that "Hamby is not the mother's maiden name." R. 102. 
This distinction is misguided as discussed, infra. Ms. Hamby 
considers Hamby her name jiast as Mr. Jacobson presumably considers 
Jacobson his name irrespective of where he acquired it, by birth or 
change of name while a minor or as an adult. Ms. Hamby assumed 
the surname Hamby during a prior marriage, has used it for years, 
and, as she stated in her affidavit to the Supreme Court, "I consider 
it my name and I never intend to use any other surname than Hamby 
for the remainder of my natural life." 
As written in the Center for a Woman's Own Name, 1975 Supplement 
to Booklet For Women Who Wish To Determine The|;r Own Names After 
Marriage 6 (1975) : 
"It is the position of the Center For A Woman's Own Name that 
the name(s) a woman chooses to use is her own name. It may 
be the name given her at birth, a name assumed during childhood, 
assumed at marriage, assumed at a previous ikarriage, a hyphenated 
name or a name made up by herself at any tiipe." 
The term "maiden" name or "married" name is not used herein except 
in reference to the trial court's usage of the term. It refers to the 
name a woman uses just prior to her first marriage when she presumably 
is a "maiden'.' Identifying a woman by her sexual and marital status is 
inappropriate. The terms"own" name, or simply "name" are used instead, 
or tne antiquated terms are used within quotes^ 
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Twtr days after her divorce was granted Ms. riamby gave birth 
to her third son, a child fathered by Mr. Jacobson. 
The divorce decree issued by Judge R. Rohjert Bullock ordered, 
with respect to the children's names: 
11. The surname of the minor child, Kelly, shall remain Hamby 
at this time. If Defendant desires that njame to be changed to 
Jacobson then he may file a Petition for change of name in 
this matter within 30 days after the birth of the minor child 
expected in April, 1985. Plaintiff may respond and/or object 
to any such Petition thus filed. 
12. The minor child expected in April 19815 shall bear the 
surname Jacobson. If plaintiff desires th^t name to be changed 
to Hamby then she may file a Petition for change of name in 
within 30 days after the birth of said chtld. Defendant may 
respond and/or object to any such petition thus filed. 
An evidentiary hearing on the children's Barnes was held before 
the judge on March 14, 1985. Mr. Jacobson did not contest the 
divorce or the award of sole custody of the two children to Ms. 
Hamby. He did not appear at the hearing. 
Prior to the hearing the parties had stipulated that the only 
issue reamining between the parties was that of the children's 
names and had asked the Court to hear the is^ue. 
Mr. Jacobson did not attend the evidentiaitv hearing of March 
14, 1985? according to his lawyer because a jdb came through. At 
the hearing it came out that since Ms. Hamby had separated from 
Mr. Jacobson in October, 1984, he had had no association with the 
child born in 1983. R. 140. 
Ms. Hamby testified that Mr. Jacobson was Verbally and physica 
abusive !,to all of the children in our home," that he is a drunk 
("He's drunk more often than he's sober") and that he "wouldn't 
work." R. 127, She testified that Mr. Jacobson had hit the baby 
born before the marriage, causing the child t0 lose the upward 
motion in his left eye. R. 128. She mentionedithat he had a re-
putation in the community in which she lives ior being a drinker 
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cting their names 
and fighter in town. T. 133-134. 
Ms. Hamby testified that, as custodial parent of her children, 
she felt she should make the decisions respe|< 
while the children are young. At the time o£ the hearing, her 
first child was 10 years old and bore the name Hamby; her second 
child, who was almost two years old, bore the name Hamby; she 
wished her third child, who was not yet born, to also bear the 
family name. She testified that she wanted the children to bear 
her name for their benefit: 
MYes. I have a lot of reasons. The main ope is for, are for 
the benefit of the children. If the children donTs have the 
same last name in the family I feel that it makes more in-
security, less family closeness. Mr. Jacopson has put me in 
a position now to raise three children by 
it's his choice not to be a husband that 
And when I have to raise three children I 
circumstances to raise those kids under t _
 r , . 
I feel that having my whole family have tjie same last name 
brings the family closer together, there yill be a lot less 
questions brought up at an earlier date fbr those little 
myself, because |I can stay with. 
need the best 
hat's possible; and 
babies. They won't be wondering why their name is different 
until they are old enough to discuss it. R. 131-132. 
Ms. Hamby futher testified that as the children get older fTif 
they make the decision that they want their father's name, if he 
has been coming around and seeing them and b^ing a father to them. 
I would never object to my children having tjieir own way when they 
are old enough to make a decision like that.f R. 141-142. 
Ms. Hamby's conclusion that the family unit which she heads 
should bear the same surname came as a result of a great deal of 
thought and her own life experience. She spoke with several people 
about it and reflected on her personal experience of having grown 
up in a household with different names following divorce. 
ffI was, also, raised in a broken home witlk a different last 
name and saw the affects[sic] of it. Even when you are happy 
in a broken home, when you come home with a child as a friend 
and you introduce your mother with a different name, your friend 
asks you: why does your mother have a different name, is she 
really your mother, or things like that. And, so that kids 
begin to wonder who their mother and father is. 
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And I feel that it's just the security onl the children. 
It's not an issue here I'm not here to argue about to hurt 
Gail Jacobson or anything also. His name fioes carry around 
stigma." R. 133. 
As Ms. Hamby summarized her position with) respect to her right, 
as a matter of her childrearing responsibilities,to determine 
her children's names while they are young: 
Q: But you want to make that decision for them now? 
A. Yes, I do. I have custody of them, and I'm their mother. R. 141. 
Following Ms. Hamby's testimony, a school psychologist, Gaylor 
Lester Downing, testified that in his opinion family identity 
is somewhat disrupted if the family unit living together following 
a divorce has two different surnames: 
"For example, I've worked with one boy wh<bse parents are 
divorced, and he will go through periods when he's more 
happy with his dad so he'll take on his dad's name, and there 
will be some problems there,and so he'll go more in with 
his mom and he'll take his mom's name. And it will create 
uncertainty in his own mind as to who he j.s and where 
he is and what he ought to be doing. Because attached to 
that name is also the values that go alont with the parent 
who also has that name." R. 146. 
Mr. Downing, in answer to a question posed by Mr. Jacobson's 
counse J., responded: 
Q: You are certainly not advocating in all circumstances that 
the name of the father be changed to that of the mother in 
case of a divorce, are you? 
A. I think it should always be considered on an individual 
basis. R. 146. 
At the hearing Mr. Jacobson's counsel contended that a man 
has a right under the common law to have children he sires bear 
his name unless there be demonstrated an overriding benefit 
to thecontrary, and that if the man has legal responsibility to 
a nonmarital child that he should have the right to name the child. 
R. 149. 
Mr. Jacobson was ordered to pay $80 a montth for each child 
pursuant to the stipulation of the parties. Tfhe State of Utah 
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appeared at the hearing by its counsel Ray Eh Gammon and 
stated that as of that date Mr.Jacobson had paid back money he 
owed the State for child support. R. 149. 
On May 13, 1985 Ms. Hamby petitioned the Fourth Judicial District 
Court pursuant to its ruling,for a change of surname of the 
thild born on April 13, 1985 (Kevin). On May 21, 1985 the Respondent 
petitioned for a change of name for the child born on June 14, 
1983 (Kelly). Ms. Hamby objected to the untimely filing of her ex-
husband's petition, but the Court heard both petitions and de-
cided the issue as to both children's names in favor of Ms.Hamby's 
ex-husband. 
The matter was decided by Judge Ray M. Harding on the evidence 
presented to Judge Bullock on March 14, 1985, an unwritten 
4 
stipulation, and briefs of the parties. 
Ms. Hamby made this appeal to the Supreme Court of Utah. 
A 
The Reply Memorandum of Gail Jacobson (R. 96) refers to a 
pre-trial stipulation "that if called the father (Jacobson) would 
say the interest of the children are best served if they bear 
his name and that the mother (Hamby) would testify otherwise." 
No written stipulation appears in the file or record to the 
knowledge of the Appellant. Judge Harding referred to matters 
raised at the evidentiary hearing on March 14, 1985 as well as 
to facts not adduced anywhere in the Record of this case. 
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Summary of Argument 
The trial court's imposition on the custodial parent of its 
own judgment that the two infant children in her custody should 
bear the surname of the noncustodial parent constitutes gross 
and reversible error. 
As more and more women do not change their surnames because 
of marriage and/or revert to their pre-marriage names when they 
divorce at the same time as courts and legislatures have all but 
abolished the tender years presumption as an absolute legal 
standard by which to award custody of children, courts across the 
nation are being faced with the situation of custodial mothers 
seeking to name their children in their custody with their own 
names, hyphenated names, or other surnames which differ from the 
patronymic. 
This case is typical of those coming before trial courts today. 
It is, consequently, a case which the Supreme Court of Utah should 
examine closely in order to render the requisite guidelines to 
lower courts faced with disputes between custodial and noncustodial 
parents of newborns and infant children. I 
Where childrsn are infants or very young-i-and in their mother's 
custody--in contrast to where children are older, were originally 
given their fathers' names which their mothers also used, and 
lived in a family unit with both parents for a substantial period 
of time--a growing number are ruling in favor of the custodial 
mother's choice of name. 
Most courts recognize the jurisdiction of divorce courts to 
determine disputes between custodial and noncustodial parents 
over the naming of marital children. The Appellant in this case 
believes that the trial courts of Utah have the jurisdiction 
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pursuant to U.C.A. 30-3-5 and 30-3-10. Appelllant would like 
clarification on this point from the Supreme Court of Utah. 
The trial court erred in not recognizing the presumption 
that a custodial parent acts in his/her children's best interests 
in all matters of childrearing, including the naming of children, 
absent proof to the contrary, and in failing to put this burden 
on the noncustodial father to prove that Ms. Hamby was abusing 
her custodial parental responsibilities. 
In ruling as it did the trial court failejd to discard as a 
relic of days past the now legally impermissible superior right 
of men over women to name marital children v^ hich was established 
in the cases of older children originally given their fathers1 
surname and which has, even under the caselaw thus developed, 
no applicability to cases involving newborn or infant children. 
The trial court's stated reasons for finding for the father 
are contrary to the evidence and are based on legally impermissible 
or incorrect criteria. 
The trial court should be reversed with instructions to the 
trial court to recognize the right of the custodial parent of 
newborn or infant or very young children to ^ iame the children in 
his/her custody consistent with California Supreme Court Justice 
Mosk's concurring opinion in the case of In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 
3d 640, 620 P. 2d 579, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1980). 
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I. Introduction and Historial Perspective on the Common Law of 
Names and the Right of Women To Name Themselves and Their Children 
The instant case is typical of cases occurring in trial courts 
across the nation. As a logical outgrowth of the efforts of women 
in this century and last to secure for themselves and their 
daughters and granddaughters the common law tight to determine 
one's own name, women who are custodial pareiits of marital children 
no longer accept that heretofore virtually unfettered right of 
men to impose their surnames on marital children irrespective of 
the children's best interests. 
It used to be so "simple.ff In yesterday Ms. Hamby would have 
retained the surname Jacobson^which she used for a period of less 
than a year,following her divorce and the children in her custody 
would have done likewise. 
The Court is referred to the article by Ms. Hambyfs counsel, 
f!The Right of Women To Name Their Children," 3 Journal of Law and 
Inequality 91(1985) which is included in the Addendum to this brief, 
and respectfully requested to read it. Ms. Hamby's case arises in 
the context of the movement towards equality in the area of naming 
children which the article discusses. 
In yesteryear women abandonned their "maiden" names upon marry-
ing and assumed their spouses' surnames as their own. They often 
ealled themselves "Mrs." plus their husbands full names, although, 
with some exceptions, for most legal purposes a married woman's 
name was her own first (given) name and her chosen surname as was 
and is the case with men. 
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In yesteryear, when women had children,thb children were 
given the family name, the surname of both of their parents* 
When divorce became permissible, and then common, women reverted 
to their "maiden" names if they had no children from the marriage 
and retained their "married" names if they did. Women who had 
children out of marriage--called "bastards" at old common law--
traditionally called them by their "maiden" names although, 
technically, a "bastard" did not have any name by birth alone. 
S/he had to earn one by reputation. 
Most men retained the family names they were born with through-
out life, but a sizeable number changed their surnames for any 
of a number of reasons, including to Americanize them. Slaves took 
on names upon emancipation. Wives and childrlen changed their names 
when the head of the family did. 
Although the foregoing was the custom, it was not the common 
law. In fact, at old English common law, which has been adopted by 
all states except Louisiana, it was not unusually uncommon for 
women of property not to change their family names upon marriage or 
to retain them for some but not all purposes. Men adopted their 
wives' names on occasion. Marital children sometimes took their 
mothers' names, Thomas Littleton, the son of Elizabeth Littleton 
and Thomas Westcott being prime examples of the same. Under the 
common law names are established by usage, not statute or court 
decree, and can be changed at will without judicial proceedings. 
Pursuant to the common law,married women change their names by 
usage, by assuming their husbands1 names after marriage. The most 
common example of a common law name change is that of a woman 
voluntarily assuming her spouse's name upon marriage, 
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"When a woman on her marriage assumes, as she usually does 
in England, the surname of her husband in substitution for 
her father's name, it may be said that she acquires a new name 
by repute. The change of name is in fact, rather than in law, 
a consequence of the marriage.ft Husband a^id Wife. Assumption 
by Wife of Husband's Name, 22 Halsbury's Laws of England, 
Sec. 1018 at 633 (4th ed. 1979JT 
Upon remarriage a woman could, and sometimes, did,retain the 
surname she acquired during her prior marriage even over the ob* 
jection of the ex-husband. See, e.g., Cowleyj v. Cowley, 1901 A.C. 
450, the case most frequently cited for this point. See also, 
Wood v. Detroit Edison, 409 Mich. 279, 294 N.W. 2d 571 (1980); 
Welcker v. Welcker, 342 So. 2d 251 (La. AppJ 1977). 
For discussions of the common law of names, see, in addition to 
the article included in the Addendum, Lamber, "A Married 
Woman's Surname: Is Custom Law? 1973 Wash. U.L. Q. 779 (1973); 
Daum, "The Right of Married Women To Assert |Their Own Surnames," 
8 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 63 (1974) and Comment,| "Married Women and 
The Name Game," 11 Rich.L. Rev. 121 (1976). Numerous articles on 
the law have appeared in recent years. In adjdition to the fore-
going and those cited in the Addendum article, see the list of 
law review commentary in MacDougall, "Women's, Men's and Children's 
Names: An Outline and Bibliography," 7 Fam. L. Rep. 4013 (March 
17, 1981). 
It was in the mid nineteenth century when! the issue of the right 
of a married woman to use her own name came to the fore as a 
feminist issue in the United States with the example of Lucy Stone, 
prominent orator and leader in the feminist and abolitionist 
movements, who did not change her surname when she married Henry 
B. Blackwell in 1885. In the early twentieth century, women facing 
strong prejudice on the part of society against women using their 
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own names, organized as the Lucy Stone League. Together with 
the National Woman's Party they brought numerous actions, including 
a successful challenge to the Passport Office, to secure married 
women the right to their own identities consistent with their 
common law right to choose their own names. 
The Lucy Stoners, however, did not take dn the issue of naming 
children and the issue of a woman's right to name herself did not 
arise frequently until the early 1970s. With the rebirth of the 
feminist movement, vast numbers of women were met with societal 
resistance as agencies were inundated across the land with married 
women seeking to vote, run for office, drive , register their cars, 
purchase property, attend educational institutions, obtain pro-
fessional licenses or employment, etc., etc., etc. Courts were 
flooded with cases of married or divorcing women seeking to 
statutorily change their surnames. Legislatures started to repeal 
divorce name change provisions which depriveld divorce courts of 
jurisdiction to change women's names pursuant to divorces if they 
had children. See, eij*. In re Harris, 236 S.E. 2d 426 (W. Va. 1977) 
wherein the West Virginia Supreme Court reco gnized the right of a 
divorced woman with children to change her njame pursuant to the 
state's general name change statute despite the divorce name change 
statute prohibiting her from doing so pursuant to her divorce. 
A whole body of law and legal commentary, some of which has been 
cited, supra, developed over the issue and today every state in 
the country recognizes that married women--afrd divorced women-
have the right to not change their names at marriage or divorce 
and/or to change them while married or at or after divorce irres-
pective of whether they have children in their custody. 
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The names issue turned to the naming of children. In 1970 
only North Carolina and Hawaii had statutes requiring newborn 
marital children to bear the paternal name on their birth 
certificates.Both of these statutes were invalidated as un-
constitutional restraints on parents1 liberty to rear their 
children. Jech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714 (D. Hawaii 1979); 
O'Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. Supp. 494 (E.D.N.C. 1981). See dis-
cussion, infra, respecting the fact that the section of a child's 
surname is a constitutionally protected childrearing right. 
Three other states passed similar laws in the 1970s. In Sydney 
v. Pingree, 564 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. Fla. 1982), Florida's statute 
was invalidated. Louisiana and New Hampshire repealed and revised 
their statutes, New Hampshire adopting as a standard for-resolving 
disputes over newborn's names, the right of the custodial parent 
to select the name. N.H.Rev. Stat. Ann., sec. 126.6-A(I) (a)(1984). 
State courts affirmed that under the common law the State makes 
no requirement as to how minors should be named. In the country's 
most inclusive case on the common law of names--it involved 
married women's names, children's names, divorced women's names, 
etc.--the Massachusetts Supreme Court wrote that the common law 
principle of freedom of choice in the matter of names "extends 
to the name chosen by a married couple for their child." 
Secretary of the Commonwealth v. City Clerk of Lowell, 373 Mass. 
178, 190, 366 N.E. 2d 717, 722(1977). See also Doe v. Dunning, 
87 Wash. 2d 30, 549 P. 2d 1 (1976). 
Attorneys general and state registrars o£ vital statistics 
reaffirmed that parents could name their children as they pleased 
absent an express statute to the contrary. 
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With the right of parents in agreement to name their children 
as they pleased, litigation developed in the area of parental 
disputes over children's names following divjorce. Disputes between 
remarried women seeking to give their older children the surnames 
of their new husbands are well known to the courts. The language 
quoted in cases to the effect that the male |has a "time-honored 
right" or "natural right" or that there is d "preference" for the 
rarelV 
male name, and that a child's name will^be changed over the ob-
jection of the natural father all comes from this kind of traditional 
case: 
1. Woman assumes husband's surname at marriage. 
2. Husband and Wife have children who are given the family name. 
3. Husband and Wife live together in a family unit with the 
children, all using the same last name. 
4. Husband and Wife divorce, Wife gets custody of the children 
and retains the family name along witl^  the children. 
5. Wife remarries and assumes her new husband's surname. 
6. Wife seeks to change the children's names to her new 
marital name. 
7. Ex-Husband objects and courts protect his right to insist 
that the children continue to use his name which they were 
given at birth and have borne all their lives instead of 
permitting the children to adopt the stepfather's name, 
provided that Ex-Husband is not guilty of gross misconduct or 
ftas&bandonned the children to the extent that they could be 
adopted from him. 
Disputes of this kind still occur regularly, but a new kind of 
case has arisen as a result of the new freedom women have in 
realizing their common law right to name themselves and their 
children. Women who have not remarried--or who have remarried 
and not changed their names--have sought to name the children in 
their custody with their names, usually to have the family unit 
share the same name or part of a hyphenated name. 
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Ms. Hamby is representative of this new k|ind of case. The courts 
are beginning to respond to the obvious need for a new way of 
reviewing parental disputes in light of the [Law which has developed 
over the past decade and a half. The women s|ich as Ms. Hamby are 
not seeking to change the names of children to stepfathers' names. 
Further, a growing number are seeking assistance from the courts 
when their children are newborns, infants or very young. Often, 
such as in Ms. Hambyfs case, the children have not lived with their 
biological fathers at all or only for a short time. 
In Jacobs v. Jacobs, 309 N.W. 2d 303 (Minh. 1981) the Minnesota 
Supreme Court articulated a distinction between disputes involving 
older and younger children, drawing on a distinction made in the 
1975 case of Laks v. Laks, 25 Ariz. App. 58, 540 P. 2d 1277 (1975), 
a case which had involved a custodial mother seeking to hyphenate 
her older children's names. In Jacobs, and its companion case, 
In re Saxton, 309 N.W. 2d 298 (Minn. 1981) the court articulated: 
flWe have recognized that neither parent has a superior right 
to determine the initial surname of their child. No preference 
is accorded to either the paternal or maternal surname...When 
one parent seeks to change the surname of a child, the 
other has standing to object and the resolution of the 
dispute hinges on the best interests of the child...Due 
deference is given, however, to the fact the child has 
borne a given surname for an extended period of time.ft p. 302. 
The Court then found against the mother an4 her two children, 
7 and 9 who wished to bear a hyphenated name of both parents, while 
stating that the children's interests would be well served by use 
of either the mother's choice of name--the hyphenated name--or the 
father's insistence on his name. 
A review of the cases decided during the past few years demon-
strates the willingness of courts to decide in favor of custodial 
mothers when the children are newborn or very! young. Indeed, given 
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the virtual impossibility of deciding which frame, as opposed to 
which parent should decide the name, should be given a child who 
is a newborn, an infant, or very young (pre-jcindergarten can be 
used as a cut-off date, or three to five years), the custodial 
parent presumption is becoming the obvious solution to the issue. 
In his scholarly and most practical concurring opinion in the 
case of In re Schiffman,28 Cal. 3d 640, 620 P. 2d 579, 169 Cal. 
Rptr. 918 (1980), California Supreme Court Justice Mosk articulated 
the "custodial parent presumption" whereby courts should expressly 
defer to the judgment of the custodial parent with respect to 
naming children as an incident of childrearijig: 
"The principle that the custodial parent fehould be given the 
choice of a newborn child's surname has been codified by the 
Pennsylvania Legislature. (Pa. Code, tit. 28, sec. 1.7(b) 
(1975). And as one commentator noted, 'since the court 
awards custody on the basis of the child's best interest, 
it can be argued that the custodial parent is acting in the 
child's best interest when he or she changes its. name.1 
(Comment, Surname Alternatives in Pennsylvania (1977) 
82 Dick. L. Rev. 101,115-116). Thus is would seem that a 
parent deemed fit to have custody ordinarily should be 
deemed fit to select a name that accords ydth the child's 
best interest." p. 585. 
Other portions of Justice Mosk's opinion are set forth through-
out this brief. 
Thus, Kathleen Hamby appeals to the Supreme Court of Utah for 
the benefit of this presumption with respect to her decision that 
it is in her two infant children's best interests that they bear 
the same surname that she and the fourth member of her household, 
her eleven year old child, bear. 
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II. The trial court had jurisdiction pursuant to its continuing 
authority over the care, custody and control of children conferred 
by Title 30, Chapter 3 of the Utah Code, to resolve the dispute 
between Kathleen Hamby and Gail Jacobson oveif the naming of the 
two children as part of the divorce action. 
As set forth in the Statement of the Case^ supra, the juris-
dictional issue arose in the trial court during the March, 1985 
hearing. Although the parties had stipulated that the name was 
the only unresolved issue in the divorce, Ms^ Hambyfs former 
attorney questioned the trial court's authority to change the 
name of the child born prior to Ms. Hamby!s Carriage to Mr. Jacob-
son. The District Court handled the matter by asking the parties 
to file applications for changes of name within thirty days of 
the birth of the child expected in April, 19$5. He ordered the 
divorce subject to the names issue being resolved at a later date. 
R.152. 
Utah's name change statute, U.C.A. 42-1-1 to 42-1-3, requires 
that a person seeking a name change be a resident of the county 
for a year prior to filing for the name change. This provision 
would likewise apply to an adult seeking to change the name of 
a minor. Compare In re Fletcher, 486 A. 2d 627 (Ct. 1984) and In 
re Staros, 280 N.W. 2d 409 (Iowa 1979). 
Pursuant to this statute neither parent cc^ uld have sought a 
name change for Kevin, born two days following the divorce, for 
a year. 
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As evidenced by the bountiful caselaw on naming children, the 
overwhelming majority of courts do accept as part of their juris-
diction over the care, custody and control of children, jurisdiction 
to resolve disputes between parents over their children's names. 
See the compilation of cases in Annot., Rights and Remedies of 
Parents Inter Se With Respect To The Names of Their Children, 92 
A.L.R. 3d 1091 (1979); MacDougall, "The Righ-t of Women To Name 
Their Children," Footnote No. 161, p. 135. Centra, Hurta v. Hurta. 
25 Wash. App. 85 95, 605 P. 2d 1278(1978). 
In Jacobs v. Jacobs, 309 N.W. 2d 303 (Minn. 1981), the companion 
case to In re Saxton, 309 N.W. 2d 298 (Minn. 1981) the Minnesota 
Supreme Court, in a case similar the the instant one in the sense 
that it involved an infant born to the parties after their divorce, 
disposed of the jurisdictional issue in an initial footnote: 
"We do not decide at what point a trial court 
loses jurisdiction to change a child's surname through 
modification of a divorce decree. Since the child was not 
provided for in the original decree, the trial court had the 
authority to change the child's name in the context of a 
petition to amend the divorce decree." p. 304. 
Jj> In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640, 620 P. 2d 579, 169 Cal. 
Rptr, 918 (1980) Justice Rose Bird in her concurring opinion ex-
pressed her concerns: 
"I am concerned about the lack of a cleaii jurisdictional 
basis for the trial court's modification of a child's name 
in the course of a dissolution of marriage...I recognize 
that many courts have apparently assumed the existence of 
such jurisdiction in a proceeding to dissolve a marriage," 
p> 586. 
This issue is raised on appeal because of the peculiar posture 
of this case and the statewide ramifications of the Supreme Court's 
determination on it. The parties all submitted to the jurisdiction 
of the court and the trial judge entertained the issue. Utah's 
statutes give trial courts continuing jurisdiction over the "custody 
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of their children and their support,maintenance, and health and 
dental care..." Custody is awarded by a tridl court's considering 
"the best interests of the child and the pa^t conduct and demon-
strated moral standards of each of the parties." U.C.A. 33-3-5; 
33-3-10. Consistent with the recognition by courts across the 
nation that naming is an incident of childrearing, and of the 
decades-long practice of the nation's court^ outside of Ohio until 
very recently, it should be clear that the trial court did have 
jurisdiction to determine the children's names both before and 
after Kevin was born on April 13, 1985. 
An Illinois court summarized the basis of a divorce court's 
jurisdiction over naming children in the regularly cited case of 
Solomon v. Solomon, 5 111. App. 2d 297, 125 N.E. 2d 675 (1955): 
"If the matter of a change of name of a minor child of divorced 
parents is a matter incidental to the custody of the child, 
and we hold that it is, then the court had the jurisdiction 
to entertain the motion and to enter the order involved in 
this appeal." p. 678. 
Solomon contains a good discussion of the issue. In efforts to 
avoid jurisdiction over controversial naming matters, courts could 
easily avoid a genuine, ongoing matter of a ^hild's best interests 
by simply avoiding jurisdiction. 
Because the Supreme Court's decision in this case will impact on 
procedures in trial courts in Utah, the Court is urged to address 
the jurisdictional issue by reaffirming the trial court's jurisdiction 
to determine disputes between custodial and noncustodial parents 
respecting their children's names. 
The distinction between what is a determination of a child's 
name and a change of the same becomes blurred when newborn, infant 
of very young children are involved. Divorce courts are courts of 
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equity. "Child custody proceedings are an4 should be equitable 
in the highest degree,ft Rice v. Rice, 564 P.[ 2d 305,306(Utah 1977). 
The trial courts of Utah clearly have jurisdiction to determine 
children's names in disputes between parent^ over the initial 
naming of children or changing their names When they are older. 
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III. The selection of newborn, infant or veijy young children's 
surnames is a constitutionally protected ch^ldrearing decision 
which properly rests with the parent(s) entrusted with the care, 
custody and control of the child(ren) pursuafnt to an award of 
custody on the basis of the children's best interests. 
At the same time that women were seeing ijecognition of their 
right to name themselves and participate in the naming of their 
marital children, men were seeing their right to be awarded 
custody recognized by states across the natijon. The "tender years 
presumption" has been abolished as a means for determining 
custody. See Freed and Foster, "Divorce in the Fifty States: An 
Overview," 18 Fam. L. Q. 369 (1985): 
"In custody law, the 'tender years' doctijine has lost ground 
and is rejected or relegated to a role of 'tiebreaker' in 
most states. Moreover, an increase is observable in a number 
of awards of joint custody (for the most part where parents 
have so provided by agreement), and also |in the number of 
custody awards to a father." pp. 434-435. 
In Utah, the tender years doctrine was specifically repealed 
by an amendment to U.C.A. 30-3-13 in 1977. ithe Supreme Court of 
Utah has several times articulated that children should be entrusted 
to a parent's custody pursuant to the children's best interests 
and not the parent's sex. Nilson v. Nilson, 652 P. 2d 1323 (Utah 1982); 
Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 599 P. 2d 510 (Utah 1979). As The Supreme 
Court wrote in 1978, in Bingham and Bingham, 575 P. 2d 703 (Utah 1978): 
"under the modern trend of social thinking away from former 
fixed rigidities, toward equality of the sexes and greater 
flexibility in considering the qualificat 
on an individual basis, that presumption 
the higher rule that the paramount concern in such cases is 
the best interest and welfare of the chil 
ions of the parents 
is subordinate to 
d." at 704. 
In Nilson, supra, the Supreme Court, citing Lembach v. Cox, 639 
P. 2d 197 (Utah 1981) with approval, stated that: 
"According to the rule as explained in Lembach, however, 
a judicial preference for the mother coulld become operative 
only if the evidence was that all other things were 
equal between the parents." at 1324. 
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Once the decision has been made as to wh^ ich parent shall have 
custody of children of a marriage, the custodial parent assumes 
full responsibility for the care, custody and control of the 
children in all aspects of their lives, including what they eat, 
where they go to school, what religion they will be reared in if 
any, etc. subject to the control of the court if a modification 
of custody is sought due to changed circumstances, or abuse or 
neglect. While joint custody does not seem to be prohibited in 
Utah, the statutes do not expressly provide for it. 
Ms. Hamby was awarded sole custody of th^ children she bore 
prior to and subsequent to her marriage to tail Jacobson and is 
entrusted with determining their upbringing!pursuant to their best 
interests. 
A. The selection of a child's name is a Constitutionally 
protected childrearing decision. 
In awarding custody to the parent who wi^l act in the best 
interests of the child(ren) courts entrust i:\ie custodial parent 
with the rights of childrearing which have been protected by 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution by the Supreme Court of the United States. 
Santosky v. Kramer, 466 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct} 1388 (1982); Wisconsin 
v, Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (197^); Smith v. Organization 
of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 97 S. Ct. 2094 (1977); Piere§ v. 
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct.571 (1925); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625 (1923); Prince v. Massachusetts 
321 U.S. 159, 64 S. Ct. 438 (1944); Dike v. School Board of Orange 
County, 650 F. 2d 783 (5th Cir. 1981). 
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In Wisconsin v. YnrW the U.S. Supreme C<|mrt upheld the 
right of parents to raise their children in accordance with their 
(Amish) religious beliefs, stating that parents' primary 
authority over their children's upbringing is "established beyond 
debate as an enduring American tradition." in Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters the Court relied on the Fourteenth Amendment as 
guaranteeing the liberty of parents to educate their children in 
private schools and striking down a statute requiring public 
school attendance. In Meyer v. Nebraska the Court upheld the 
liberty right of parents to have their children taught foreign 
languages in face of a statute prohibiting tjhe teaching of any-
thing but English to school children. The Court said that the 
parental role in directing their children's {upbringing was 
"essential." 
The Supreme Court of Utah has just as strjongly affirmed the 
primary right of parents to rear their children absent abuse or 
neglect which would call the State into the situation pursuant 
I 
to U.C.A. 78-3a-48. In re Castillo, 632 P. 2Id 855 (Utah 1981); 
State in re Walter B., 577 P. 2d 119 (Utah l|978). In In re J.P., 
648 P. 2d 1364 (Utah 198 ), citing the above cases and others of 
i 
the U.S. Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Utah referred to 
Article I, sections 2, 25 and 27, as a basis for the liberty right 
of parents to rear their children under Utahfs Constitution, and 
with language as strong as that of the U.S. Supreme Court, stated 
inter alia: 
"The integrity of the family and the parents' inherent 
right and authority to rear their own children have been 
recognized as fundamental axioms of Ango-jjumerican culture, 
presupposed by all our social, political, and legal in-
stitutions. . .this Court has stated that the parent's right, 
as well as duty, to care for a child 'maylbe termed 
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natural, as well as legal and more.' ^ ill v. Brown, 31 Utah 
473, 483, 88 P. 2609, 613(1907)." at| 1373. 
Naming one's children has long been recognized as a primary 
childrearing function which has in recent y^ars been recognized 
as a liberty right protected by the due proqess clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitutiqn by several federal 
district courts. 
The Attorney General of Connecticut articlulated this child-
rearing right in 1975: 
"The natural parents, or parent, as the c ase may be, 
have legal responsibility for the childreh which may be 
terminated only after certain procedures and findings are 
followed and made...Until such time, the parents have 
their prerogatives as well as the respons 
which devolve upon them. One of the prero 
the child.ff Op. Atty. Gen. Conn. 5 (Jan. 
abilities and duties 
gatives is naming 
f>3, 1975). 
See also L.A.M. v. State, 547 P. 2d 827, 832 (Alaska 1976); Parks 
v. Francis Administrator, 50 Vt. 626 (1878); D'Ambrosio v. Rizzo, 
81 Mass. App. 1539, 425 N.E. 2d 369 (1981); jiosmer v. Hosmer, 
611 S.W. 2d 32 (Ma. App. 1981); Gardner v. D^nison, 217 Mass. 492, 
105 N.E. 359 (1914); Eaton v. Libby, 165 Mas|>. 218, 42 N.E. 1127 
(1896) for illustration of judicial recognition of naming as a 
childrearing function. 
As the Massachusetts Supreme Court stated in Secretary of the 
Commonwealth v. City Clerk of Lowell, 373 Ma^s. 178, 366 N.E. 2d 
717 (1977): 
ff[T]he common principle of freedom of choice in the matter 
of names extends to the name chosen by a parried couple for 
their child." at 725. 
And, citing the U.S. Supreme Court precedent cited above, 
the Massachusetts Court stated that: 
"Parents' claim to authority in their own [household to 
direct the rearing of their children is basic to the structure 
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of society; the custody, care and nurturle of the child 
reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom 
include preparation for obligations the State can neither 
supply nor hinder...There has unquestionably been a wide-
spread custom in this country to give a child the surname of 
its father...Consistently with what we have said above, we 
think this has been a matter of parental choice rather 
than a matter of law. We once assumed that 'the right to name 
a child belongs to its parents, and ultimately to its 
father." at 723,725. 
Several recent cases have specifically railed on the issue of 
parents1 right to name their children. In J^ch v. Burch, 466 F. 
Supp. 714 (D. Hawaii 1979) the federal district court Stated that 
parents have a ffcommon law right to give thteir child any name 
they wish, and that the Fourteenth Amendment protects this right 
from arbitrary state action." In a case involving a couple wanting 
to fuse their surnames, Jech and Befurt, to give their child the 
surname "Jebef," the court characterized th^ naming of one's child 
as one of the "blessings of liberty" under ^he U.S. Constitution. 
466 F. Supp. 714, 719 (1979). 
The Hawaiian court invalidated the state statute requiring a 
marital child to bear its father's name. Following the decision 
the Legislature amended the statute. 
In a similar case in North Carolina, in 6'Brien v. Tilson, 
523 F. Supp. 494 (E.D.N.C. 1981), a federal district court invalidated 
to be given their 
s. The case involved 
name their son in the 
the state statute requiring marital children 
fathers' surnames on their birth certificates 
three married couples. One couple wished to 
Swedish tradition, by combining the father's) first name, Arne, 
with the suffix "son" to create "Arneson." Tlhe two <£her couples 
wanted to give their child a hyphenated combination of both parents' 
names, one in accordance with Spanish traditlion and the other as 
an expression of the equality between the sexes, 
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The North Carolina court found that the stlatute f,impinge [d] 
upon decisions affecting family life, procreation, and childrearing; 
areas of human experience which the Supreme nnUrt has long held 
must be accorded special protection." 523 F. Supp. at 496. 
And in Sydney v, Pingree, 564 F. Supp. 41^ (S.D.Fla. 1982) 
a Florida federal district court followed Jecjh and O'Brien in 
striking down a similar statute as an unconstitutional intrusion 
on the parents1 "constitutionally protected ifight to choose the 
name of their child." 
See also Doe v. Hancock County Board of Health, 436 N.E. 2d 791 
(Ind. 1982) (Hunter, J. dissenting). 
That selection of children's names is a parental, childrearing 
right is self apparent. When parents separate, when they disagree 
over their children's names after separation or divorce, the 
courts get involved. By awarding the care, custody and control of 
a child to the custodial parent--the same caire, custody and 
control which is constitutionally protected--^courts entrust the 
parent with the educational, psychological and religious upbringing 
of the child. This includes deciding what nai^ ies are in the child(ren)'s 
best interests. 
B. In a dispute between a custodial and noncustodial parent 
over the naming of newborn or very young children, the 
custodial parent's decision should be rebuttably presumed 
valid as being in the best interests of the children 
consistent with the concurring opinion of Justice Mosk 
in In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640, 62(^  P. 2d 579, 169 
Cal. Rptr. 918 (1980). 
If the father of a marital child in the mother's custody does 
not object to the child's bearing a name oth^r than his, the 
casemav **at reach a court. The law protects both parents as 
against the State from intrusion into their Tight to name their 
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children as they please. In practice, a great many parental 
disputes get settled as part of a divorce settlement. In practice, 
also, many women are asked to forfeit child s|upport in exchange 
for the fathers not hassling them about the |name theyselect 
for the children. 
The courts lack a guiding principle by which to decide the 
cases beyond the general "best interests of the child" recitation. 
Justice Mosk, in his concurring opinion in the 1980 California 
Supreme Court case of In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d ,640, 620 P. 
2d 579, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1980), a case involving a child born 
to the custodial mother during the pendency c)f divorce proceedings, 
articulated a presumption in favor of the custodial parent con-
sistent with that parent's responsibility of the care, custody 
and control of the child: 
"Since the law has long recognized the ability and right 
of the parent with custody to choose among the innumerable 
alternative courses involving the child'sjwelfare, I can 
see no rational reason to deny that parent a similar 
right to select the name with which the cljiild will be 
more comfortable. 
Thus I would recognize a presumption that I the parent with 
custody--whether custody was assumed without conflict, by 
agreement or by court order--has acted in the child's best 
interest in sel ecting the name. The selection may be the 
original name, or a name change for a child of tender 
years. The presumption, however, would be rebuttable. Just 
as the noncustodial parent can seek a corrective cour order 
if the child's health, education or control are deleterously 
affected by the abuse of custodial care, so the selection 
of name can be contested on the ground that it is not in 
the child's best interest. The burden, however, would be on 
the noncustodial parent to establish the intrusion on the 
child's best interest." at 584. 
Justice Mosk's opinion has been accepted favorably by law 
review commentary. See Foggan, "Parents' Selection of Children's 
Surname," 51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 583 (1983); Comment, "No 
Judicial Dyslexia: The Custodial Parent Presumption Distinguishes 
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The Paternal From The Parental Right To Name A Child/1 58 
N.D.L. Rev. 793 (1982). The early law review article written in 
the state of Utah, Note, "The Controversy Ov)er Children's Surnames: 
Familiarl Autonomy, Equal Protection and thd Child's Best 
Interests," 1979 Utah L. Rev.303, suggested the presumption as 
a possible means of resolving disputes, but did not thoroughly 
consider it. It was suggested in Comment, "Surname Alternatives 
in Pennsylvania," 82 Dick. L. Rev. 101 (197^). 
As more and more men receive custody and the courts continue 
to acknowledgment women's rights in the are?* of naming their 
children, the custodial parent presumption Will most likely become 
recognized as the logical means for resolving disputes generally. 
The Utah Supreme Court, however, does not n^ed to, in this case, 
adopt a custodial parent presumption as a m^ans of resolving all 
disputes between parents over naming their children. There is a 
vast difference between changing the name o$ an older who has used 
its noncustodial parent's name since birth ^nd determining the 
name for a child during the first few years of its life. 
The legislaturesof two states have expressly adopted the 
custodial parent presumption statutorily as a means of recording 
births when parents are in disagreement. Similar proposals have 
been introducted in Kentucky and Florida. NJH. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
sec. 126-6-A(I)(a)(1984) reads that "The choice of surname rests 
with the parent who has actual custody following birth"). See 
to same effect, sec. 69. 14(1)(f)(1)B), Wis^ Stat. 
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A published regulation in Pennsylvania , is Pa. Admin. Code, 
sec. 1.7(b) reads that "If the parents are divorced or separated 
at the time of the child's birth, the choice of surname rests with 
the parent who has custody of the newborn children" and has been in 
effect since 1975. It was interpreted in the recent case of In re 
Schidlmeier by Koslof, 496 A. 2d 1249 (Pa. Sliper. 1985). The non-
custodial father attempted to change the namfe of the child who 
was born following the parents' separation when the mother had 
custody. The child was then 18 months. 
The administrative regulation was upheld as a valid record 
keeping measure. Although the Superior Court would not articulate 
the presumption as a standard for resolving all postbirth dis-
putes over children's surnames, it held that the father had the 
burden of "coming forward with evidence that the name change he 
requested would be in Jessica's best interest." at 1254. 
The Pennsylvania court essentially turned around the burden 
of proof usually imposed on women who seek tb change older children's 
names. Given that a sex neutral method of fi|rst naming the child 
was operative, the court did not need to reinforce the presumption 
by stating it. The change in the burden of ptroof accomplished the 
same thing. 
In Utah the State Bureau of Health Statistics of the Department 
of Health has not yet adopted a provision fotr registering births 
in cases where the parents are in disagreement. Its Guidelines 
for Reporting Name of Father and Surname of Child on the Birth 
Certificate( revised October 5, 1981) do expressly recognize that 
marital children do not need to bear their fathers' surnames, but 
the Guidelines leave to the courts the determination of the 
"Best interests of the child." 
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In determining the ,fbest interests of the child" the Court 
should employ the custodial parent presumption. Different people 
could debate for hours, days, weeks and months about what name 
a child should have. Reasonable people could/will differ. The 
choice, to be reviewed by the courts by putting the burden of 
proof on the noncustodial parent to rebut itb belongs to the parent 
entrusted with the care, custody, control and upbringing of the 
child(ren). 
Not only is the custodial parent presumption consistent with 
sound public policy to eliminate discrimination on the basis of 
gender, it is sound because it will discourage attempts of non-
custodial parents to disrupt the award of custody by seeking modif-
ications of divorce decrees to change child support obligations 
and children's names. 
Most importantly, the custodial parent presumption is founded 
on the premise that the child's best interests will be served by 
entrusting the naming function to the parent whom the court has 
determined is best suited to act in the chilld's best interests. 
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IV. The trial court should be reversed because its findings of 
fact and conclusions of law (Ruling and Ordet) are contrary to 
the evidence, assume facts not in evidence, and reflect a pre-
sumption for the paternal name and a superiot right of men over 
women to name marital children irrespective of who is entrusted 
with the care, custody and control of the children, in violation 
of the Constitutions of the United States andl Utah and Utah's 
statutory scheme to guarantee equal rights to women in all as-
pects of private and public life. 
A. The trial court's reasons are erroneous in fact and law. 
The trial court, in its effort to find anV and all rationale 
by which to justify letting the father impos^ the paternal name 
on the children, made several errors of fact and law. 
First, the court erroneously presumed that upon marriage a 
woman's name authormatically becomes that of her husband as a 
matter of law in reasoning that MWere plaintiff to remarry Kevin 
and Kelly would again have a surname other than that of at least 
one of their custodial parentsV There is no evidence in the trial 
record that Ms. Hamby would change her name again. Indeed, she 
has told the Supreme Court,in her affidavit to change to the title 
of the action, that she never intends to change her name again. 
The law is clear that a woman is not required to assume her hus-
band's surname as a matter of law. See Halsbury's Laws of England, 
supra, and State v. Taylor, 415 So. 2d 1043 (Ala. 1982) and cases, 
laws and attorney general opinions cited in MacDougall, "The Right 
of Women To Name Their Children/1 included in the Addendum, Footnote 
9. 
Second, the trial court erroneously presumed that a child's 
bearing a surname which differs from that of its father if another 
child bears the father's name implies illegitimacy as a matter of 
fact or law. 
Several courts have ruled that a name does not imply birth 
status. See Doe v. Dunning, 87 Wash. 2d 50, 549 P. 2d 1 (1976). 
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MacDougall, supra, pp. 152-154. The statement of the judge makes 
no more sense than were he to apply the same standard to Ms. Hamby, 
that one or more of her children,by the same father or not, were 
born out of marriage. Besides using an impermissible criteria—birth 
status — for determining a child's name (see (^ 'Brien v. Tilson, 
523 F. Supp. 494 (E.D.N.C. 1981); Doe v. Hancock County Board of 
Health, 436 N.E. 2d 791 (Ind. 1982), the law permits couples to 
name their children as they fit, even with different last names. 
As but one example of this admittedly not coijimon practice is the 
couple in New Hampshire who named one child,tyorn in California,with 
one hyphenated name and the other one, born in New Hampshire, with 
an entirely different hyphenated name. See MacDougall, supra, Footnote 
109. 
Third, the trial court erroneously concluded that the children 
should bear Ms. Hamby!s ex-husband's surname because the name Ms. 
Hamby has determined is best for her childrep, Hamby, "is not the 
mother's maiden name." 
Hamby is Kathleen Hambyfs surname. It is her name irrespective of 
where she originally acquired it. She has bopi it for years except 
for the period of less than a year when she ysed the surname Jacobson. 
The issue in this case is what is best for t}ie children. Children 
are not cattle, to be branded by an owner's |iame. 
Fourth, the trial court erroneously concluded that because 
"the children are too young to be accustomed to the surname Hamby" 
it is a reason to defer to Ms. Hamby's ex-hu^band's desire that 
the children bear his surname. 
As discussed, supra, the deference to the] name longer used as 
a criteria for deciding what name a child shbuld use arose in the 
Saxton and Jacobs cases. The rationale was that if a child has born a 
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by the name Hamby which 
paternal name for a long while, that the narte should be deferred 
to. if the children are newborn, as in Jacobs, then the same 
criteria would not operate to entrench the paternal naming custom 
in the law. The trial court misused the standard. The same reasoning 
would apply to the fact that the children aite too young to be 
accustomed to Mr. Jacobson's name, or any other name. 
Fifth, the trial court erroneously found, despite any evidence 
remotely to such effect, that if the childrdn bear their father's 
name at this time that they "will always be identified with at 
least one natural parent by being known by the surname Jacobson." 
Mr. Jacobson might himself change his name sometime. Another court 
may determine that the children are better off with a name other 
than Jacobson. There is absolutely no evidenjce of record that the 
children are not identified to their mother 
she and the household uses. 
Sixth, there is absolutely no evidence in| the record of this 
case to support the trial court's conclusion that "The father-child 
relationship will be strengthened by the children bearing the name 
Jacobson while not harming the mother-child Relationship." This kind 
of language derives from the cases involving older children whose 
mothers seek to change their names to stepfathers' names. As a 
judicial presumption it is ridiculous. As a factual determination, 
it has no basis in the record. 
Seventh, the trial court erroneously found, contrary to the 
clear and uncontradicted evidence in the record, and without any 
explanation, that "there is no embarrassment of inconvenience 
associated with an explanation of why their pother's surname is 
different since divorce is a common occurrencieV Ms. Hamby testified 
about her own experience in this regard. 
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Eighth, the trial court erroneously found, contrary to the 
clear and uncontradicted evidence in the recolrd, and without any 
explanation, that "there is no embarrassment because of defendant's 
alleged bad reputation." To the contrary, the|re is no evidence 
that there is not embarrassment. 
Further, the court ignored Ms. Hamby's testimony that the father 
had not even visited the newborn child at the time of the hearing. 
The trial court in this case went all out Ito justify in some 
way a finding for the father. He put the burdlen of proving why the 
father's name should not be imposed on the children on the mother. 
His predecessor had (incorrectly) ordered tha|t the child born after 
the divorce bear the paternal name as a matter of common law. Ms. 
Hamby was required to rebut this erroneous statement of the 
common law and the law of Utah and every cour|t which has dealt with 
the issue: at birth neither parent has a superior right to name a 
child because of his/her gender and the operating rule of the Utah 
Department of Health that a newborn does not Jiave to bear the paternal 
name. See Jacobs v. Jacobs, Laks v. Laks, Cohjee v. Cohee,2!0 Neb. 855, 
317 N.W. 2d 381 (1962). 
By imposing the paternal name on the marit|al children in this 
case contrary to the judgment of the children's custodial parent, 
the trial court impermissibly discriminated against Ms. Hamby on 
the basis of sex in violation of Article I, sections 1,2,7, and 
27, and Utah's statutory scheme to guarantee (equal rights to women. 
U.C.A. 30-5-2 guarantees that men can procur (divorces on the same 
basis as men. U.C.A. 30-3-10 provides for either parent to receive 
custody. Discrimination in employment is prohibited. U.C.A. 34-35-6. 
The Legislature has established a Governor's (Commission on the 
Status of Women to address the concerns of wo^nen.U.C.A. 63-47-1 
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to 63-47-5. 
The United States Supreme Court, in a long line of cases 
beginning with Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 70, 92 S. Ct. 251 (1971) 
has made it clear that classifications based pn sex cannot 
withstand constitutional scrutiny if they reflect "the traditional 
baggage of sexual stereotypes." Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 99 S. Ct. 
1102 (1979). A requirement that marital children bear the paternal 
name or the name of the fahter's choice, creates an impermissible 
classification on the basis of sex contrary to the standard set 
forth by United States Supreme Court precedent: in order for a 
gender-based discrimination to be valid it must serve important 
governmental objectives and the means employed must be substantially 
related to the achievement of such objectives!. See Craig v. Boren, 
429 U.S. 190, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 
7, 95 S. Ct. 1373 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 
93 S. Ct. 1764(1973); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 101 S. 
Ct. 1195 (1981); Mississippi University For Women v. Hogan,458 
U.S. 718 (1982). 
If a trial court decision such as the instant one is allowed to 
stand, it will be a clear message to women in Utah that they do not 




For the reasons stated herein the Appellant Kathleen Hamby 
asks that the Order and Ruling of the Fourth Judicial District 
Court be reversed and her two children fathered by her ex-husband 
be given her surname, Hamby. The Appellant also requests that in 
its Order to such effect,the Supreme Court ofl Utah give clear 
direction to trial courts of the state for a [method for resolving 
disputes between custodial and noncustodial parents of newborn, 
infant or very young children consistent with the custodial parent's 
authority to direct the upbringing of children in accordance with 
their best interests. 
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RICHARD M. TAYLOR 3207 
TAYLOR & TAYLOR 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
a r t MONTH MAIN amurr 
••. o. aox saa 
SPANISH rORK. UTAH B46tO-02SB 
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Attorney, for
 D e f e n d a n t 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KATHLEEN JACOBSON, 
AND THE STATE OF UTAH 
by and through Utah State 





Defendant. Civil No. 67,957 
This matter came on for hearing October 24, 1985 before 
the Honorable Ray M. Harding upon plaintiff's petition to change 
the surname of Kevin Jacobson to Kevin Haniby and upon defendant's 
petition to change the surname of Kelly Hamby to Kelly Jacobson. 
The Court heard profers of testimony from plaintiff and 
defendant and counsel for the parties stipulated that the Court 
may consider the petitions before it upon such profers and upon 
memoranda to be filed. The parties filed the memoranda and the 
Court having considered the same it is therefore 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 




























continue to bear the surname of defendant Gail Jacobson. 
2. Kelly Hamby born June 14, 1983 shall bear the 
surname of Jacobson and shall be knovm as Kelly Jacobson. 
DATED this y f f ^ d a y of /%gft^£-^ I 1986. 
BY THEjCe«RT: 
CERTIFICATE &F MAILING 
I hereby certify I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to Mr. Donald E. Elkins, Attorney at Law, 60 East 
100 South No. 200, Provo, UT 84601, postage prepaid on the 28th 




IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 








Ca£e Number 67957 
RULING 
******** 
Having considered the memoranda a^ id argument of the 
parties, and having taken the matter under pdvisement, the court 
hereby grants defendant's petition and denies plaintiff's 
petition. The court finds that it is in thfe best interest of the 
parties minor children, Kelly Lynn & Kevin p., to be known by the 
surname Jacobson. 
The court bases this ruling on thb following reasons: 
1) the father-child relationship will be strengthened by the 
children bearing the name Jacobson while not harming the mother-
child relationship, 2) there is no embarrassment or inconvenience 
associated with an explanation of why their mother's surname is 
different since divorce is a common occurrence, 3) the children 
are too young to be accustomed to the surname Hamby, 4) Hamby is 
not the mother's maiden name, 5) there is np embarrassment 
because of defendant's alleged bad reputation, and 6) the 
children will always be identified with at least one natural 
parent by being known as Jacobson. 
A-3 
The court finds unpersuasive plalintiff's arguments that 
it would be beneficial for Kevin and Kellyl to be known by Hamby 
as their mother and stepsister are. Were Custody to change, 
Kevin and Kelly would be faced with the saime situation plaintiff 
now seeks to avoid. Furthermore, were plalintiff to remarry Kevin 
and Kelly would again have a surname other than that of at least 
one of their custodial parents. Of paramdunt concern to the 
court is the fact that Kevin and Kelly should both bear the same 
name to avoid any implications of illegitimacy which might arise 
if asked why brothers of the same natural father have different 
last names. 
Finally, the court notes that tHe law provides that the 
children may petition for a name change if they so desire when 
they are old enough to make an intelligent decision. 
Defendant's counsel to prepare an appropriate order. 
DATED this j^/^day of F$ 
JUDGE ^ t ^ 
cc: Richard M. Taylor T x 
Donald E. Elkins 
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KATHLEEN JACOBSON, Plaintiff 
Appearing Pro Se 
Box 188 
Goshen, Utah 84663 
Telephone (801) 667-9966 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRCIT COURT o!F UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
KATHLEEN JACOBSON, and the State ) 
of Utah, by and through Utah State ) 
Dept. of Social Services, )
 N 0 T 1 C E Q F A p p E A L 
Plaintiffs, ) 
-vs- ) 
GAIL JACOBSON, ) 
) Civijl No. 67,957 
Defendants. ) 
Plaintiff KATHLEEN JACOBSON, appearing prb se, hereby gives 
notice to all concerned parties that she will kppeal that ORDER 
entered herein on March 10, 1986 in the office of the Clerk of 
the above-entitled Court which said ORDER determined the surnames 
by which the minor children of the plaintiff KATHLEEN JACOBSON and 
the defendant GAIL JACOBSON shall be legally k^iown. Such appeal 
is to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
DATED this 7th day of April, 1986. 
KATHLEEN JACOBSON, plaintiff 
Appearing Pro Se 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true copy of the foregoing, 
postage prepaid, U.S. Mail, to counsel for the defendant, RICHARD 
M. TAYLOR, at P. 0. Box 288, Spanish Fork, Ut.|84660-0288 on the 
7th day of April, 1986. 
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The Right of Women to Name Tfyjir Children 
Priscilla Ruth MacDougal] 
I. Introduction 
Over the past decade important strides have been made to-
ward recognizing the right of women to name their children. 
However, relentless resistance to giving up tne virtually irrebut-
table male prerogative to name marital children1 promises to 
make achievement of the right of women to najne children a major 
feminist struggle for the next decade. 
Women's growing demand to share the l|)asic right to name 
children follows logically from women's successful assertion of 
their right to name themselves. In Doe v. Dunning, the country's 
first major case involving women's rights to name their children, 
the Washington Supreme Court acknowledged this in 1976 stating 
that "[a]s more women exercise their right to retain their own sur-
name after marriage, the likelihood that children will be given a 
surname other than the paternal surname increases."2 
The right of married and divorced women to choose whether 
or not they will use the surnames of their spouses or ex-spouses 
arose to the fore as a feminist issue with the erroneously litigated 
case of Forbush v. Wallace in 1972.3 In Forbitsn, the United States 
Supreme Court summarily affirmed an Alabama federal district 
court's determination that a conceded common law requirement, 
1. In referring to children, the terms marital childrenl nonmarital children, or 
children born to married or unmarried parents are generally used. The old com-
mon law appellation for a nonmarital child, "bastard," has all but passed out of par-
lance; the term "out of wedlock" likewise is giving way; the terms "legitimate" and 
"legitimacy," and "illegitimate" and "illegitimacy" denote good or base societal sta-
tus as determined by fathers. The rights of parents in naming their children in re-
lation to the state and each other still relate directly to their status as married or 
unmarried, and to the birth status of their children as modified or not by state stan-
dards for legitimation or determination of paternity. Therefore, this article uses 
terms denoting the birth status of children. A nonmarital child is one born to par-
ents who were not married to each other from the time of conception to birth. A 
marital child is one born to parents who were married at the time of birth or 
conception. 
2. Doe v. Dunning, 87 Wash. 2d 50, 53, 549 P.2d 1, 3 (1976). "An erosion of the 
traditional system of adopting the husband's surname as the single and sole sur-
name for each member of the family unit is apparent and in practice and has been 
recognized by the case law of many jurisdictions." Rice y. Department of Health 
and Rehabil. Services, on remand No. 80-1674 Order and Findings of Fact of Div. of 
Administrative Hearings, Dec. 31, 1980 at 7-8. Final order entered Jan. 13, 1981, on 
remand from 386 So. 2d 844 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). 
3. 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), affd per curiaml 405 U.S. 970 (1972). 
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that by operation of law a woman adopts tier husband's surname 
as her "legal name," was constitutional. 1rhe so-called common 
law requirement accepted by the litigants w^s not, however, an ac-
curate statement of the common law. The case brought the issue 
to the attention of the country. 
In the wake of the widely publicized forbush decision, wo-
men encountered difficulties using their owrj surnames throughout 
the country. Lawsuits arose everywhere4 knd women organized 
around the issue of a woman's right to control her own name.5 
4. Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 266 k d . 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1973) 
arose immediately and served to guide the long line of well-litigated and successful 
cases reaffirming the common law right of a woman not to change her name be-
cause of marriage. See Priscilla Ruth MacDougall,Married Women's Common Law 
Right To their own Surnames, 1 Women's Rts. L. Reri., Fall/Winter 1972-73, at 2. 
Women brought petitions for name changes in trial courts across the nation. 
Within a year, the appeal in Kruzel v. Podell, 67 Wis. 2^ 138, 226 N.W.2d 458 (1975), 
which became the pivotal case on the issue, was filed iri Wisconsin. 
5. The Center for a Woman's Own Name developed in 1973 as a result of the 
appeal in Kruzel. Organized and directed by the writer and Terri P. Tepper, be-
tween 1973 and 1976, it took a national lead with the American Civil Liberties 
Union during such time in advocating the recognition [of women's rights to name 
themselves and their children. The Center published and distributed the basic 
guide to the names issue, Booklet For Women Who Wish To Determine Their Own 
Names After Marriage (1974). 
In 1974, while Kruzel was on appeal, the Olympia ^rown League was organized 
by Suzan Hester, Fran Kaplan, Anne Brouwer and others to aid Milwaukee women 
directly affected by the lower court's ruling. The League, which developed a mem-
bership numbering over 200, joined the case as amiqus curiae. The group was 
named after the country's first female ordained minister, from Racine, Wisconsin, 
who retained her own name in 1873 when she married John Henry Willis. See, e.g., 
Kathy Harney Wins, Newsletter of the Olympia Brown League, April, 1975. 
In 1972, Massachusetts women founded Name-Change in the wake of Forbush 
and litigation in Massachusetts over women's right to use their names for voting. 
The group distributed a "Fact Sheet For Women Who Wish To Retain Their Own 
Name After Marriage" and promoted the right of women to determine their own 
names in that state. Letter from Diana Altman, organizer of the group, to writer 
(January 23, 1973). 
In 1973, Michigan women organized the Committee To Encourage Richard H. 
Austin To Give Michigan Women Their Middle Names For The Holidays (CERHA) 
with Attorney Jean L. King, and led a humorous and successful campaign support-
ing the right of women to obtain drivers' licenses using their birth names as middle 
names. The campaign demanded such right on every holiday from Valentine's Day 
to Christmas. See Booklet for Women Who Wish to Determine Their Own Names 
After Marriage 23 (1974). 
In California, the Name Choice Center distributed 
the issue with the Attorney General and the Legislature! 
list of over 15,000 by 1974. Letters from the group's organizer, Pat Montandon, to 
writer (March 25, 1974 and May 13, 1974) and to Wall iptreet Journal reporter Jo-
anne Lublin (September 9, 1984). 
The Women's Legal Defense Fund in Washington, D.C. established a commit-
tee on names which published and distributed a booklet bn women's names for D.C. 
area residents. The NOW Legal Defense and Educatiori Fund participated as ami-
cus in Kruzel. Governors' commissions on the status of Women supported the right 
of married women to have their first names listed in telephone directories. Special 
a fact sheet and promoted 
The Center had a mailing 
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The cause was not new. During the early part of the century wo-
men had organized around it as the Lucy Stone League, named for 
Lucy Stone, the nineteenth century abolitionist knd feminist 
leader who did not change her name when she married Henry B. 
Blackwell in 1855.6 The League, however, expressly decided not to 
take on the issue of women's rights in naming children.7 
In 1982 the Alabama Supreme Court repudiated the Forbush 
case as not accurately representing the common law br the law of 
Alabama.8 The decision thus capped a body of law developed dur-
NOW task forces dealt with the name issue, and law student, legal services, and 
other organizations participated in litigation. The subject became| a popular topic 
for law review articles. See infra note 9. The National Conference on Women and 
the Law began offering workshops on women's naming rights in l|)76. 
Where the term "own" name is used in this article it refers to the chosen name 
of the woman, regardless of the origin of the name. As written in Center For A 
Woman's Own Name 1975 Supplement To Booklet For Women Who Wish To De-
termine Their Own Names After Marriage 6 (1975): 
It is the position of the Center For A Woman's Own Name that the 
name(s) a woman chooses to use is her own name. It may be the name 
given her at birth, a name assumed during childhood, assumed at mar-
riage, assumed at a previous marriage, a hyphenated name <>r a name 
made up by herself at any time. 
During this period of feminist activity over the issue in the mid 1970s, Ellen 
Goodman commented 
I guarantee you that the first generation of women who grow up with-
out scribbling "Mrs. Paul Newman" all over their notebooks "just to 
see what it looks like" is going to think we were mad. It is & very odd 
and radical idea indeed that a woman would nominally disappear just 
because she got married. 
The Name of the Game, Boston Globe, Sept. 24, 1974. 
6. Under the primary leadership of Ruth Hale and Jane Grant, the Lucy Stone 
League and the National Woman's Party litigated the right of married women to 
use their own surnames with the few state and federal agencies people had to con-
tend with in those days. This included the passport office, which since that time 
has recognized the right of married women to be issued passports in their own sur-
names. See Ruth Hale, The First Five Years of the Lucy Stone League (1926); 
Note, Names—Married Women—Right to Retain Maiden Names, 73 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
110 (1924). The right was codified in the first Code of Federal Regulations in 1938. 
22 C.F.R. § 51.20 (1938). The Lucy Stone League still exists in Nejv York City. 
7. Hale, supra note 6. Lucy Stone and Henry Blackwell na^ned their distin-
guished daughter Alice Stone Blackwell. See Elinor Rice Hays, Liicy Stone: One of 
America's First and Greatest Feminists (1961); Alice Stone Blackwell, Lucy Stone: 
Pioneer of Woman's Rights (1930). The Lucy Stoners likewise frequently gave 
their children the surname of the mother as a middle name. For example, Ruth 
Hale and her husband Heywood Broun named their sports commentator son Hey-
wood Hale Broun. 
8. State v. Taylor, 415 So. 2d 1043 (Ala. 1982). The Department of Public 
Safety, however, only conceded in 1984, in the face of litigation, th^ right of an indi-
vidual married woman to a driver's license in "the name of her choice." Letter 
from Ray Acton, department attorney, Alabama Department of public Litigation, 
to Daniel L. McCleave, co-counsel in State v. Taylor (Nov. 1, 1984). Litigation to 
make the Department change its general policy and to apply this concession to all 
married women in Alabama has been commenced in a federal class action. Wendy 
A. Rockwell v. Prescott, Case No. 85-0875-XS (filed July 12, 1985, U.S. D.C. S.D. 
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ing the 1970s recognizing the right of women to choose their own 
names.9 Until a married or divorced woman's legal right to name 
Ala.). It is incredible that the Department refuses to acknowledge the ruling of Al-
abama Supreme Court and it is hoped that the Attorney General will effectuate a 
swift resolution of the Department's recalcitrance. 
9. The Alabama Supreme Court in its unanimous decision in Taylor followed 
Kruzel v. Podell, 67 Wis. 2d 138, 226 N.W.2d 458 (1975). For leading cases recogniz-
ing a woman's right to not change her name because of marriage, see also Dunn v. 
Palermo, 522 S.W.2d 679 (Term. 1975); Secretary of the Commonwealth v. City 
Clerk of Lowell, 373 Mass. 178, 366 N.E.2d 717 (1977); Simmons v. O'Brien, 201 Neb. 
778, 272 N.W.2d 273 (1978). 
By statute, judicial opinion, state attorney general opinion, formal and informal 
agency directives or memoranda, or legislation, all states now recognize that wo-
men have the right to not change their names when they mar^y. Alabama: State v. 
Taylor, 415 So. 2d 1043 (Ala. 1982); Alaska: Op. Att'y. Gen. Alaska (May 5, 1976); 
Arizona: Malone v. Sullivan, 124 Ariz. 469, 605 P.2d 447 (19^0); Laks v. Laks, 25 
Ariz. App. 58, 540 P.2d 1277 (1975); Arkansas: Walker v. Jackson, 391 F. Supp. 1395 
(E.D. Ark. 1975); Op. Att'y Gen. Ark. No. 74-123 (Oct. 8, 1974J; Op. Att'y Gen. Ark. 
No. 74-75 (April 19, 1974); California: Weathers v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. App. 3d 
286, 126 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1976); Op. Atty Gen. Cal. (March 12, 1974); Connecticut: 
Custer v. Bonadies, 30 Conn. Supp. 385, 318 A.2d 639 (SupeiL Ct. 1974); Op. Att'y 
Gen. Conn. (Jan. 23, 1975); Delaware: Op. Att'y Gen. Del. (Aiig. 7,1974); District of 
Columbia: Brown v. Brown, 382 A.2d 1038 (D.C. 1978), vacating 384 A.2d 632 (D.C. 
1977); Op. Corp. Counsel D.C. (1975); Florida: In re Hooper 436 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Pilch v. Pilch, 447 So. 2d 989 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1984); Davis v. 
Roos, 326 So. 2d 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Marshall v. S t a k 301 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1974); 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 076-66 (March ^4, 1976); Georgia: Ga. 
Code Ann. § 19-3-33.1 (Supp. 1985); Op. Att'y Gen. Ga. No. 7549 (June 3, 1975); Ha-
waii: Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 574-1 (1976); Jech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714 (D. Hawaii 
1979); Illinois: Op. Att'y Gen. 111. No. S-711 (Feb. 25, 1974); Oji. Att'y Gen. 111. S-695 
(Feb. 13,1974), both opinions indicating that Illinois does not follow Rago v. Lipsky, 
327 111. App. 63, 63 N.E.2d 642 (1945) (country's sole case holding that a married 
woman takes her husband's surname as her "legal" name at common law); Indiana: 
In re Hauptly, 262 Ind. 150, 312 N.E.2d 857 (1974); Iowa: IoVa Code Ann. § 595.5 
(West 1981); Op. Att'y Gen. Iowa (March 25,1980); Kansas: oJ>. Att'y Gen. Kan. No. 
73-47 (Feb. 1, 1973) following Gallop v. Shanahan, No. 120, 456 (Dist. Ct. Shawnee 
County, Nov. 2, 1972), noted in Note, Constitutional Law—Equal Protection and 
Right of Suffrage Prohibits State From Cancelling Voter Registration of Newly 
Married Woman—Women Upon Marriage Do Not Necessarily Abandon Maiden 
Name, 21 U. Kan. L. Rev. 588 (1972-73); Kentucky: Op. AttV Gen. Ky. No. 77-334 
(May 23, 1977); Op. Att'y Gen. Ky. No. 77-239 (April 13, 1977); Op. Att'y Gen. Ky. 
No. 74-902 (Dec. 26, 1974); Op. Att'y Gen. Ky. No. 74-349 (Malr 14, 1974); Memoran-
dum Ky. Dept. Transportation (Oct. 30, 1981) (Kentucky Department of Transpor-
tation relinquishes position that a married woman must obtain driver's license in 
her husband's surname unless she has a court-ordered name ("change"); Louisiana: 
Pugh v. Theall, 342 So. 2d 274 (La. Ct. App. 1977), cert, denied 344 So. 2d 1055 (La. 
1977); Succession of Kneipp, 172 La. 411, 134 So. 376 (1931); Boothe v. Papale, No. 
74—939 (E.D. La. Feb. 12, 1975) (Order granting plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:34,A.(l)(a)(iii) (West 1984) (statute relating to 
naming children at birth); Maine: In re Reben, 342 A.2d 688 (Me. 1975); Op. Att'y 
Gen. Me. (April 4, 1978); Op. Atty. Gen. Me. (April 12, 1974) Maryland: Stuart v. 
Board of Supervisors, 266 Md. 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1972), noted in The Right of a Mar-
ried Woman To Use Her Birth-Given Surname For Voter Registration, 32 Md. L. 
Rev. 409 (1973); Goldin v. Goldin, 48 Md. App. 154, 426 A.2^ 1 410 (Ct. Spec. App. 
1981); Klein v. Klein, 36 Md. App. 177, 373 A.2d 86 (Ct. Spec. App. 1977); Op. Att'y 
Gen. Md. (Jan. 20, 1983); Op. Att'y Gen. Md. (May 7, 1974); Op. Atty. Gen. Md. 
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herself was established, she could not expect the law to recognize 
(March 30, 1974); Op. Att'y Gen. Md. (Nov. 30, 1972); Massachusetts: Secretary of 
the Commonwealth v. City Clerk of Lowell, 373 Mass. 178, 366 N.E.2d 717 (1977); 
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 46 § ID (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); Michigan Jones v. Sanilac 
County Road Comm'n, 128 Mich. App. 569, 342 N.W.2d 532 (1983) Wood v. Detroit 
Edison, 409 Mich. 279, 294 N.W.2d 571 (1980); Piotrowski v. Piotrowski, 71 Mich. 
App. 213, 247 N.W.2d 354 (1976); Op. Att'y Gen. Mich. No. 4834 (Oct. 2, 1974); Mich. 
Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.2824(1) (West 1980) (statute relating to niming children at 
birth); Minnesota: Minn. Stat. Ann. § 517.08 (West Supp. 1985); Missouri: In re Na-
tale, 527 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Miller v. Miller, 670 S.W.2d 591 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1984); Johnson v. Pacific Intermountain Expr. Co., 662 S.W.2d 237 (Mo. 1983), 
cert, denied 104 S. Ct. 2349 (1984); Montana: Op. Att'y Gen. Mdn. (May 1, 1974); 
Nebraska: Simmons v. O'Brien, 201 Neb. 778, 272 N.W.2d 273 (197^); Neb. Rev. Stat. 
§ 71-640.01 (1984) (statute relating to naming children at birth); | New Hampshire: 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 126.6-a (1983) (statute relating to naming diildren at birth); 
Moskowitz v. Moskowitz, 118 N.H. 199, 385 A.2d 120 (1978); New Jersey: In re Law-
rence, 133 N.J. Super. 408, 337 A.2d 49 (1975); Op. Att'y Gen. N.J. No. 20-1975 (Aug. 
26, 1975); New York: N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law §§ 14-a(l), 15(1), 240-a (McKinney Supp. 
1985); N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 64, 65 (McKinney Supp. 1985); Ik re Halligan, 46 
A.D.2d 170, 361 N.Y.S.2d 458 (App. Div. 1974); North Carolina: lit re Mohlman, 26 
N.C. App. 220, 216 S.E.2d 147 (1975); O'Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. sJpp. 494 (E.D.N.C. 
1981); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 130-A-101(c) (Supp. 1983) (statute relating to naming chil-
dren at birth); North Dakota: Op. Att'y Gen. N.D. (March 20, 1974); Ohio: Krupa v. 
Green, 144 Ohio App. 497,177 N.E.2d 616 (1961); Ball v. Brown, 450 F. Supp. 4 (N.D. 
Ohio 1977); Oklahoma: Sneed v. Sneed, 585 P.2d 1363 (Okla. 1978); Op. Att'y Gen. 
Okla. (Nov. 14, 1975); Oregon: Ore. Rev. Stat. § 106.220 (1983); Pennsylvania: Op. 
Att'y Gen. Pa. No. 8 (Jan. 31, 1974); Op. Att'y Gen. Pa. No. 72 (Oct. 25, 1973); Op. 
Att'y Gen. Pa. No. 62 (Aug. 20, 1973); Rhode Island: Traugott v. Petit, 122 R.I. 60, 
404 A.2d 77 (1979); South Carolina: Op. Atty. Gen. S.C. (June 0, 1975); Op. Att'y 
Gen. S.C. (Dec. 12, 1974); South Dakota: Op. Att'y Gen. S.D. N6. 77-31 (April 15, 
1977) (interpreting Ogle v. Circuit Court, 89 S.D. 18, 227 N.W.2d 621 (1975)); Ten-
nessee: Dunn v. Palermo, 522 S.W.2d 679 (Tenn. 1975); Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-3-305 
(1983) (statute relating to naming children at birth); Texas: Op. Att'y Gen. Tex. No. 
MW-225 (Aug. 21, 1980) (says that a married woman may vote under a hyphenated 
last name, of her "maiden name" and her husband's name); Op. Att'y Gen. Tex. No. 
H-432 (Oct. 25, 1974); Rice v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. 36, 38 S.W. 801 (1897); Vermont: 
Op. Att'y Gen. Vt. No. 179 (Feb. 4, 1974); Virginia: In re MilleJ, 218 Va. 939, 243 
S.E.2d 464 (1978); In re Strikwerda, 216 Va. 470, 220 S.E.2d 245 (1975); Op. Att'y 
Gen. Va. (June 6, 1973) (re voting); Washington: Doe v. Dunnink 87 Wash. 2d 50, 
549 P.2d 1 (1976); Op. Att'y Gen. Wash. 507 (1927-28) (right of l&arried woman to 
use husband's name even though she is not living with him); West Virginia: Op. 
Att'y Gen. W. Va. (April 30, 1975); Wisconsin: Kruzel v. Podell, kl Wis. 2d 138, 226 
N.W.2d 458 (1975); Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. No. 7-77 (Jan. 31, 1977); Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 
(Sept. 21, 1982). The states not listed—Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, 
Utah, and Wyoming—have recognized the right of women to use their own names 
but have not circulated opinions, memoranda or the like to the knowledge of the 
writer. E.g., "The [Wyoming] Motor Vehicle Division has recently allowed the use 
of a woman's maiden name as either a middle or last name on a driver's license and 
has also allowed the use of hyphenated names on driver's licenses. This was done 
pursuant to legal advice from this office." Kenneth G. Vines, Assistant Attorney 
General Wyoming, letter to author (January 16, 1980). Some states expressly pro-
hibit discrimination against women in the granting of credit because of their sur-
names. E.g. Act of May 28, 1985, ch. 243, § 5, 1985 Minn. Laws 77y (to be codified at 
Minn. Stat. § 325G.041). 
See also 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(b) (1982), interpreting the federal Equal Credit Op-
portunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982) (prohibits creditors from refusing to open or 
maintain a person's account in his or her "birth-given first name and a surname 
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her legal right to name her children over the objection of her hus-
band or ex-husband. 
As a woman's right to determine her own surname became 
recognized in the 1970s, married couples, by mutual agreement, be-
that is the applicant's birth-given surname, the spouse's surnam, 0r a combined sur-
name"). A requirement that a woman change her surname to tfyat of her husband 
on employment records when she marries, in absence of a corresponding require-
ment for men violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l 
to 17 (1982). Allen v. Lovejoy, 533 F.2d 522 (6th Cir. 1977). 
The law is also well established that married and divorce4 women have the 
right to change their names, statutorily or nonstatutory, irrespective of what 
names the children in their custody use. Kg., In re Natale, 527 SLW.2d 402 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1975) (married woman adopting a brand new name unrelated to her husband's 
surname or her own prior names); In re Hauptly, 262 Ind. 1^ 0, 312 N.E.2d 857 
(1974); In re Erickson, 547 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); Tra\igost v. Petit, 122 
R.I. 60, 404 A.2d 77 (1979); In re Banks, 42 Cal. App. 3d 631,117 CM. Rptr. 37 (1974); 
In re Hooper, 436 So. 2d 401 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Piotrowski v. Piotrowski, 71 
Mich. App. 213, 247 N.W.2d 354 (1976); Egner v. Egner, 133 N.J. Sniper. 403, 337 A.2d 
46 (1975). 
An issue that needs to be litigated in the area of women's names involves the 
right of women to use different surnames for different purposes* The right to not 
change one's surname because of marriage is not identical to tpe right to retain 
one's premarriage surname for some purposes and to change it fpr other purposes. 
A woman who uses her husband's surname for any purpose may have difficulty not 
using it, instead of another surname, for state recordkeeping purposes. However, 
under the common law persons can use more than one surname. The one state at-
torney general who has expressly examined the issue reaffirmed the right of wo-
men to use one surname with one state agency (for example!, for voting) and 
another surname with another state agency (such as for driving dr practicing a pro-
fession). Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. No. 7-77 (Jan. 31, 1977). 
The right of women to name themselves does not depend on iheir husbands' or 
ex-husbands' consent or acquiescence. Because attorneys raise the issue in plead-
ings and/or trial, mention of spousal consent appears in most of the name change 
cases, but notably not in the name retention cases of the 1970$. See, e.g., In re 
Strickwerda, 216 Va. 470, 220 S.E.2d 245 (1975) (plaintiff's attorney informed author 
that mention of husband's agreement was deliberate tactic). Name retention cases 
following Stuart v. Board of Supervisors, 266 Md. 440, 295 A.2d 22$ (1972) (antenup-
tial contract determined to be evidence of intent to use own name, not a require-
ment of Mary Emily Stuart's doing so) do not even mention spokisal opinion. See, 
e.g., Kruzel v. Podell, 67 Wis. 2d 138, 226 N.W.2d 458 (1975); Durin v. Palermo, 522 
S.W.2d 679 (Tenn. 1975). ' 
See generally Herma Hill Kay, Sex-Based Discrimination: Text, Cases and 
Materials 171-77 (2d ed. 1981); Kathleen A. Ryan Carlsson, Surnames of Married 
Women And Legitimate Children, 17 N.Y.L.F. 552 (1971); Roslyn Goodman Daum, 
The Right of Married Women To Assert Their Own Surnames, 8 \J. Mich. J.L. Ref. 
63 (1974); Julia Lamber, A Married Woman's Surname: Is Custom Law?, 1973 
Wash. U.L.Q. 779 (1973); Priscilla Ruth MacDougall, Women's, Men's, Children's 
Names: An Outline and Bibliography, 7 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 4Q13-18 (March 17, 
1981) and sources cited therein; Richard Thornton, Married WomJen and The Name 
Game, 11 Rich. L. Rev. 121 (1976). A very fine recent article espouses the value of 
nonjudicial name change. Patricia A. Felch, The Common Law Right For An Adult 
To Assume A New Name Without Court Approval, VIII Women's Law Reporter 
(Loyola U School of Law) 1 (Fall 1984) (article, however, mistakenly attributes a 
statement of Elizabeth Cady Stanton to Lucy Stone, which will be noted in a future 
addition of the Women's Law Reporter). 
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gan giving their children hyphenated names, maternal names, or 
entirely new surnames. They immediately encountered resistance 
from state agencies which refused to register marital children in 
any other surname than the paternal. At the same time, unmar-
ried mothers met resistance in giving their children the surnames 
of their biological fathers whether the men agreed with their 
choice or not.10 
As this article demonstrates, where women have the approval 
of their children's fathers, state resistance to women's choices of 
their children's surnames ultimately fails. The government simply 
cannot tell parents what to name their offspring. 
In contrast, when a woman wants to name her children one 
way and the father does not agree, a woman finds herself facing an 
almost insurmountable legal obstacle. Except in some cases in-
volving nonmarital children, the courts have traditionally and ex-
pressly upheld the right of the father to control the naming of 
children, irrespective of what surname best serves tne children. 
This legal brick wall blocks the parental influence of women 
on their own children and in their own homes. It tells children 
that their mother's authority remains secondary to that of their fa-
ther even after their parents are divorced. Women must topple 
this brick wall, as it stands in the way of their responsibility and 
authority to rear their children. 
Children's names are a women's issue regardless of the origin 
of the name chosen by a woman. This article neither espouses that 
a child should bear any particular surname11 nor advocates that 
women should give their children the maternal name or any other 
nonpaternal name. It is, however, a fundamental feminist concern 
that society and its courts respect women for wanting to pass their 
surnames onto their children or to give them surnames which dif-
general 10 Most of these situations were resolved by attorney 
caused agencies to recognize the legal rights of parents to name 
favorable attorney general rulings or failure of agencies to 
ions resulted m litigation See,eg, Secretary of the 
of Lowell, 373 Mass 178, 366 N E 2d 717 (1977) For a list of the 
eral opmions respectmg the right of women to use their own n 
gall, supra note 9, at 4017-18 
11 When "name" is used m this article it usually refers to 
assert their authority over women in naming children primarily) 
surnames Men also claim the right to determine children's first 
and to require women to name sons for them with the 
have, therefore, m a few cases also adjudicated the relative 
lectmg first and middle names which are also referred to as 
men have always prevailed m cases involving conflicts of 
middle names In re Nguyen, 684 P 2d 258 (Colo App 1983), cert 
785 (1985), Webber v Parker, 167 So 2d 519 (La Ct App 1964) 
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fer from those of the children's fathers. It is a fundamental wo-
men's issue that women should and must have a legally recognized 
and enforceable right to name their children on an equal basis to 
men. Further, it is a fundamental women's concern that women 
who are custodial parents have the same legally recognized deci-
sion-making power respecting their children's names as they have 
over other aspects of their children's lives. 
Recognition of the right of women to name meir children 
also promotes the rights of children. Such recognition will result 
in children being allowed to bear names which arej in fact, good 
for their welfare,12 rather than requiring them to use their fathers' 
names whenever their fathers want them to. 
Despite these interests of children and women, courts are 
quick to respect men's desire to control their children's names. In 
March 1982, the United States Supreme Court declined to review 
the first case to reach it involving the right of women to name 
their children. In Saxton v. Dennis ,13 the Court refused to review 
the Minnesota Supreme Court's denial to a custodial mother and 
her two children of the right to statutorily change the children's 
surnames to a hyphenated name of both parents' names. The fa-
ther had objected and insisted that the children continue to use 
only his surname. A month later, the Nebraska Supreme Court 
became the first appellate court to construe a state statute which 
specified what surnames could be given newborn marital children 
on their birth certificates. The court accepted one of the non-cus-
todial father's choices of a name—a hyphenated name with the fa-
ther's name first—over the wishes of the custodial mother to have 
the children bear only her surname.14 
Similarly, courts and legislatures are allowing unmarried fa-
the day that it 
1911), offd per 
12. The legal term used in family law is the child's "best interests." See infra 
notes 120-132, 139, 200-206, 216-217, 227-237 and accompanying text. 
13. In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1981), cert, deniedl 455 U.S. 1034 
(1982), Noted in Note, Family Law-Parental Rights in Changing Child's Surname-
In re Saxton, 9 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 484 (1983) and Note, Like Father, Like Child: 
the Rights of Parents in their Children's Surnames, 70 Va. L. Rev. 1303 (1984). The 
court denied certiorari in Saxton ten years and sixteen days from 
summarily affirmed Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala 
curiam, 405 U.S. 970 (1972). See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
14. Cohee v. Cohee, 210 Neb. 855, 317 N.W.2d 381 (1982) (rehearing denied May 
12, 1982). The father asked that the child bear only his name or me hyphenated 
name. 
The Nebraska Supreme Court recited and deferred to the standards established 
by courts over the years to protect divorced noncustodial fathers' right to control 
the naming of their children: 1) misconduct by "one of the parents" (i.e. the fa-
ther); 2) failure to support the child; 3) failure to maintain contact with the child; 4) 
the length of time a surname has been used, and 5) whether the surname is differ-
ent from that of the custodial parent. The court neither made nor ordered any fac-
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thers rights almost equal to married fathers in naihing children if 
they contribute to the children's support and express minimal in-
terest in them.15 This is in spite of these fathers' limited success in 
obtaining other rights over mothers to their children unless the fa-
thers have demonstrated a considerable comn^itment to the 
child.i6 
Because the issue of a woman's right to name| 
only beginning to be recognized as a feminist issue, 
have been litigated from a women's rights perspective and taken to 
the appellate level. Therefore, with the exception 
litigated cases and forward-looking judiciary17 the courts of this 
country are not yet sensitized to the importance of the issue of 
naming children as a women's and children's legal rights issue. 
Nor are they aware to any depth of the extent o^  legal develop-
ments in the area over the past decade. 
Women generally have been hesitant to express and assert 
their desires and their rights to name their children over their 
her children is 
not many cases 
of a few well-
tual evaluation of the "best interests" of the child in question anjd denied rehearing 
to clarify the meaning of the opinion. 
The bid for rehearing was almost not filed. The father, whol had at first denied 
paternity, gave up the child for adoption as the mother remarried, possibly raising a 
mootness issue. One of the reasons D.R.S. v. R.S.H., 412 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1980), was not pursued beyond an unsuccessful petition for rehearing was because 
the unwed father relinquished any rights to the child, the mother married and her 
husband adopted the child. Although the individual situations in such cases may 
thus be rectified, the appellate opinions make bad law for later cases. 
15. Donald J. v. Evna M-W, 81 Cal. App. 3d 929, 147 Cal. Rp r^. 15 (1978); D.R.S. 
v. R.S.H., 412 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Winkenhofer v. Griffin, 511 S.W.2d 
216 (Ky. 1974); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 309 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 1981); Kirksey v. Abbott, 
591 S.W.2d 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979). 
16. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) ("the mere existence of a biological 
link does not merit equivalent protection."). In re Baby Girl S., 628 S.W.2d 261 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1982), cert, granted sub nom., Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of 
Abilene, 459 U.S. 1145, vacated and remanded, 460 U.S. 1074 (1983); Caban v. Mo-
hammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (statute giving unwed mother butl not unwed father 
right to block an adoption is a violation of equal protection; not denial of equal pro-
tection to deny unwed father who has participated in rearing of his child right to 
veto adoption of child); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (Upholding Georgia 
statute denying father who had not legitimated child right to sue for child's wrong-
ful death); Quillon v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (unmarried father may not legiti-
mate child and block adoption of child where adoption is in the child's best 
interests); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). See further If ancy S. Erickson, 
The Feminist Dilemma Over Unwed Parents* Custody Rights: 
Must Take Priority, 2 Law & Inequality 447 (1984). 
17. O'Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. Supp. 494 (E.D.N.C. 1981); J. 
Supp. 714 (D. Hawaii 1979), noted in 18 J. Fam. L. 408 (1979-80); I\ 
Cal. 3d 640, 620 P.2d 579,169 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1980); Doe v. Han< 
Health, 436 N.E.2d 791 (Ind. 1982) (Hunter, J., dissenting); 
monwealth v. City Clerk of Lowell, 373 Mass. 178, 366 N.E.2d 
Dunning, 87 Wash. 2d 50, 549 P.2d 1 (1976). 
> Mother's Rights 
v. Burch, 466 F. 
re Schiffman, 28 
County Board of 
itary of the Com-
17 (1977); Doe v. 
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husbands* and families' expectations.18 Such hesitation is based in 
part on individual women's resistance to appear as if they are only 
fighting domestic matters in public. No organization monitors de-
velopment of this issue despite the fact that new casts are continu-
ously arising and establishing new law that affects all women. The 
right of women to name their children has not yet received the at-
tention of feminist and civil rights activists as an issue in need of a 
carefully planned strategy for necessary legal reform. 
This article sets forth the law of naming children as it has 
been inherited from England and developed in this country. It dis-
cusses the rights of the three people always involved in the deter-
mination of a child's name: the mother, the father, and the child. 
Parts II and IV discuss the various naming rights women have 
achieved: the right of married women and men in agreement to 
name their children without state interference, and the invalidity 
of state statutes requiring that children bear specific names on 
their birth certificates. Part III explains the traditional right of 
women to name nonmarital children, and part V considers the law 
in disputes between fathers and mothers over naming infant mari-
tal and nonmarital children. Part VI analyzes disputes between 
parents about naming older marital children originally given the 
paternal name. Part VII sets forth the custodial parent presump-
tion as a solution to determining which parent should be entrusted 
with the right of naming children. Part VIII examines the argu-
ments of fathers and the contention that the maternal name im-
plies illegitimacy. Finally, part IX discusses the role of legislation, 
constitutional challenges, and the Equal Rights Amendment in as-
suring a woman's right to name children on an equal basis to men. 
The first section sets forth the the common law of names, 
which is based on English common law, and followed generally in 
the United States. This section further summarizes ihe context in 
which litigation over naming children arises and sets forth the im-
portance of developments of the past decade in the movement to-
ward recognizing the right of women to participate ijri the naming 
of their children. 
A. English Common Law 
American states, except Louisiana,19 expressly fallow English 
18. One married woman rented a post office box for the sole purpose of corre-
sponding with the author about the possibility of giving her child her name instead 
of her husband's and still keeping her marriage intact. She anticipated unreasona-
bleness and hostility to the idea from her husband. 
19. Commentators and courts usually contend that Louisiana 
law and a married woman never loses her "patronymic" name alt3 
follows the civil 
;hough "she has 
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common law. In contrast to the civil law of the continent,20 the 
common law recognizes the right of all persons to use and be 
known for all legal and social purposes by the surname(s) they 
choose as long as they do not do so for a fraudulent purpose. 
Under the common law, fraudulent purpose meant intent to con-
ceal one's person to avoid being recognized.21 A person can be 
the right to use her husband's name in all acts of her civil life ahd even of her com-
mercial life." 1 Marcel Plainiol & Georges Ripert, Traite El^mentaire De Droit 
Civil, Pt. 1, p. 258, §§ 390, 392 (1935). Thus the fact that a remarried woman signed 
her marriage license in her "maiden name" did not indicate she had not been previ-
ously married: "[I]n law, she still retained her maiden name, and bore Rupp's 
name, if married to him, as a matter of custom." Succession of foieipp, 172 La. 411, 
416, 134 So. 376, 378 (1931). Where defendents did not show that a woman was 
known by her "maiden name" a lien in the woman's husband's name was not held 
improper. Pugh v. Theall, 342 So. 2d 274 (La. Ct. App. 1977), «H*. denied, 344 So. 2d 
1055 (La. 1977). Louisiana law recognizes the custom of a wife Rising her husband's 
name. Welcker v. Welcker, 342 So. 2d 251 (La. Ct. App. 19^7), cert, denied sub 
nom., Welcker v. Little, 343 So. 2d 1077 (La. 1977) (denying injunctive relief of man 
against his ex-wife from continuing to use "his" name); Coyle v. Coyle, 268 So. 2d 
520 (La. Ct. App. 1972) (denying injunction to man against his e^x-wife from contin-
uing to use his full name proceeded by "Mrs."). Louisiana wom^n nonetheless have 
had to litigate to vote using their birth names due to a re-registj*ation statute refer-
ring to changes of name by "marriage or otherwise." Boothe v. Papale, No. 74-1939, 
Slip. Op. at 3 (E.D. La. Feb. 11, 1975) ("The Court . . . concludes that under the 
Law of Louisiana a wife never loses her patronymic name.") (citing Planiol, supra); 
Nett v. Parish Registrar of Voting, No. 568-265 (Civ. Dist. Ct1 Parish of Orleans, 
April 2, 1976) (Judgment for Plaintiff on Motion for Summary Judgment). 
A 1950 Tulane Law Review note analyzed Louisiana as a tommon law names 
state. Note, Names—Change of Name, 24 Tul. L. Rev. 496 (1^50) and the case of 
Wilty v. Jefferson Parish Dem. Exec. Comm., 245 La. 145, 197 So. 2d 718 (1963) 
leave room for doubt as to how Louisiana law really differs frojn the common law. 
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:34(l)(a)(iii) (July, 1983) repealed the law requiring new-
born marital children to be given their fathers' names on their fcirth certificates. It 
specified that marital newborns be given the husband's name, or, if both parents 
agree, the "maiden" name of the mother or a combination of the two, rendering 
references to a woman never losing her "patronymic" name obsolete. A bill to de-
lete the preference for the paternal name and the superior right of the father to 
veto any other name died in committee during the 1985 Legislative Session. S. Bill 
No. 227 (1985). 
20. Noncommon law countries regulate personal names by statutory prescrip-
tion. Charles F. Blackman, The Civil Sacrament: Law and Practice of Soviet Wed-
dings, 28 Am. Jur. Comp. L. 555 (1980); Symposium on the Status of Women in 
Various Countries, 20 Am. Jur. Comp. L. 585, 588 (Ruth Bader Ginsburg ed. 1972); 
Symposium on Law and the Status of Women, 8 Colum. Hun*. Rts. L. Rev. 1, 15 
(1976). 
21. The Marriage Act of 1823, 4 Geo. 4, c. 76, ss. 7 and 22 (repealed, Marriage 
Act of 1949, c. 76, s. 25) required persons to publish notice of their marriage in their 
"true" Christian and surnames. A marriage published "knowingly and wilfully . . . 
without due publication" was void. Sullivan v. Sullivan (1818) 2 Hag. Con. 238 ("I 
am of the opinion that the interposition of the name of Holmes is not calculated to 
conceal the identity of the woman"); Wiltshire v. Prince (1830) ? Hag. Ecc. 332, 334, 
27 Digest 48, 162 E.R. 1176 ("both the man and the woman were aware that the 
banns had been published in a manner calculated to conceal thte identity of one of 
the parties"); Tooth v. Barrow (1854), 1 Ecc. and Ad. 371, 164 E.R. 214; Dancer v. 
Dancer (1948) 2 All E.R. 731; Chipchase v. Chipchase, (1941) 2 All E.R. 560. A 
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known by more than one surname, although at old English com-
mon law, one could have only one first—Christiar*— name which 
could be changed only at baptism, confirmation or royal decree.22 
A person's "full" name usually includes a first and last name; mid-
dle names are not required or strictly part of a person's name in 
the sense that they must be used.23 Courts do not deem prefixes 
and titles such as Ms., Mr., Miss, Mrs., or Dr., suffixes such as Jr. 
or Sr., or education degree initials part of a person'? name.24 
Pursuant to the common law, people can change their names 
at will, without judicial proceedings. State name change statutes 
"maiden" name could conceal or be used to conceal identity when the woman was 
no longer known by it. Fendall v. Goldsmid (1877), 2 P.D. 263.; Allen v. Wood 
(1834), 1 Bing. N.C. 81, 4 Moo. and S. 510, 3 L.J.C.P. 219, 131 E.R. 1020; Parks v. 
Tolman, 113 Mo. App. 14, 87 S.W. 576 (1905), although a "maided name" is not per 
se an alias. State v. Braxton, 294 N.C. 446, 242 S.E.2d 769 (1978). As a criminal 
standard for the fraudulent use of a name, concealing one's identity in itself is con-
stitutionally vague. Esco v. State, 43 Ala. App. 61,179 So. 2d 766 (1965). See United 
States v. Wasman, 484 F. Supp. 54 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (adopting name to conceal being 
Jewish to trade with Arab merchants constitutes fraudulent name usage); People v. 
Briggins, 50 N.Y.2d 302, 406 N.E.2d 766, 428 N.Y.S.2d 909 (198<b (using assumed 
name to hide finances from wife not a fraudulent usage as to creditor). 
22. Co. Litt. 3a; Re Parrott (1946) 1 All E.R. 321; Personal Naikes, 26 The Solici-
tors Journal 689 (Sept. 9, 1882); Lawyer, The Legal Status of a Name, 40 Cen L.J. 
316 (1895). The old English rule has been eroded and considered no longer in effect 
by legal commentary. Names and Arms, Change of, 22 Halsb. L. Eng. 1211 (3d ed.); 
W.E. Lisle Benthan, What's In a Name? Justice of the Peace ana Local Gov't Rev. 
616 (Sept. 29, 1951); Vincent Powell-Smith, Change of Name Problems, The New 
L.J. 1027 (July 7, 1966). American courts have not carved out an exception to the 
common law right of name change to first names. In re Faith's Application, 22 N.J. 
Misc. 412, 39 A.2d 638 (1944); Roberts v. Mosier, 35 Okla. 691, 132 P. 678 (1913) (cit-
ing examples of Presidents Cleveland and Grant and others who changed first 
names); Stevenson v. Ellisor, 270 S.C. 560, 243 S.E.2d 445 (1978); Op. Att'y Gen. 
Ken. (May 14, 1974); Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. (March 4, 1976) (President Carter's first 
name a change, not a nickname). State legislatures in the U.S. are deleting the 
term "Christian" name from their statutes. E.g., 1979 Wis. Laws 337 amending Wis. 
Stat. §§ 443.01(8), 446.02(2), 447.05(7), 447.08(7). 
23. 57 Am. Jur. 2d Name § 4 (1971); 65 C. J.S. Names § 4; G.S. Arnold, Personal 
Names, 15 Yale L.J. 227, 228 (1905-06); Perays Morris, The Middle Initial, Dicta 361 
(Nov.-Dec. 1960); Turner v. Gregory, 151 Mo. 100, 52 S.W. 234 (1899); Imperial-
Yumo Production v. Hunter, 609 P.2d 1329, 1330-31 (Utah 1980). Generally courts 
give middle names or initials little legal significance. This approach, which is 
rooted in the common law recognition of only one Christian name, is not without 
exception. 
24. 57 Am. Jur. 2d Name § 1; 65 C.J.S. Names § 3 (1966). "Mrs " is not part of a 
name and raises no presumption in law that the person using it is married. Davis v. 
Roos, 326 So. 2d 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Carlton v. Phelan, 100 Fla. 1164, 131 
So. 117 (1930); Hubbard v. State, 123 Ga. App. 597, 181 S.E.2d 890 (1971); Bank of 
America Nat. Trust and Savings Ass'n v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 90 Ga. App. 332, 83 
S.E.2d 66 (1954); City of Camilla v. May, 70 Ga. App. 136, 27 S.E.2d 777 (1943); Guy-
ton v. Young, 84 Ga. App. 155, 65 S.E.2d 858 (1951); Wrightsville and T.R. Co. v. 
Vaughan, 9 Ga. App. 371, 71 S.E. 691 (1911); Brown v. Reinke, 159 Minn. 458, 199 
N.W. 235 (1924); State ex rel Rainey, M.D. v. Crowe, 382 S.W.2d 38 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1964); In re Dengler, 246 N.W.2d 758 (N.D. 1976); Hamilton v. Stat^ 555 S.W.2d 724 
(Tenn. 1977); Walker v. Jackson, 391 F. Supp. 1395 (E.D. Ark. 197^). 
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are meant to be in aid of that right, as optional meakis of making a 
record of a name change. In England, changing oners name is stat-
utorily defined as "exercising a deed poll."25 
At common law no one has a property rightl to a personal 
name such that she can keep another from using ii.26 Consistent 
with the right to change one's name is the right not to change it at 
marriage as most women traditionally have done.27 A woman has 
the right to discard her pre-marriage name by failing to use it; fail-
ure to use a name can lead to its extinction as a reliable means of 
25. Enrollment of Deeds (Change of Name), Regulations 1949, S.I. 1949 No. 316 
as amended by S.I. 1951 No. 377 and S.I. 1969 No. 1432; Olive Stone, The Status of 
Women in Great Britain, 20 Am. J. Comp. L. 592 (1972); Smith v. United States 
Casualty Co., 197 N.Y. 420, 90 N.E. 947 (1910); In re Snook, 2 ffilt. Rep. 566 (N.Y. 
1859); In re Useldinger, 35 Cal. App. 2d 723, 96 P.2d 959 (1939); Iri re Ross, 8 Cal. 2d 
608, 67 P.2d 94 (1937); noted in Discharge in Bankruptcy as Affecting Individuals 
Right to Change Name, 26 Cal. L. Rev. 268 (1938); In re HauptR 263 Ind. 150, 312 
N.E.2d 857 (1974); Loser v. Plainfield Savings Bank, 149 Iowa 672, 128 N.W. 1101 
(1901); In re Buyarsky, 322 Mass. 335, 77 N.E.2d 216 (1948); In \e Merolevitz, 320 
Mass. 448, 70 N.E.2d 249 (1946); In re Falcucci, 355 Pa. 588, 50 A.2d 200 (1947); Laf-
lin and Rand Co. v. Steytler, 146 Pa. 434, 23 A. 215 (1892). 
26. Arnold, supra note 23; Weingand v. Loire, 231 Cal. AjJp. 2d 289, 41 Cal. 
Rptr. 778 (1964); George Cohen, The Law Concerning Change of Personal Names, 2 
Conn. B.J. 110 (1928); In re Falcucci, 355 Pa. 588, 50 A.2d 200 (1947), noted in Clark, 
Name Case of Falcucci To Frame, 3 J. Mo. B. 80 (May, 1947); DuBoulay v. DuBou-
lay (1869) L.R. 2 P.C. 430; Cowley v. Cowley (1901) A.C. 450. 
Accordingly, women have adopted names of men with whom they live. Clark 
v. Clark, 19 Kan. 522 (1878). A wife is entitled to adopt her husband's name but has 
no right to enjoin others from using the same despite personal displeasure or em-
barrassment. O'Brien v. Eustice, 198 111. App. 510, 19 N.E.2d 137 (1939); Lowe v. 
Lowe, 265 N.Y. 197,192 N.E. 291 (1934); Bauman v. Bauman, 250 JN.Y. 382, 165 N.E. 
819 (1929); Somberg v. Somberg, 263 N.Y. 1,188 N.E. 137 (1933). One court denied a 
minor son the right to enjoin another woman from using "Mrs " and his father's 
full name. Bartholomew v. Workman, 197 Okla. 267,169 P.2d 1012 (1946). Another 
court denied a married woman the right to preclude the other woman from naming 
her nonmarital child with the woman's husband's surname. In re\ M, 91 N.J. Super. 
296, 219 A.2d 906 (1966). While assumption of the man's name is evidence of an in-
tent to hold herself out as his wife, courts do not require such assumption in a com-
mon law marriage. State v. Durnam, 49 Ohio App. 2d 231, 360 N.E.2d 743 (1976); In 
re Glasco, 619 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981). But see In re Liijda Ann, 126 Misc. 
2d 43, 480 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup. Ct. 1984) in which a New York City trial court refused 
to grant an unmarried woman's petition for a court order changing her surname to 
that of her lover whom the court presumed was married to another woman 
although recognizing that pursuant to the common law no judicial proceeding is 
necessary to change a name. 
27. Vera Brittain, Surnames of Married Women, 12 Equal Rts. 317 (Nov. 14, 
1925); Stone, supra note 25, at 606; Note, Bill 28—An Act to Am&nd the Change of 
Name Act, 41 Sask. L. Rev. 177 (1976-77); Cowley v. Cowley, (19^1) A.C. 450; In re 
Fry Reynolds v. Denne (1945), 1 Ch. 348; The King v. Inhabitantiof St. Faith's, III 
Dow. and Ry. 348 (K.B. 1823), discussed in Helena Normanton, The Institution of 
the Surname, 12 Equal Rts. 30, 31 (March 7, 1925); Cecil Henry Ewen, History of 
Surnames of the British Isles 391-92 (1931); Rainey, The OrigirJs of English Sur-
names 82-85 (1962); Leslie Gilbert Pine, The Story of Surnames £3 (1966); M. Tur-
ner-Samuels, The Law of Married Women (1957). 
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identification.28 
A person's right to use and change names und^r the common 
law does not depend upon one's right or marital status or sex. 
Men can change their names to those of their wives or to any 
other name. This custom is not uncommon at old English common 
law and has received some recent legal and social attention in the 
United States.29 Clearly set forth in Halsbury's\Laws of Eng-
land ,30 this common law of personal names should py now be part 
of common legal knowledge.31 
28. A woman can lose the right to use her birth name as her "true" name by 
nonusage. Fendall v. Goldsmid, (1877) 2 P.D. 263; Allen v. Wcjod, (1834) 1 Bing. 
N.C. 81, 4 Moo. and S. 510, 3 L.J.C.P. 219, 131 E.R. 1020; Chipcfiase v. Chipchase, 
(1941) 2 All E.R. 560. 
29. Pine, supra note 27. Some state statutes provide for nken to adopt their 
wives' names and hyphenate their names when they marry or divorce. Supra note 
9. The Tennessee Supreme Court stated that a statute requiring a person to re-reg-
ister within 90 days "after he changes his name by marriage or otherwise" is 
"equally susceptible of the construction that when either party to the civil contract 
of marriage elects to use the name of the other, the registration will be changed." 
Dunn v. Palermo, 522 S.W.2d 679, 680 (Term. 1975). Three attorneys general have 
issued opinions recognizing men's common law right to change their names because 
of marriage. Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. (Aug. 25, 1984); Op. Att'y Ge^i. Mich. (April 14, 
1980); Op. Att'y Gen. Me. (April 4, 1978). 
The modern man who changes his name to that of his wife currently receives 
media attention similar to, but somewhat less sympathetic than, that which women 
received a decade ago when they did not change theirs. Detroit Free Press colum-
nist Nickie McWhirter commented: "So far . . . we haven't taken the next step. 
That would be for a man to trade his surname for his wife's. . . . I guess they won't 
do that, not until she is president of Seagram's anyway." Nickie McWhirter, Next 
Play in the Name Game is for Him to Adopt Hers, Detroit Frpe Press, June 11, 
19S2 
Without court orders men have experienced difficulty using their wive's names. 
Men's difficulties, however, are not comparable to the obstacles women exper-
ienced exercising their right to not change their names. See, e.g. J Dave Gourevitch, 
Double Standard Irks Spouse of Electrician, Palm Beach Post, June 25, 1982 (man 
denied driver's license in new marital name). In contrast to the support his prede-
cessors gave the issue of women's names, the Florida attorney general declined to 
intervene in this situation. He advised a state legislator that the correct agency 
must inquire in order to render an opinion on the issue. Letter to William G. My-
ers, Representative, from Jim Smith, Florida Attorney General (^ July 13, 1982) and 
to author (August 6, 1982). 
30. Husband and Wife Assumption by Wife of Husband me , 22 Halsb. L. 
of Eng., § 1018 at 633 (4th ed. 1979). 
31. "A woman is not legally obligated to assume her husband's name when she 
marries him," reads a trivia book. E.C. McKenzie, Salted Peanuts, A Fun-Filled 
Collection of 1800 Tantalizing Facts (1972). Most advice columnists have acknowl-
edged the right. See, e.g., Abigail Van Buren advises addressing two surnamed 
couples "Mr. Peter Smith and Ms. Joan Jones." Dear Abby, Faulty Invitations 
May Miss This Ms., Fairmont Sentinel, Dec. 5,1982. The beleaguered Environmen-
tal Protection Agency head Anne Burford was criticized for changing her name 
when she married, thereby deflecting the adverse publicity against her. Susan 
Trausch, New Name Stirs Brouhaha, Boston Globe, March 3, 198a. 
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The law recognizes names as words32 which identify a person, 
the "designation or appellation used to distinguish one person 
from another."33 Courts deem irrelevant the intrinsic or personal 
meaning people give to their names. The name "is not the person, 
but only a means of designating the person intended."34 A name 
assists the state's interest in proper identification. As stated by the 
Pennsylvania attorney general, in interpreting state law requiring 
persons to vote in their "surname," a citizen must g|ve her or his 
name 
for the same reason that he or she must provide information 
as to height, color of hair and eyes, and date of birth: this is 
the means by which an identity is established, so that the ap-
plicant may be assured of the right to exercise the franchise, 
while the state may guard against any fraudulent exercise of 
that right.35 
A person's name in law is merely evidence of ofte's person, a 
symbol of one's identity. The term "legal" name, carelessly used 
in the United States as a registered inflexible name equivalent to a 
social security number and dependent upon one's marital, sex or 
birth status, is unknown to the common law. "[T]here is no such 
thing as a legal name' of an individual in the sense that he may 
not lawfully adopt or acquire another and lawfully do business 
under the substituted appellation" wrote the Iowa Supreme Court 
in 1901 in a frequently cited case.36 
32. A number is not a name. In re Dengler, 287 N.W.2d 637, 639 (Minn. 1979), 
appeal dismissed, 446 U.S. 949 (1980); In re Dengler, 246 N.W.2d [758 (N.D. 1976) 
(number 1069 is not a "name"). In re Ritchie III, 159 Cal. App. 3d 1070, 206 Cal. 
Rptr. 239, (1984) (Numeral III is not a name, following the Dengler cases). See 
Thomas Lockney & Karl Ames, Is 1069 a Name?, 29 Names 1 (1981). 
33. Romans v. State, 178 Md. 588, 596, 16 A.2d 642, 646 (1940). 
34. Emery v. Kipp, 154 Cal. 83, 87, 97 P. 17, 19 (1908). "The Waning of the 
word constituting the name of a person is of no importance, for, considered as a 
name, it derives its whole significance from the fact that it is the mark or indicia by 
which he is known." In re Snook, 2 Hilt. Rep. 566, 566-67 (1859). The periodical, 
Names, published by the American Names Society, regularly contributes to the 
literature on the meaning and derivation of names which is beyond the scope of 
this discussion. See also Elsdon Smith, The Story of Our Names (1970) and Smith 
v. United States Casualty Co., 197 N.Y. 420, 90 N.E. 947 (1910). The Snook and 
Smith cases relate most of the history of surnames discussed in leg^l commentary 
and judicial opinions. 
35. Op. Att'y Gen. Pa. No. 72 (Oct. 25, 1973). 
36. Loser v. Plainfield Savings Bank, 149 Iowa 672, 677, 128 N.W. 1101, 
(1910): | 
In the absence of any restrictive statute, it is the common-law right of 
a person to change his name, or he may by general usage or habit ac-
quire a name notwithstanding it differs from the one given him in in-
fancy. A man's name for all practical and legal purposes is tne name 
by which he is known and called in the community where he lives and 
is best known. 
An English law professor summarized the common law of names in 1972: "In Eng-
V 1103 
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Just as English common law never required a married wo-
man to adopt her husband's name, never has it required parents to 
name marital children with their fathers' names.37 Nor does the 
common law require nonmarital children to bear their mothers' 
surnames. At common law a "bastard" had no name based on par-
entage, but was a "filius nullius"—a child of no one—and could 
gain a name only by becoming known by it.38 By custom, however, 
because mothers were the identified parents and took the care, 
custody, and control of the children, the mothers named them, 
usually but not always with their own surnames.3? 
Minors' names at English common law weije established by 
usage and could be changed at will, just as adults names could be 
changed.40 Because parents had control of children, they generally 
lish law, contrary to the law of most countries, there are ho rules about legal 
names. The surname of any person, male or female, is the name by which he or 
she is generally known, provided that the name was not assumed for any fraudu-
lent purpose." Stone, supra note 25, at 606. 
37. Cf. Secretary of the Commonwealth v. City Clerk of Lowell, 373 Mass. 178, 
366 N.E.2d 717 (1977). 
The California Supreme Court in In re Schiffman made the misleading state-
ment that Henry VIII "required recordation of legitimate births in the name of the 
father. Thence the naming of children after the fathers became the custom in Eng-
land." 28 Cal. 3d at 643, 620 P.2d at 580, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 920, ttting Note, The Con-
troversy Over Children's Surnames: Familial Autonomy, Equal Protection and the 
Child's Best Interests, 1979 Utah L. Rev. 303, 305. The articte asserts that Henry 
VIII caused a "record to be kept in every parish of the births, marriages, and deaths 
of the parish inhabitants, with legitimate births generally being recorded in the 
name of the father," id. at 305-06. The article cited In re Silook, 2 Hilt. 566, 571 
(C.P.N.Y. City and County 1859), which advised that "a record was required to be 
kept in every parish of births, marriages and deaths. . . . [T]nis recording of such 
events in every family, led to the use of one name to designate members of one 
family." However, until the Births and Deaths Registration Act of 1874 (37 and 38 
Vict. c. 88) registration was voluntary according to the introductory notes to Hals-
bury's Laws of England. The 1874 Act referred to registering 'the names, if any, by 
which it was registered is altered, or if it was registered without a name; when a 
name is given to it." Sec. 25, Name reads "In column 2 (Name, if any)." Current 
regulations read "(3) With respect to space 2 (Name and surname) the surname to 
be entered shall be the surname by which at the date of the registration of the 
birth it is intended that the child shall be known and, if a name is not given, the 
registrar shall enter the surname by a horizontal line." S.I. 1968, 2049 18(3). It is 
not an error of fact or substance per se to record a child in a name other than the 
father's. D. v. B. (1979) 1 All E.R. 92. See generally In re SMpley, 26 Misc. 2d 204, 
205 N.Y.S.2d 581 (Sup. Ct. Nassau, 1960); In re Snook, 2 Hift. 566 (C.P.N.Y. Cty. 
1859); Smith v. United States Casualty Co., 197 N.Y. 420, 90 N.E. 947 (1910); In re 
Falcucci, 355 P. 588, 50 A.2d 200 (1947). I 
38. W. Hooper, The Law of Illegitimacy (1911); Estate of Lund, 26 Cal. 2d 472, 
159 P.2d 643 (1945); DuBoulay v. DuBoulay, (1869) 2 L.R.-P.C. 430: Shannon v. The 
People, 5 Mich. 71 (1858). 
39. Sullivan v. Sullivan (1818) 2 Hag. Con. 238,161 Eng. Rip. 728, affd, (1819) 3 
Phill. Ecc. 45, 161 Eng. Rep. 1253; Wakefield v. MacKay (1807) 1 Hag. Con. 394, 161 
Eng. Rep. 593; Wilson v. Brockley (1810) 1 Phill. Ecc. 132, 161 Eng. Rep. 937. 
40. The cases under the old English statute requiring publication of an impend-
ing marriage (marriage banns statute) reflect examples of young persons who have 
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caused them to be known by a certain name.41 By custom, marital 
children were initially named with their fathers' surnames and 
thereafter known by them.42 Children of married parents, how-
ever, sometimes took their mothers' surnames at birth or thereaf-
ter.43 As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated in 
1977 in the United States' most comprehensive opinion on the 
common law naming rights of adults and children, Secretary of the 
Commonwealth v. City Clerk of Lowell :44 "[T]he common law 
principle of freedom of choice in the matter of names extends to 
the name chosen by a married couple for their chila."45 
However, where parents have originally given a child the fa-
ther's surname, the English courts have traditionally accorded 
men superior naming rights in disputes between the parents over 
changing the children's patronymic after divorce or separation.46 
They have based this right on the man's prerogative to decide his 
been known by different surnames throughout their minority. See supra note 21. 
The right of minors to change their names (subject to their parents' authority) 
without statutory proceedings is recognized in American caselaw. Clinton v. Mor-
row, 220 Ark. 377, 247 S.W.2d 1015 (1952); Burke v. Hammonds, $k S.W.2d 307 (Ky. 
Ct. App. 1979); Hall v. Hall, 30 Md. App. 214, 351 A.2d 917 (1976) In re Natale, 527 
S.W.2d 402 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Bruguier v. Bruguier, 12 N.J. sliper. 350, 79 A.2d 
497 (1951). It must be noted that minors have never had a common law right to 
name themselves independent of their parents. The State only recognized that mi-
nors' names could be changed without judicial proceedings. A recent valuable law 
review note on In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1981), cert^ denied, 455 U.S. 
1034 (1982) did not emphasize this important distinction. Note, \Like Father, Like 
Child: the Rights of Parents in their Children's Surnames, 70 Va.|L. Rev. 1303,1309 
(1984) 
41. Supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
42. Supra note 30. 
43. A prime example of this accepted variance in custom is Thomas Littleton, 
son of Elizabeth Littleton and her husband Thomas Wescott. Co. Litt. 3a. The On-
tario Law Reform Commission, used this example in its comprehensive study of 
naming customs and laws in Ontario. Report on Changes of Name (1976); Mark 
Anthony Lower, English Surnames: An Essay on Family Nomenclature, Historical, 
Etymological, and Humorous 52 (1875); Rainey, supra note 27; Ewen, supra note 27. 
44. 373 Mass. 178, 190, 366 N.E.2d 717, 725 (1977). 
Courts and state attorney generals have accepted naming one's children as an 
incident of childrearing: "The naming of a child is a right and privilege belonging to 
the child's parents." D'Ambrosio v. Rizzo, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 926, 425 N.E.2d 369 
(1981); See also L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827, 832 (Alaska 1976); Parks v. Francis's 
Administrator, 50 Vt. 626 (1878); Hosmer v. Hosmer, 611 S.W.2d 32 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1980). The Attorney General of Connecticut wrote in 1975: 
The natural parents, or parent, as the case may be, have legal responsi-
bility for the children which may be terminated only after pertain pro-
cedures and findings are followed and made. . . . Until sucjh time, the 
parents have the prerogatives as well as the responsibilities and duties 
which devolved upon them. One of the prerogatives is naming the 
child. ' 
Op. Att'y Gen. Conn. 5 (Jan. 23, 1975). 
45. 373 Mass. 178, 190, 366 N.E.2d 717, 725 (1977). 
46. E.g., W. v. A. (1981) 2 W.L.R. 124, noted in Note, Changelof Child's Name, 
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children's names, and the supposed best interests [of the children, 
and not on a factual or legal presumption that minors should not 
change their names at all during their childhood. 
B. Erosion of the Common Law 
Several states, in various contexts, have erodfed the common 
law right to name children.47 A few states have |imited parents' 
rights in naming marital children on their birth certificates. At 
the beginning of the 1970s only Hawaii and Nortjh Carolina had 
statutes requiring the father's name to be given to| newborn mari-
tal children. During the 1970s Florida, Louisiana 4nd New Hamp-
shire passed similar laws. All of these statutes have been 
invalidated as unconstitutional48 or repealed and replaced.49 
Twelve states have passed statutes requiring that the 
mother's name be given newborn nonmarital children on their 
birth certificates absent an acknowledgement or determination of 
paternity or legitimation.50 Three states statutorily mandate that 
97 Law Q. Rev. 197 (1981); Re T (1963) 1 Ch. 238; Evelyn Ellis, pie Choice of Chil-
dren's Surnames, 9 Anglo-Am. L. Rev. 92 (1980). 
47. See infra notes 102-113 and accompanying text. 
48. Jech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714 (D. Hawaii 1979), declared Hawaii's statute 
an unconstitutional infringement on parental liberty. A federal district court like-
wise invalidated North Carolina's statute as an unconstitutional infringement on 
parents' right to privacy. O'Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. Supp. 494 (EjD.N.C. 1981). This 
court also noted that the statute created a classification on the basis of gender and 
birth status, and granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs. Id. Florida's statute 
was invalidated as an unconstitutional intrusion on the parents' "constitutionally 
protected right to choose the name of their child." Sydney v. Pingree, 564 F. Supp. 
412, 413 (S.D. Fla. 1982). 
49. Louisiana replaced its statute in July, 1983 with a provision which limits pa-
rental choices to the father's name, the mother's "maiden" name or a combination 
thereof and gives the husband veto power over the latter two options by requiring 
both parents' consent. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40.34(1)(a)(iii) (WJ>st Supp. 1985). A 
recent attempt was made to revise this statute. See supra, note 19; infra, note 52. 
North Carolina replaced its statute in 1983 with a provision that "[t]he surname of 
the child shall be the same as that of the husband, except that upon agreement of 
the mother and father . . . any surname may be chosen." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 130A-
101(e) (Supp. 1983). The New Hampshire legislature replaced its statute in 1979 
with a law limiting parental naming options to "either the father or the mother or 
any combination thereof." N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 126:6, V(a) (Repealed 1983). In 
June, 1983 New Hampshire removed these limitations and amended the statute to 
read that "[t]he surname of the child shall be any name chosen by the parents." 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 126:6-a, 1(a) (Supp. 1983). In case of separation or divorce at 
the time of birth, "the choice of surname rests with the parent Who has actual cus-
tody following birth." Id. 
50. D.C. Code Ann. § 6-205(e)(5) (Supp. 1984); Fla. Stat. I n n . § 382.16(5)(e) 
(West Supp. 1983); Ga. Code Ann. § 31-10-9(e)(5) (Supp. 1984); I Hawaii Rev. Stat. 
§ 574-3 (Supp. 1984); Ind. Code Ann. § 16-1-16-15 (Burns 1983); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§213.050(1) (1982); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40-34(l)(a)(iii) (West! 1985); N.D. Cent. 
Code § 23-02.1-13(6) (1983); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3705.14 (Page 1980); Tenn. Code 
Ann. § 68-3-305(b) (1983); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-1-411 (1977). A new law in North 
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upon a determination or acknowledgement of paternity or legiti-
mation the surname on a child's birth certificate automatically be-
comes the same as the father's, or that the father hps the right to 
choose the name.51 
Louisiana,52 Nebraska,53 and Tennessee54 currently restrict 
marital newborn children's surnames on their certificates to those 
of the mother, father or a combination thereof. Several states 
have regulations to the same effect.55 Similarly, nine states statu-
torily limit the surnames given to nonmarital children on their 
Carolina recognizes the father's right to participate in the naming, but requires the 
mother's name be given a nonmarital child m cases of disagreement N C Gen 
Stat § 130A-101(f) (Supp 1983) For a statutory compilation, seeJNote, The Contro-
versy Over Children's Surnames Familial Autonomy, Equal Protection and the 
Child's Best Interests, 1979 Utah L Rev 303, 335-45 The author'L categorization of 
changes m birth certificate records as a "change of name" is not accurate Whether 
or not a change m the name on a birth certificate amounts to a "change of name" 
depends on the age of the child when the birth certificate is changed and the name 
by which the child has been known In considermg the names of infants or very 
young children who do not yet know their names, the courts give mconsistent at-
tention to the issue of whether a determmation of the child's name is really a 
change at such an age See infra notes 114-148 and accompanying text 
51 Indiana, Kentucky and South Carolina still have such laws Statutes in Ala-
bama, North Carolina and South Dakota have been invalidated as unconstitutional 
Roe v Conn, 417 F Supp 769 (M D Ala 1976), Jones v McDowell, 53 N C App 
434, 281 S E 2 d 192 (1981), Boelter v Blair, No Civ 81-4217 ( S D S D April 21, 1982) 
(Judgment) The Kentucky statutes are currently bemg reviewed for revision 
Conversation with John H Walker, Counsel to the Kentucky Department For 
Human Resources (June 7, 1985) 
52 La Rev Stat Ann § 40 34(A)(a)(l)(ui) (West 1984) 
The surnames of the child shall be the surname of the husband of the 
mother if he was married to the mother at the time of conception and 
birth of the child or had not been legally divorced from the mother of 
the child for more than three hundred days prior to the birth of the 
child, or, if both the husband and mother agree, the surname of the 
child may be the maiden name of the mother or a combination of the 
surnames of the husband and the maiden name of the mother 
The defeated bill to correct this statute provided "The surname of the child shall 
be the surname agreed upon by the mother and the husband of the mother " S 
Bill No 227 (1985) 
53 Neb Rev Stat § 71-640 01(1) (1981) 
[T]he surname of the child shall be entered on the certificate as being 
(a) the same as that of the husband, unless paternity has been deter-
mined otherwise by a court of competent jurisdiction, (b) the surname 
of the mother, (c) the maiden surname of the mother, or (d) the hy-
phenated surname of both parents 
54 Tenn Code Ann § 68-3-305(a) (1983) 
The surname of the child shall be entered on the certificate as that of 
the natural father, except that where the mother though married has 
retained her married surname, then on sworn application of both par-
ents, the child's surname to be entered on the birth certificate may be 
the maiden surname of the child's mother, or both surnames as the 
parents mutually agree 
55 See, eg , Sec 4(e)(1) Ark Rules and Regulations Pertaining to Vital 
Records (1981), N J Admin Code tit 8 § 2-1 l(a)(l)(u) (1975) (New Jersey Depart-
ment of Health Rules Recording and/or Correctmg Original Birth Certificate of a 
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birth certificates to the mother's, the father's, or a combination of 
both upon their joint request following acknowledgement or deter-
mination of paternity or legitimation.56 
The consequence of this erosion of the commbn law has been 
to generate a new type of litigation, that by parents against the 
state instead of against each other. 
C. Contexts of Litigation 
Litigation over children's names generally arises between 
separated or divorced parents over the change of tlhe child's name 
from the father's name. The language in United States cases con-
cerning children bearing the paternal name and regarding the fa-
ther's "natural," "primary," "time-honored,!' "legal" or 
"protectible" right57 to name marital children derives from dis-
putes of this kind, not from any state requirements that children 
bear certain names. No reported case involves a parental dispute 
over naming children in an ongoing marriage, either at birth or 
thereafter.58 
Child Born In or Out of Wedlock); Sec. 1-311(I)(B) (1982) Oklahoma Rules and 
Regulations Governing Vital Statistics Registration of Birth Certificates. 
56. E.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 6-205(e)(3) (Supp. 1984); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 382.16(5)(c) 
(West Supp. 1983); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 574-2 (Supp. 1984); I^eb. Rev. Stat. § 71-
640.01(2) (1981); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 126:6-a(II)(a) and (IV) (1983); Ohio Rev. 
Code Ann. § 3705.14 (Page 1980); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 34-25-15 (Supp. 1984); 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-3-305(b) (1983); Va. Code § 32.1-269(D) (Supp. 1984); Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-l-411(d) (1977). 
57. See generally In re Tubbs, 620 P.2d 384 (Okla. 1980); kobinson v. Hansel, 
302 Minn. 34, 223 N.W.2d 138 (1974); Application of Lone, 134 N.J. Super. 213, 338 
A.2d 883 (1975). A trial court in New Jersey recently refused to follow the Lone 
reasoning in In re Rossell, 196 N.J. Super. 109, 481 A.2d 602, 605 (1984) 
The principle which it \Lone] espouses denies equality. The right of 
the father to have his child bear his name is no greater than the right 
of the mother to have her child bear her name. The deference which 
Lone accords the father is a deference rooted in an antiquity. 
58. A singular case involved a child who had always born her mother's birth 
given surname. In a divorce action the trial court, on its own motion, referred to 
the child by the husband's surname. The father, however, w4s not attempting to 
change the child's name and the appellate court said that the lower court's refer-
ence did not operate to change the child's surname. In re Ramirez, 31 Or. App. 959, 
571 P.2d 1280 (1977). 
As head of the household under the common law, the father in an ongoing 
marriage probably would have been judged to have the primary right of naming— 
first, middle and last names—over the mother. See Kathleen A. Ryan Carlsson, 
Surnames of Women and Legitimate Children, 17 N.Y.L.F. 852 (1971). 
At common law the father had absolute control and custody of his marital chil-
dren after divorce. Herma Hill Kay, Sex-Based Discrimination: Text, Cases and 
Materials 299 (1981). Commonwealth recognized the father's absolute control by 
citing cases in which fathers contracted with third persons for money in exchange 
for naming their children for them. 373 Mass. 178, 366 N.E.2d 717 (1977). Gardner 
v. Denison, 217 Mass. 492, 105 N.E. 359 (1914); Eaton v. Libbekr, 165 Mass. 218, 42 
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two 
state 
Courts would have certain jurisdiction to 
over children's names in ongoing marriages in 
statutory name change proceedings, probably in a 
ing both parents to petition for consent to the chandi 
against the state for recognizing one parent's choic^ 
the other's for driving, school registration, or the 
courts will discuss the relative rights of parents ir\ 
riages to name infants and older children in 
vorced parents who have legal and actual joint cu i^ 
divorce.59 
Recent litigation has, additionally, arisen in 
parents challenging statutory or other state 
they name their children in a particular way at 
ter.60 Statutes recognizing a superior naming righ^ 




]e, or 2) actions 






%he context of 
that 
or thereaf-
in the father 
requirements 
bikh 
D. Developments of the 1970s and Early 1980s 
To plan legal action and strategy for the next 
essary to articulate the precise extent of women's 
name their children. Summarizing the advances made 
knowledges our history and sets the stage for an evaluation 
future. The last several years have seen the following 
qecade it is nec-




(March 22, 1951). 
bf name of a man 
neglect, the state 
N.E. 1127 (1896). There is, however, no case on the issue of a parental dispute in an 
ongoing marriage. 
Several of the earliest state attorney general opinions state that a father's 
change of name does not automatically change his children's names absent their us-
age of the same. Op. Att'y Gen. Cal. (Sept. 25, 1969); Op. Att'y (pen. Cal. (Nov. 26, 
1943); Op. Att'y Gen. Mo. (May 15, 1951); Op. Att'y Gen. Mo. 
Some state name change statutes have provided that a change 
changes his wife's and children's names also. Vermont repealed the country's last 
such statute in 1979. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 814 (1974), repealed^ by 1979 Vt. Acts, 
No. 142 (Adj. Sess.), Sec. 26. 
As a general rule, absent criminal action or child abuse or 
does not interfere with ongoing marriages and the rearing of children. See gener-
ally Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Smith v. Organization of Foster Fami-
lies, 431 U.S. 816 (1977); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); 
Dike v. School Board of Orange County, 650 F. 2d 783, 786 (5th Cir. 1981) 
59. In a recent decision the Minnesota Court of Appeals treated a situation in-
volving joint legal custody in which physical custody was with the mother no differ-
ently than if the mother had sole legal custody. Young v. Your>g, 356 N.W.2d 825 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984). 
60. See infra notes 81-96 and accompanying text. 
61. See, e.g., Jones v. McDowell, 53 N.C. App. 434, 281 S.E.^d 192 (1981). The 
Louisiana, North Carolina and Tennessee birth certificate statutes which require 
the father's name be given a newborn marital child on its birth certificate unless 
the father agrees otherwise are certain to create litigation which could be destined 
for Supreme Court review within the next decade if they are r|ot repealed or re-
vised. See supra notes 52-54. 
114 Law and Inequality [Vol. 3:91 
of the rights of parents to name their marital knd nonmarital 
children: 
1. Courts and state legislatures, attorneys gdneral and regis-
trars of vital statistics have generally recognized that married par-
ents have the common law right to name their newborn children 
any surname they choose.62 
2. Courts and state attorneys general and registrars of vital 
statistics have generally recognized that, absent & statute to the 
contrary, unmarried women have the right to name their newborn 
children either as a right superior to the father's or in the absence 
surname. 
1076; 
62. The highest courts of two states have recognized the 
parents to name their children with any surname they wish, 
monwealth v. City Clerk of Lowell, 373 Mass. 178, 366 N.E.24 
Dunning, 87 Wash. 2d 50, 549 P.2d 1 (1976). On remand, the 
Health and Rehabilitative Services determined that a statute 
surname on its birth certificate encompassed a hyphenated 
mother's surname. Rice v. Department of Health and Rehabil 
844 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (Case No. 80-1674) (on remand, 
and Findings of Fact of Div. of Administrative Hearings, Dec. 3i, 
Jan. 13, 1981). Prior to the passage of the statute the Florida 
ruled that parents had the right to give their children any 
Fla. No. 076-235 (Dec. 21, 1976). The present statute was 
ney v. Pingree, 564 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. Fla. 1982). Numerous state 
have recognized this common law right. Op. Att'y Gen. Alask^i 
Att'y Gen. Conn. (Jan. 23,1975); Op. Att'y Gen. Me. (Aug. 18, 
Op. Att'y Gen. Md. (Nov. 9, 1978); Op. Att'y Gen. Mass. (Jan. 
Gen. Mich. (April 14, 1980); Op. Att'y Gen. Mo. (May 1, 1953); 
Att'y Gen. June 6, 1974; Op. Att'y Gen. Vt. No. 81-75 (March 10[ 
Gen. Wis. 501 (Oct. 7, 1974). 
Several state health agencies expressly recognize this 
require parents to choose a specific surname, e.g., "Illinois 
what name a child shall be given when a birth record is prepare^, 
ried or unmarried parents may be given any surname the 
quest." Letter from Aaron Bengeison, Deputy State Registrar}, 
1982). "Iowa law does not specify as to, between two parents, 
determine surname for the child shall control. If parents 
that the name provided on the child's birth certificate would 
til that name is changed pursuant to a court order." Letter 
General Jeanine Freeman to author (April 19, 1982). Mich 
§ 333.2824(1) (West 1980) provides that "the surname of the 
parents] shall be registered as designated by the child's parentis, 
Ann. § 126:6-(a)(I)(a) (1983) reads: "The surname of the child 
chosen by the parents. . . . " S.C. Code Ann. vol. 24 A, R. 61-19 
1982) reads: "The child's surname shall be entered on the 
by the parents." Pennsylvania's published regulation, 28 Pa. 
reads: "The designation of a child's name, including surname 
child's parents. Thus, a child's surname . . . may be the surnarin 
of the child's parents, a surname formed by combining the 
in hyphenated or other form, or a name which bears no 
of either parent." 
Secretary < 
law right of 
of the Com-
717 (1977); Doe v. 
Fl4rida Department of 
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ijiame including the 
Services, 386 So. 2d 
Rjecommended Order 
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Op. Att'y Gen. 
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of an objection by an acknowledged father.63 
3. State registrars and health officials fori 
abide by the general rule of law that in the absence of a specific 
statute to the contrary parents have the mutual 
their newborn marital children with any surname.64 These offi-
cials also recognize an unmarried women's right td 
nonmarital children with any surname on their birth certificates.65 
the most part 
right to name 
name newborn 
63. Doe v. Dunning, 87 Wash. 2d 50, 549 P.2d 1 (1976); Secretary of Common-
wealth v. City Clerk of Lowell, 373 Mass. 178, 366 N.E.2d 717 U977) 
Several state attorney generals have recognized the commop law naming rights 
of unmarried women. Op. Att'y Gen. Conn. (Jan. 23, 1975); 
(April 8, 1977); Op. Atty. Gen. Me. (Feb. 23, 1978); 63 Att'y GeiL Md. 70 (1978); Op. 
Att'y Gen. Pa. No. 75-8 (Feb. 19, 1975); Op. Att'y Gen. Tex. No. H-1078 (Oct. 26, 
1977); Op. Att'y Gen. Vt. No. 81-75 (March 10, 1975); 63 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 501 
(1974). Op. Att'y Gen. Mo. (May 1, 1953) was reaffirmed by the Missouri Attorney 
General by opinion June 6, 1974. Statutes giving a father the right to name a child 
upon legitimation or determination of paternity have been successfully challenged 
in Alabama, North Carolina and South Dakota. See supra note 51. 
64. Some registrars, however, convey to citizens their views of how parents 
should name children. 
There are no restrictions on the bestowing of surnames of children 
born in Missouri. However, our experience has been that when a sur-
name other than that of the father's is bestowed upon the issue of a 
legitimate marriage problems with the record result for the parents 
and child. . . . The mother of a child born out of lawful wedlock may 
bestow upon the child any surname that she chooses. Again, this fre-
quently causes problems for if she applies for public assistance, she 
usually furnishes the agency with a different surname wfhich makes it 
extremely difficult to identify the child's record so that 
qualify for any benefits that might be available. 
Letter from Charles L. Bell, Director, Bureau of Vital Statistic^, Mo. Dept. of Social 
Services, Division of Health to author (Jan. 22, 1982). 
65. Several state health agencies expressly recognize this 
mother and do not require her to choose a specific name. E.g. 
Reg. 61-19(8)(g)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1983) ("In any case in which 
parental right of the 
24A S.C. Code Ann. 
the mother was not 
married either at the time of birth or conception and there is do paternity acknowl-
edgment . . . the surname of the child shall be entered as designated by the 
mother."). 
"In the case of a child born out-of-wedlock, the mother niay choose any name 
she wishes and that name is entered on the child's birth certificate." Letter from 
Muriel E. Cedeno, Iowa State Department of Health, to authok- (Feb. 18, 1982). 
the child may 
that, if the father is 
chosen by both par-
when a father is not 
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.2824 (West 1980) provides 
named, at the consent of the mother and father, the name is| 
ents. If the father is named as a result of a paternity suit as 
named at all, "[t]he surname of the child shall be entered on tke certificate of birth 
pursuant to the designation of the child's mother." 
"Mothers in Nevada, are allowed to name their child whatever they wish." 
Letter from Mary Howard, Management Ass't, Nevada State Division of Health to 
author (Feb. 23, 1982). 
See supra note 63 for the two state court decisions recognizing women's com-
mon law rights in naming nonmarital children. 
Several states operate pursuant to administrative regulations specifying what 
names shall be given newborns. The validity of these regulations depends on the 
states. Statutes prescribe names; record keepers do not. Sidney Norton, L^egal As-
pects of Illegitimacy for the Registrar, 12 Md. L. Rev. 181 (1951). 
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4 Wherever challenged, statutory requirements that either 
a marital or nonmarital child bear its father's surname or its fa-
ther's choice of surname on its birth certificate at birth66 after ac-
knowledgement or determination of paternity,67 or legitimation68 
have been invalidated as unconstitutional. 
5. In several of the appellate cases involvingI the naming of 
marital children at birth or in their first few years where the par-
ents disagree and the mother, who usually uses her birth given 
surname, has custody, the courts have rejected the traditional su-
perior naming right of the father and have awarded the naming 
right to the custodial mother in one of three ways: 1) by declining 
jurisdiction, 2) by a direct ruling, or 3) by remanding for a determi-
nation of the child's best interests.69 
6. Courts have moved in the direction of recognizing new 
rights of men to name nonmarital children.70 As custodial parents 
of nonmarital children, women, however, usually maintain their 
right to determine their children's names at least when the chil-
dren have been given a non-paternal name on their birth certifi-
cates or in early infancy.71 
Brien 66 Sydney v Pingree, 564 F Supp 412 (S D Fla 1982), O' 
F Supp 494 (E D N C 1981), Jech v Burch, 466 F Supp 714 (D 
67 A statute requiring that a child bear the patronymic aftek* 
or determination of paternity was invalidated in Boelter v Blair, 
(S D S D April 21, 1982) (Judgment) | 
68 Roe v Conn, 417 F Supp 769 (M D Ala 1976), Jones v 
App 434, 281 S E 2d 192 (1981) I 
69 In re Schiffman, 28 Cal 3d 640, 620 P 2d 579,169 Cal Rpt^ 
Nguyen, 684 P2d 258 (Colo App 1983), cert denied, 105 S Ct 
Blasi, 648 S W 2d 80 (Ky 1983) (divorce court refused to exercise| 
der mother to change infant's name back to father's by a statutory 
Webber v Parker, 167 So 2d 519 (La Ct App 1964), writ refused 
So 2d 269 (1964) (dispute over given names), Jacobs v Jacobs, 
(Minn 1981), Cohee v Cohee, 210 Neb 855, 317 N W 2d 381 (1982) 
honored—hyphenated name with his name first), In re Schidlmeier, 
slip op (Pa Super Aug 9, 1985), In re M L P , 621 S W 2d 430 
1981), Hurta v Hurta, 25 Wash App 95, 605 P2d 1278 (1979) ty 
Ariz App 58, 540 P 2d 1277 (1975) the court stated m dicta that 
rights to name marital children at birth The court did not indicate 
rights exist within or without an ongomg marriage 
70 In re Schiffman, 28 Cal 3d 640, 620 P2d 579, 169 Cal Rj>t; 
ing Donald J v Evna M, 81 Cal App 3d 929, 147 Cal Rptr 15 
Jacobs, 309 N W 2d 303 (Minn 1981) (equal naming right at birtfi), 
bott, 591 S W 2d 751 (Mo Ct App 1979), Hardy v Hardy, 269 
A 2d 244 (1973) (framing the father's right as an mterested part^ 
pertaining to the child's mterests) In Kirksey, 591 S W 2d at 752, 
"Neither parent has an absolute right for the child to bear his qr 
Massachusetts Supreme Court did not explain whether or not 
tween wed and unwed fathers was significant m a factually unclear 
Fuss, 371 Mass 64, 368 N E 2d 271 (1977) | 
71 Sullivan v McGaw, 134 111 App 3d 455, 480 N E 2 d 
v Tilson, 523 
Hawaii 1979) 
acknowledgment 
No Civ 81-4217 
McDowell, 53 N C 
918 (1980), In re 
ff85 (1985), Blasi v 
jurisdiction to or-
name change), 
264 La 886, 168 
309 N W 2 d 303 
(father's choice 
No J 27018-85, 
(Tex Civ App 
Laks v Laks, 25 
parents have equal 
whether these 
r 918 (1980) (cit-
(1978)), Jacobs v 
Kirksey v Ab-
iMd App 412, 306 
with information 
the court stated 
her name " The 
the distinction be-
setting Fuss v 
1283 (1985), In re 
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Thus, wherever married parents are in agreement or there is 
a statute requiring that a marital child be giver} its father's sur-
name or choice of surname on its birth certificate, parents suing 
jointly have prevailed in all challenges to mandatory state require-
ments. Courts hold that the requirements interfere with parental 
liberty and privacy to rear children and discriminate on the basis 
of sex or birth status.72 Only one reported case has challenged a 
statute requiring the mother's name to be given a newborn marital 
child on its birth certificate. The Indiana Supreme Court rejected 
the challenge in a one-paragraph opinion, but a long dissent rea-
soned that the statute was unconstitutional.73 Where children are 
newborn or very young (under three), until 1982 courts were up-
holding custodial mothers' judgments as to their children's names. 
The courts in all such cases nevertheless consistently articulated 
that women and men have equal rights in naming marital children 
at birth. Since 1982,74 however, courts have retreated from award-
; pending, 
G.L.A., 430 N.E.2d 433 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). G.L.A. overruled 
court rendered a year previously. D.R.S. v. R.S.H., 412 N.E. 
1980). D.R.S. awarded the primary naming right to the 
married father. G.L.A. was litigated expressly to undo the 
D.R.S. Although D.R.S. was on appeal when G.L.A. was 
gating G.L.A. did not know about the case until the decision 
newspapers. The same appellate division decided the two 
any court could be expected to in rectifying its own mistake 
before. It is too early in litigation to evaluate if mothers of 
maintaining their naming right because they are the custodial 
always held that third persons have no legal interest in 
nonmarital children. In re Dunston, 18 N.C. App. 647, 
Winkenhofer v. Griffin, 511 S.W.2d 216 (Ky. Ct. App. 1974); Ir\, 
406, 545 P.2d 1012 (1976). 
72. See infra notes 81-96 and accompanying text. 
73. In Doe v. Hancock County Board of Health, 436 N.E.: 
Indiana Supreme Court dismissed a challenge to the statute 
name to be given to a nonmarital child on its birth certificate 
dismiss because the Indiana Court of Appeals refused to 
The Supreme Court granted the State's motion. Review 
sought because of the procedural posture of the case and 
married. An Indiana law, the constitutionality of which 
mandatorily gave the parents the relief they sought as an 
marriage—the father's name for the child. A long dissent 
merits and concluded that the state cannot constitutionally 
parents' right to name their children. 
Lawsuits against mother's name requirements are 
reasons: 1) the parents intermarry and states will then change 
certificate names, 2) the mother or both parents want the 
the mother or parents do not know where to get legal 
certificates thus issued do not appear as an original marital 
has been ruled to not constitute discrimination on the basis 
v. Johnson, 297 N.W.2d 175 (S.D. 1980). Compare Doe v. 
549 P.2d 1 (1976). 
74. In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1981), cert, denie^ 
Cohee v. Cohee, 210 Neb. 855, 317 N.W.2d 381 (1982). 
decision of the same 
.4d 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 
father as if he had been a 
pad law articulated in 
;, the attorneys liti-
appeared in the local 
;. It went as far as 
bf only a few months 
nonmarital children are 
parents. Courts have 
statutory name changes of 
197 S.E.2d 560 (1973); 
re Toelkes, 97 Idaho 
2d 791 (Ind. 1982), the 
requiring the mother's 
The state moved to 
accept its late-filed brief, 
beyond rehearing was not 
because the parties inter-
is yet to be tested, 
automatic result of their 
reviewed the case on the 
interfere with unwed 
difficult to locate for three 
:e the children's birth 
mother's name and/or 3) 
That new birth 
s birth certificate 
birth status. Dorian 




:, 455 U.S. 1034 (1982). 
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ing women the right to name infant children over fathers* objec-
tions. They have almost unanimously upheld the demands of 
divorced fathers to have children bear the patronymic.75 
The naming of children is necessarily an orchestration of the 
relative rights of parents against the state and each other.76 No 
state has ever required a child to bear a certain surname simply 
because of its birth status or parentage. Until very recently, all 
states have expressly or indirectly accepted the primary right of 
fathers over mothers to determine marital children': 
a dispute between the parents arises. They have accepted a pre-
sumption that children are best off keeping their father's sur-
names if fathers want them to use them.77 The recent at-birth 
75. In re Presson, 102 111. 2d 303, 80 111. Dec. 294, 465 N.E.2d 85 (1984); In re 
Meyer, 471 N.E.2d 718 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Young v. Young, 356 N.W.2d 823 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1984); Lassiter-Geers v. Reichenbach, 303 Md. 88, 492 A.2d 303 (1985); 
Overton v. Overton, 674 P.2d 1089 (Mont. 1983); Cohan v. Cunnijigham, 104 A.D.2d 
716, 480 N.Y.S.2d 656 (1984); In re Newcomb, 15 Ohio App. 3d 1<W, 472 N.E.2d 1142 
(1984); Brown v. Carroll, 683 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984). But see In re Gold-
stein, 104 A.D.2d 616, 479 N.Y.S.2d 385 (N.Y. App. 1984); compdre In re Fletcher, 
144 Vt. 419, 468 A.2d 627 (1984). Ex parte Stone, 328 S.E.2d 346 (S.C. 1985). Trial 
courts have also moved in the direction of sustaining the male naming power. In re 
Petras, 123 Misc. 2d 665 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1984). 
76. The yardstick used to measure these rights is supposedly the children's best 
interests. See Annot., Rights and Remedies of Parents Inter Se With Respect to the 
Names of Their Children, 92 A.L.R.3d 1091 (1979). Note, Domestic Relations: 
Change of Minor's Surname: Parental Rights in Minor's Surname: Sobel v. Sobel, 
46 N.J. Super. 284, 134 A.2d 598 (Ch. 1957); Marshall v. Marshall, 93 So. 2d 822 
(Miss. 1957), 44 Cornell L.Q. 144 (1958). J 
77. Arkansas: Norton v. Norton, 268 Ark. 791, 595 S.W.2d 709 (Ark. Ct. App. 
1980); Carroll v. Johnson, 263 Ark. 280, 565 S.W.2d 10 (1978); Clinton v. Morrow, 
220 Ark. 377, 247 S.W.2d 1015 (1952); Arizona: Laks v. Laks, 25 Ariz. App. 58, 540 
P.2d 1277 (1975); California: see cases cited in In re Schiffman, i8 Cal. 3d 640, 620 
P.2d 579, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1980); Delaware: Degerberg v. McCbrmick, 41 Del. Ch. 
46, 187 A.2d 436 (1963); Degerberg v. McCormick, 40 Del. Ch.|471, 184 A.2d 468 
(1962); District of Columbia: Nellis v. Pressman, 282 A.2d 539 (B.C. 1971), cert de-
nied, 405 U.S. 975 (1972); Florida: Arnett v. Matthews, 259 So. 2d 535 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1972); Lazow v. Lazow, 147 So. 2d 12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Georgia: Doe 
v. Roe, 235 Ga. 318, 219 S.E.2d 700 (1975); Illinois: In re Pressok, 116 111. App. 3d 
458, 71 111. Dec. 816, 451 N.E.2d 970 (1984); In re Omelson, 112 111. App. 3d 725, 445 
N.E.2d 951 (1983); Weinert v. Weinert, 105 111. App. 3d 56, 433 N-E.2d 1158 (1982); 
Indiana: In re Meyer, 471 N.E.2d 718 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Iowa: Green v. Sherman, 
173 N.W.2d 843 (Iowa 1970); Kentucky: Burke v. Hammonds, 586 S.W.2d 307 (Ky. 
Ct. App. 1974); Maryland: West v. Wright, 263 Md. 297, 283 A.2d 401 (1971); Hall v. 
Hall, 30 Md. App. 214, 351 A.2d 917 (1976); Lassiter-Geers v. Reiihenbach, 303 Md. 
88, 492 A.2d 303 (1985); Massachusetts: Margolis v. Margolis, 338 Mass. 416, 155 
N.E.2d 177 (1959); Mark v. Kahn, 333 Mass. 517, 131 N.E.2d 758 (1956); Minnesota: 
Robinson v. Hansel, 302 Minn. 34, 223 N.W.2d 138 (1974); In re Skxton, 309 N.W.2d 
298 (Minn. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1034 (1982); Young v. Yourlg, 356 N.W.2d 823 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Mississippi: Marshall v. Marshall, 230 Miss. 719, 93 So. 2d 
822 (1957); Montana: Firman v. Firman, 187 Mont. 465, 610 P.2d 178 (1980); Ne-
braska: In re Spatz, 199 Neb. 332, 258 N.W.2d 814 (1977); New Jersey: In re Lone, 
134 N.J. Super 213, 338 A.2d 883 (1975); W. v. H., 103 N.J. SuperL 24, 246 A.2d 501 
(Ch. Div. 1968); Sobel v. Sobel, 46 N.J. Super. 284,134 A.2d 598 (Ch. Div. 1957); New 
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naming cases were beginning to erode this right aiid presumption, 
but to date only the California Supreme Court, in the landmark 
case In re Schiffman ,78 has expressly rejected this niale power and 
overturned all the state's precedent79 based on it. In the cases in-
volving older children, women prevail rarely and phen only when 
they succeed in rebutting the superior right of thb father to con-
trol the naming of children, usually where the children have al-
ready been known by the name selected by the mother and/or 
children.80 Women have made some gains in naming children, but 
4 i : 
2d; 
York Cohan v Cunningham, 104 A D 2d 716, 480 N Y S 2d 656 
re Goldstein, 104 A D 616, 479 N Y S 2 d 385 (1984), (trial 
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major, perhaps insurmontable, barriers still stand. It is important 
to note that the cases of old involved women seeking to give their 
children a new marital name. Where women have made recent 
gains, they have sought to name their children with their own 
names. 
II. The Right of Married Parents in Agreement to Name Their 
Children Without State Interference 
As set forth in the previous section, courts and state attor-
neys general have firmly established the right of married parents 
in agreement to name their children without state interference. 
The major case on this issue arose in Massachusetts in the mid-
1970s.81 When city and town clerks in Massachusetts refused to 
follow the Massachusetts Attorney GeneraTs directive that parents 
had the common law right to select or change the names of them-
selves and their children, the State Registrar of Vnal Records and 
Statistics, represented by the Attorney General's office, brought an 
action directly in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 
The City Clerk's Association had unanimously adopted the posi-
tion that "legitimate births would only be recorded in the surname 
of the father and illegitimate births in the surname of the 
mother"82 in accordance with "custom and usage" for over 200 
years. The clerks had asserted "a power to determine people's sur-
names according to customary rules regardless of me people con-
cerned."83 In Secretary of the Commonwealth v.\ City Clerk of 
Lowell, et al the court ruled in favor of the Attorney Greneral, 
stating that "it is no part of the duty of the clerk to substitute his 
legal judgment for that of the Attorney Greneral. . . . No tradition 
of city and town clerks can override the law or tl^e rights of the 
people."84 
The court, specifically disregarding cases involving parental 
disputes, articulated that the common law principle of freedom of 
choice in the matter of names "extends to the name chosen by a 
married couple for their child."85 Similarly, absent objection from 
the father, the mother of a nonmarital child has "the same right to 
App. 481, 34 Ohio Op. 198, 64 N.E.2d 84 (1945); Newman v. Kikig, 433 S.W.2d 421 
(Tex. 1968); In re Yessmer, 61 Misc. 2d 174, 304 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1%4); In re Fein, 51 
Misc. 2d 1012, 274 N.Y.S.2d 547 (1966); In re Christjohn, 286 Pa. ^uper. 112, 428 A.2d 
597 (1981). 
81. Secretary of the Commonwealth v. City Clerk of LowellJ 
N.E.2d 717 (1977). 
82. Id. at 181, 366 N.E.2d at 720. 
83. Id. at 179, 366 N.E.2d at 720. 
84. Id. at 183,185, 366 N.E.2d at 720, 722. 
85. Id. at 190, 366 N.E.2d at 725. 
373 Mass. 178, 366 
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control the initial surname of the child as the parents of a legiti-
mate child."86 
Attorneys general in Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, 
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Vermont and Wisconsin have simi-
larly directed their birth registration record keepers that, absent a 
statute to the contrary, couples have the right td give their chil-
dren the mother's name, a hyphenated name, or a brand new 
name.87 "Parents are free to choose whatever surname they please 
for their child,"88 wrote the Vermont Attorney (General in 1975. 
"[I]t may be the mother's or the father's surname, or a combina-
tion of the two, or it may be a surname wholly different from the 
parents' surnames."89 i 
It is not unusual, however, for state registrars to resist 
change and to attempt to follow the traditional Model State Vital 
Statistics Act90 or to make their own legal interpretations, rules or 
regulations.91 Most registrars, however, follow the law that in the 
86. Id. at 191, 366 N.E.2d at 726. 
87. Supra note 62. 
88. Op. Att'y Gen. Vt. 3 (March 10, 1975). 
89. Id. 
90. U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, Public Health Service, Na-
tional Center for Health Statistics (1977 Revision) § 7(e)(l)-(5p. (marital children 
should be given the paternal name and non-marital children the maternal name 
unless the father and mother request the paternal). 
91. The Kentucky State Registrar until 1982 refused to recognize married par-
ent's right to give their children hyphenated names, citing uJ.S. for the law of 
married women's names instead of Kentucky Attorney General opinions or Burke 
v. Hammonds, 586 S.W.2d 307 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). He pointed to the statutory re-
quirement that a nonmarital child bear its mother's surname as indication of legis-
lative intent to require that a marital child be given only its father's surname. 
Letter from Omar L. Greeman, Registrar of Vital Statistics to a citizen (March 13, 
1979). Following an opinion of May 14, 1982 from John H. Walker, counsel to the 
Department for Human Resources, the Department changed its policy to recognize 
the right of parents to name their marital children with the surname of their 
choice. Letter from Omar L. Greeman to author (Jan. 31, 1983). The Maine Attor-
ney General in 1976 ruled that married parents have the right to give their child a 
hyphenated surname. At the time the state still had a statute, since repealed, re-
quiring the mother's name be given a nonmarital newborn child. Op. Att'y Gen. 
Me. (Aug. 18, 1976). Cf. Op. Att'y Gen. Ga. (Nov. 22, 1976) (itiarital child can be 
given hyphenated name if parents use hyphenated name: requirement that 
nonmarital child bear mother's surname on certificate of no bearing). Following 
this opinion a married couple successfully litigated their right to give their child a 
hyphenated name. Kibler v. Skelton, No. 31278 (Fulton County Georgia, 1978) (Or-
der Granting Writ of Mandamus). 
For an example of rules made by a state registrar, see Rules Governing the Re-
gistration and Certification of Vital Events in Mississippi, Rule 24 ("Name of the 
Child" requires a marital child to bear her or his father's surname and a 
nonmarital child her or his mother's "legal surname" or the father's if he acknowl-
edges paternity, or the court's decision if there is a court determination of pater-
nity). 
Rules and Regulations Governing Vital Statistics Registration (1977) Part 
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absence of a statute to the contrary any name m^y be given new-
born children.92 Where no such statute exists, litigants have need-
lessly conceded to the record keeper's version of the law.93 Such 
agency impositions on parents' right to name their children have 
no better chance of withstanding constitutional scrutiny than the 
state statutes which have been successfully challenged.94 
Parents faced with agency impositions can 
tional grounds. A state mandamus action will, 
more speedy for a client even if it may not guarantee attorneys' 
fees. If state counsel do not simply rubber stamp their client agen 
sue on constitu-
however, prove 
II(1)(B)(C) of Oklahoma required a marital child to be given its father's surname 
and a nonmarital child its mother's name. In Miller v. Leavitt, No. CIV 82-369-E 
(W.D. Okla., Dec. 24, 1982) (Journal Entry of Judgment) the registrar interpreted 
its regulation to prohibit a couple from giving a marital child a hyphenated sur 
name unless the father's name came last. A couple who wanted the father's name 
first in the hyphenated name challenged the registrar. After losing a motion to dis-
miss, the state entered into a settlement changing the regulation so that it now 
reads: "The child's surname shall be shown the same as either the father's or 
mother's surname or a combination of both." 
92. E.g., Utah Vital Statistics Regulations (Jan. 25, 1982) Surname of the Child 
reads: 
The surname given the child should be determined by bbth parents. It 
clearly is not mandatory that the child have the father's 
When the mother is not married she . . . may give the child a surname 
different than her own surname. Additionally, the mother may name 
the father on the birth certificate . . . and give the ctyild a surname 
different that [sic] the father's. 
State registrars have often vigorously opposed free naming choice 
Carolina health officials lobbied against legislation sought 
O'Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. Supp. 494 (E.D.N.D. 1981), to amend 
quirement. The State Registrar of Vital Statistics was qiioted as saying that 
"[u]nder common law it is the child's birth right to have his father's name." Janet 
Fox, Couples Want Choice in Naming Babies, Winston-Salem Twin City Sentinel, 
Aug. 8, 1979, at 1. After losing in Rice v. Department of Health and Rehabil. Serv-
ices, 386 So. 2d 844 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), Case No. 80-167^ (Recommended Or-
der and Findings of Fact of Div. of Administrative Hearings, 
Order, Jan. 13, 1981), Florida officials changed their assertion 
record keeping problems and perpetuation of custom to preserving the family and 
preventing inappropriate names from being given children py their parents. At 
oral argument Judge Gonzales asked if one's sense of liberty 
the state imposition. Conversation with James K. Green, attorney for the couple 
(November, 1982.) In Iowa, registrars lobbied for S.B. 301 in 1973 which would 
have given the state registrar the authority to "refuse to register a certificate of 
birth with an unacceptable name given in the same manner as a delayed certificate 
of birth is refused registration" (referring to "obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, or 
otherwise potentially harmful to the future of the child" names). 
93. Kg., Miller v. Leavitt, No. CIV 82-369-E (W.D. Okla., Dec. 24,1982) (Journal 
Entry of Judgment). See supra note 91. Instead of contesting the agency's prohibi-
tion of a hyphenated name as a violation of Oklahoma law J the parties went di-
rectly into federal court with a constitutional challenge to the requirement. This is 
dangerous litigation strategy which risks a court's pronouncing as law a require-
ment that a child bear a certain name when, in fact, the legislature has not so man-
dated. E.g., Forbush v. Wallace. 
94. Id. See infra notes 102-113 and accompanying text. 
In North 
by the plaintiffs in 
the father's name re-
Dec. 31, 1980. Final 
bf state interest from 
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cies' desires, most lawsuits can be avoided or cut short95 with a lit-
tle name law assistance to the agency. Because state attorney 
general offices rarely designate an attorney responsible for di-
recting agencies in the area of name law, the agency may simply 
be ignorant in the matter of the law of personal names. 
Federal agencies are not unaware of the issueJ The passport 
office, for example, has recognized the right of parents to procure 
a new passport for a child in a new name without a court order 
since at least 1938.96 Married parents in agreement as to their chil-
dren^ names will prevail against any state mandate that they 
name their children a particular way. 
III. The Traditional Right of Women to Name Nonmarital 
Children Without Interference from the State or tlje 
Biological Fathers 
American courts have long recognized that a nonmarital child 
may be known by a name other than its mother's.97 Attorneys 
general in Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Pennsylvania, 
Vermont and Wisconsin have specifically ruled that nonmarital 
children need not bear the mother's name on their birth certifi-
cates and that the right of naming lies primarily with the 
mother.98 In the absence of an objection from the father, courts 
have always recognized the right of a mother of a nonmarital child 
to statutorily change her child's name.99 This right sjems from the 
unwed mother's status as sole parent and custodian of her 
95. As but one example, in Maine a lawsuit by a couple for a hyphenated sur-
name for their marital child was resolved by the attorney general's issuing Op. 
Att'y Gen. Me. (Aug. 18, 1976). Sheppard v. Labrack, No. 76-206 (Superior Court, 
Penobscot Co. Oct. 12, 1976) (Judgment). 
96. Passport Agents Manual (1978) E.O. 7856 (March 30, 1938) 22 C.F.R. § 51.3, 
4, 5, 19 (1938). The Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction specifically recog-
nizes out-of-court name changes for students and accepts the custodial parent's au-
thority in registering children. Max Ashwill, Student May Change Name Without 
Court Proceedings, Legal Corner, Wis. D.P.I. Newsletter, Nov. 19, 1978, at 6. Letter 
from D.P.I. Legal Counsel Mary Brooks Fraser to author (Oct. 6, 1981). 
97. E.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Buckley \/. State, 19 Ala. 
App. 508, 98 So. 362 (1923); Don v. Don, 142 Conn. 309, 114 A.2d 203 (1965); In re 
Toelkes, 97 Idaho 406, 545 P.2d 1012 (1976); People v. Gray, 251 111 431, 96 N.E. 268 
(1911); Hardy v. Hardy, 269 Md. 412, 306 A.2d 244 (1973); In re CMobrisi, 7 F.L.R. 
2721 (Westchester City Sup. Ct. July 21, 1981); In re M., 91 N.J Super. 296, 219 
A.2d 906 (1966); In re Biegaj, 25 N.Y.S.2d 85 (1941); Pintor v. Martinez, 202 S.W.2d 
333 (Tex. 1947); Pettus v. Dawson, 82 Tex. 18, 17, S.W. 714 (1891); But see Boston v. 
Sears, 11 Ohio App. 2d 220, 229 N.E.2d 847 (1967). 
98. E.g., Op. Att'y Gen. Vt. (March 10, 1975) at 3 ("The mother of an illegiti-
mate child is its legal guardian. . . . As such, she is solely responsible for the nam-
ing of the child. In accordance with the common law, she may insert any surname 
she pleases on the child's birth certificate."). 
99. E.g., Winkenhofer v. Griffin, 511 S.W.2d 216 (Ky. Ct. App. 1974); In re Dun-
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nonmarital children. In 1974 the Wisconsin Attorney General con-
cluded that biological fathers' rights had not expanded to the point 
that they could participate in the at-birth naming of nonmarital 
children.100 Biological fathers, however, are now challenging this 
right of women, with some success.101 
IV. Constitutional Challenges to Statutory Requirements 
That Children Be Given Specified Surnames on Their 
Birth Certificates 
Parents have successfully maintained 
lenges to statutory requirements that children 
names on their birth certificates. The United 
Court has established the helpful precedent 
rearing one's children, absent abuse or neglect, 
gitimate interest in interfering with parental 
theless, in Commonwealth, the Massachusetts 
declined to articulate a federal constitutional rij 
dren. It was a federal district court, in 1979, in 
Burch,103 which elevated the "common law 
give their child any name they wish"104 to federal 
status. Parents wanting to give their marital 
fering from both their names (a fusion of their] 
son's birth certificate challenged Hawaii's statute 
ther's name. The court articulated that "[t]he 
child comes within this catalogue of blessings of 
the Constitution. 
At the end of 1982 a Florida court invalidated 




in matters of 
state has no le-
102 None-
Supreme Court 
kht to name chil-
tjhe case of Jech v. 
[of parents] to 
constitutional 
a surname dif-
names) on their 
requiring the fa-









gave their son a 
Gen. Wis. 501 (Oct. 7, 
ston, 18 N.C. App. 647, 197 S.E.2d 560 (1973); In re Toekles, ?7 Idaho 406, 545 P.2d 
1012 (1976). 
100. Op. Atfy. Gen. Vt. 3 (March 10, 1975); 63 Op. Att'y I 
1974). In the early 1970s issuing an opinion which simply affirmed that in the ab-
sence of a statute to the contrary, a parent could give a nonmarital newborn any 
name, was highly controversial and many attorney generals were reluctant to deal 
with the issue. The Wisconsin opinion, for example, was prepared in 1972 but the 
Wisconsin Attorney General did not issue it until 1974 because of its potential con-
troversial effect. 
101. See generally discussion, infra notes 134-148. See (pollins v. Collins, 126 
Misc. 2d 522, 483 N.Y.S.2d 151 (Sup. Ct. 1984). 
102. See supra note 58. 
103. Jech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714 (D. Hawaii 1979). The| Hawaii attorney gen-
eral had interpreted the requirement as encompassing a hyphenated name includ-
ing the mother's. Id. 
104. Id. at 719. See also Doe v. Hancock County Board of Wealth, 436 N.E.2d 791, 
792 (Ind. 1982) (Hunter, J. dissenting) referring to "the constitutionally protected 
common law right of parents to name their children." 
105. Jech, 466 F. Supp. at 714. 
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fused surname of their last names.106 The father's name require-
ment had been interpreted as not precluding a hyphenated 
name,107 but the couple wanted a fused name. In 1981 a federal 
district court set aside the North Carolina's father's name birth 
certificate statute as an unconstitutional infringement on family 
liberty as well as discrimination on the basis of sex and birth sta-
tus.108 New Hampshire repealed its statute which restricted 
names parents could choose to the mother's, father's, or a combi-
nation name in 1983. The legislature's guarantee that parents can 
choose any name for their child directly resulted from a constitu-
tional challenge by a couple seeking to name their child with a hy-
phenated name bearing no relation to either parent's name.109 
Courts have similarly questioned statutes specifying which 
names may be recorded on nonmarital children's birth certificates. 
Statutes mandating the change of a child's name on its birth certif-
icate to its father's choice of name upon legitimation110 or pater 
nityin have similarly been invalidated in recent years. In an 
Indiana case,112 a long dissent on the merits analyzed a statute re-
quiring nonmarital children to be given their mothers' names. The 
dissent noted that the statute distinguishes between "legitimate 
children, who may be given any name, and illegitimate children, 
who must bear the mother's name."113 
106 Sydney v Pingree, 564 F Supp 412 (S D Fla 1982) I Sydney Anthony 
Skybetter was named for columnist Sydney Harris, Susan B Anthony and his par-
ents Chris Ledbetter and Dean Skylar and would have been giv^n the same moni-
ker whether he had been a boy or a girl Conversation with Sydney's parents, May 
20, 1982 
107 Rice v Department of Health and Rehabil Services, 3#6 So 2d 844 (Fla 
Dist Ct App 1980), on remand No 80-1674, Recommended Order and Fmdmgs of 
Fact (Div of Administrative Hearings, Dec 31, 1980 Final OrdJr, Jan 13, 1981) 
108 O'Brien v Tilson, 523 F Supp 494 (E D N C 1981) The <tase mvolved three 
sets of married parents One couple wanted to name their child h 
ish custom by combining the father's first name with the suffix "son " Another 
wanted to give their child a hyphenated surname pursuant to Spanish custom The 
third wanted to give their child a hyphenated name as a symbol U 
109 1983 N H H B 729 amending § 126 6-a(i)(a) The parents, 
Carol Frost, wanted to give their child the hyphenated surname of Smith-Cook, a 
combmation of the names of maternal and paternal ancestors having no relation to 
either parent's names Their first child, born in California, was given the hyphen-
ated name Roth-Tubman, bearing no relation to his parents' or ancestors' names A 
third child born September 30, 1984 was given the nonhyphenate|d surname Woods, 
the name of the mother of the child's maternal grandmother, 
Conversations with Pierce Barker (Jan 25, 1983, June 20, 1985) 
110 Roe v Conn, 417 F Supp 769 (M D Ala 1976) 
111 Boelter v Blair, No CIV 81-4217 (D C S D ) (Judgment April 21, 1981) (case 
moot after passage of amendment to S D Codified Laws 34-25-15 (1984) deleting re-
quirement that child be given father's name upon acknowledgment of paternity) 
112 Doe v Hancock County Board of Health, 436 N E 2d 79 (Ind 1982) See 
supra note 73 and accompanying text 
113 Id at 794 (Hunter, J , dissenting) 
of equality 
Pierce Barker and 
with no difficulty 
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Wherever parents challenge statutes mandating a child be 
given the father's surname, courts have found the (statute unconsti-
tutional. In carefully litigated cases when pareikts are in agree-
ment, no statute prescribing what names parenis can give their 
children will withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
Disputes Between Mothers and the Biological Fathers Over 
Naming Newborn or Infant Marital and Nonmarital Children 
The law establishing some right of women to name their mar-
ital children, where fathers disagree with their choice, is develop-
ing in situations involving the naming of children at birth or while 
they are very young. The women usually use their birth given sur-
names and seek to give the same to their children. 
A 1964 case provided favorable precedent for women.114 In a 
separation action the Louisiana Court of Appeals recognized the 
court's jurisdiction to decide the child's name issue. The court de-
nied the father the right to require the mother to rename their 
child born during the proceeding, rejecting his clsqm to an absolute 
legal right to name the child. The case involved a 
given names and a lineal designation for the child, 
Ten years later, in Laks v. Laks ,115 an Arizona Court of Ap-
peals denied a custodial mother's claim that she 
constitutional right with the children's father to include her birth 
surname in the names of the children, ages ten, tnirteen, and four 
teen. The court, in a statement relied on by future courts, said: 
"[T]here is merit in this contention. Howevpr, 
remembered that what we are concerned with 
tial naming of the child but a change of name 
have the paramount interest are the children and 
ests are controlling."116 
In the companion cases of Application of Sexton117 and Ja-
cobs v. Jacobs,118 the Minnesota Supreme Court, 
the Laks reasoning as to the initial naming of cthildren. In re 
manding a dispute over the naming of a marital child in a divorce 
action, the court in Jacobs stated that "neither parent has a supe 
dispute over the 
it must be 
is not the ini-
Tfhe persons who 
their best inter-
n a Webber v. Parker, 167 So. 2d 519 (La. Ct. App. 1964), ityrit refused, 264 La. 
886, 168 So. 2d 269 (1964). 
115. 25 Ariz. App. 58, 540 P.2d 1277 (1975). 
116. 25 Ariz. App. at 61, 540 P.2d at 1280. The Court did not! < 
mutual right would be applicable in dissolution or separation situations, or in ongo-
ing marriages, or both. 
117. 309 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1981),cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1034 (1982)-
118. 309 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 1981). 
clarify whether this 
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rior right to determine the initial surname of their child."119 In 
Saxton the court denied any independent right to the custodial 
mother of older children, ages seven and nine, to give the children 
a hyphenated name of both parents' names over the objection of 
the father. Stating that either name would serve the children's 
best interests, the majority deferred to "the fact that the child has 
borne a given surname for an extended period of time."120 
In 1979 and 1983 state courts in Washington and Kentucky 
declined jurisdiction to decide a child's name or to order a woman 
to statutorily change her child's name back to the ex-husband's 
surname pursuant to the courts' divorce jurisdiction.121 The Wash-
ington Court of Appeals stated, however, that if it 
it would have denied the father's motion to havej 
during the action, renamed to bear his name 
mother's. The father's motion would have been 
there is nothing in the record to show that the proposal was con 
sidered from the standpoint of the child, and it is 
|had jurisdiction, 
the child, born 
instead of the 
denied "because 
the child's best 
interests which control."122 The refusals to take jurisdiction effec-
tively confirmed the custodial mother's choice of | her birth name 
for the children. 
In 1981, on facts almost identical to those of iVebber, a Texas 
Court of Civil Appeals refused to change the given names of a 
child to those of the father's choice.123 The court cited Webber 
and reasoned that "the record . . . falls far short of even sug-
gesting that the name chosen by the mother would prove detri-
mental to the child, now or in the future, or that the name 
preferred by appellant would further the present op future welfare 
of the child."12* 
In 1980 the California Supreme Court rendered a landmark 
decision. In re Schiffman125 held that "the rule giving the father, 
as against the mother, a primary right to have his child bear his 
surname should be abolished."126 The court emphasized that the 
119. Id. at 305. 
120. 309 N.W.2d 298, at 302. In seeking United States Suprenie Court review, the 
plaintiff argued that where both names serve the child's best interest, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court's rule favoring the paternal name compared to Oregon's for-
mer statute selecting fathers over equally qualified mothers in administering 
children's estates. The Court invalidated Oregon's statutory solution in Reed v. 
Reed, 411 U.S. 91 (1971). 
121. Hurta v. Hurta, 25 Wash. App. 95, 605 P.2d 1278 (1979)|; Blasi v. Blasi, 648 
S.W.2d 80 (Ky. 1983). 
122. Hurta, 25 Wash. App. at 96, 605 P.2d at 1279. 
123. In re Interest of M.L.P., 621 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Civ. App. 11981). 
124. Id. at 431. 
125. 28 Cal. 3d 640, 620 P.2d 579, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1980). 
126. Id. at 647, 620 P.2d at 583, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 922. 
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custodial mother gave the child, born during the I dissolution pro-
ceedings, her birth name. The court remanded the case to the trial 
court for a ' 'finding whether the name change requested by the fa-
ther is in the best interest of the child."127 
Despite this precedent involving the naming lof newborns, in 
1982 the Nebraska Supreme Court decided that the father's choice 
of name—a hyphenated surname with his name first—would best 
serve the child's welfare.128 This ruling was without regard to the 
virtually nonexistent trial record on the child's best interests. The 
trial court in Cohee v. Cohee had ordered the custodial mother to 
change the child's birth certificate name from hers to one of two 
names, the husband's name or a hyphenated surname with the 
mother's name first. The supreme court said "No automatic pref-
erence as to the surname of a legitimate child now exists in Ne-
braska law. We believe each parent has an equal right and interest 
in determining the surname of a child."129 The court, however, did 
not follow this rule. Instead, it recited the tests traditionally used 
by the courts to protect the primary right of the father to block 
name changes of older children originally given his name and gave 
the father his choice.130 
Similarly, in 1983, the Montana Supreme Couk131 stated that 
parents have an equal right to name their children but then de-
127. Id. at 648, 620 P.2d at 584, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 923. 
128. 210 Neb. 855, 317 N.W.2d 381 (1982). 
129. Id. at 860, 317 N.W.2d at 384. 
130. The court denied rehearing to clarify itself. Motion and Brief in Support of 
Motion for Rehearing, No. 43923. The Supreme Court's decision does not report 
that the trial court ordered a hyphenated name with the mother's name first, and 
that the father demanded his name or a hyphenated name with his name first. The 
decision only states that the father sought a hyphenated name and that the mother 
sought only her name. A requirement that the father's name come first in a hy-
phenated name would be unconstitutional according to the Maine Attorney Gen-
eral. Op. Att'y Gen. Me. (March 22, 1977). Although the hyphenated names sought 
by the women in Laks and Saxton included the mothers' name listed first, in 
neither of those cases was the order of the names separated by a hyphen made an 
issue. The fathers in both cases opposed the children using any names other than 
the paternal alone. 
131. Overton v. Overton, 674 P.2d 1089 (Mont. 1983). Petitions for Rehearing 
and to Suspend the Rules to Rehear and Reconsider the Appeal and Decision were 
denied. Where an appeal involves the review of a trial court order granting the fa-
ther the right to name a child, higher courts seldom overrule the lower court. 
Where a woman wins the right to determine her child's name at the trial court 
level, however, appellate courts are likely to overturn the lower courts. The Mon-
tana Supreme Court was a classic example of this dynamic. In 
187 Mont. 465, 610 P.2d 178 (1980) the court overruled, as an abuse of discretion, a 
trial court's judgment that children should bear their mother's 
The Montana Supreme Court has thus effectively cut off any enforceable legal 
right of married women in that state to name their children 
band's objection. 
Firman v. Firman, 
new marital name. 
over their ex-hus-
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ferred to the trial court's order in favor of the noncustodial father. 
The court declined to overturn the trial court's determination that 
the two-year-old girl's name should be changed from her mother's 
to her father's surname at the request of the father. The same 
month, the Colorado Court of Appeals132 deferred to a trial court's 
judgment in favor of a custodial mother. Because the mother had 
custody the court reasoned that the mother could change the in-
fant girl's first name despite the objection of ^he mother's ex-
husband. 
In addition, this year Pennsylvania's intermediate court ruled 
in favor of a custodial mother who had given her newborn daugh-
ter her birth given surname pursuant to Pennsylvania's published 
regulation which expressly gives the right of naming to "the par-
ent who has custody of the newborn child."133 The noncustodial 
father waited over a year after the child's birtifi and then peti-
tioned to change the child's surname. 
These at-birth/infancy naming cases all respect a naming 
right of women which is new to the law of naming marital chil-
dren perhaps because, in the ones involving surnames, the women 
all used their birth given surnames. However, since Schiffman 
women have not prevailed at the appellate | level with few 
exceptions.134 
1984 was a particularly bleak year. Women I lost bids to give 
the children in their custody their new marital names in appellate 
courts in Illinois,135 Indiana,136 Minnesota,13^ New York,138 
Ohio,139 and Texas.140 In South Carolina the s4preme court re-
132. In re Nguyen, 684 P.2d 258 (Colo. App. 1983), cert, denied, 105 S. Ct. 785 
(1985). 
133. In re Schidlmeier, No. J. 27018-85, slip op. (Pa. Super. Aug. 9, 1985). A Peti-
tion for Allowance of Appeal has been filed in this first case involving interpreta-
tion of 28 Pa. Admin. Code § 1.7 (Shepard's 1975). See infta notes 231-234 and 
accompanying text. 
134. These exceptions involved the mother's and child's use lof the mother's birth 
name. In re Schidlmeier, No. J. 27018-85, slip op. (Pa. Super. Aug. 9, 1985). In In re 
Goldstein, 104 A.D.2d 616, 479 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1984) the court denied a divorced fa-
ther's appeal of a name change of his daughter from the name Goldstein, which he 
no longer used, to the mother's birth name which the mother used as a middle 
name with her new marital name. The court, however, recited the traditional stan-
dard in favor of the paternal name. In In re Fletcher, 146 Vt. 209, 486 A.2d 627 
(1984), the supreme court remanded a case on appeal by the mother (name used by 
mother and requested for child appears to be mother's birth (name, but opinion is 
unclear). 
135. In re Presson, 116 111. App. 3d 458, 71 111. Dec. 816, 45l| N.E.2d 970 (1984). 
136. In re Meyer, 471 N.E.2d 718 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). 
137. Young v. Young, 356 N.W.2d 823 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)1. 
138. Cohan v. Cunningham, 480 N.Y.S.2d 656 (App. Div. 3.984). See also Ger-
showitz v. Gershowitz, 491 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1985). 
139. In re Newcomb, 15 Ohio App. 3d 107, 472 N.E.2d 1142 (1984). 
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manded a decision unfavorable to a father141 in 198J3. In May, 1985 
Maryland's Court of Special Appeals denied a divorced woman 
whose child was born when she was separated, tfye right to give 
the newborn her birth-given surname.142 
In cases involving disputes between parents oVer the initial or 
infancy naming of nonmarital children women prevail more fre-
quently than the biological fathers, but the fathers are being recog-
nized by the courts as having new naming rights over their 
children if they contribute to, or are ordered to contribute, support 
to them. In Jacobs ,143 a main issue was the birth status of the 
child in question. The mother claimed that the child was 
nonmarital and that she consequently had primary control over 
rearing the child in all aspects. After determining that the child 
was marital, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that "a finding 
of illegitimacy in the instant case would not have affected the reso-
lution of the dispute as to the child's surname sinck Jacobs has as-
serted his parental rights and recognized his parental 
obligations."144 
In In re G.L.A. ,145 the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed a 
trial judge whose general practice was 
to change the surname of children in paternity proceedings to 
that of the father in the absence of good reasons shown to the 
contrary. . . . I always point out that the man who is going to 
support the children should have the children in his name un-
less there is some valid strong reason, like he is a piurderer or 
a criminal of some kind that would keep him from—the chil-
140. Brown v. Carroll, 683 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984). 
141. Ex parte Stone, 328 S.E.2d 346 (S.C. 1985). 
142. Lassiter-Geers v. Reichenbach, 303 Md. 88, 492 A.2d 303 (1985). 
143. 309 N.W.2d at 303. 
144. Id. at 305. Michigan and New Hampshire have statutorily recognized mu-
tual rights to name nonmarital children at birth. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§ 333.2824(2) (West 1980) provides that where the father acknowledges paternity, 
"upon the written request of both parents, the surname of the child shall be desig-
nated by the child's parents." If the father is judged the father by a lawsuit, how-
ever, the mother has control over naming. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.2824(4) 
(West 1980). New Hampshire's new law provides that when the mother consents to 
have a man named as the child's father on its birth certificate, "the surname of the 
child shall be any name chosen by the mother and father." N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 126:6-a(II)(a) (1983). Otherwise the name will be "any name chosen by the 
mother," N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 126:6-a(IV) (1983), or as determined by a court in 
paternity proceedings, § 126:6-a(III) (1983). This law is expected to be revised in the 
next legislative session to give the mother or custodial parent the right of naming. 
Several states have recognized the right of the unmarried father to participate 
in naming a child on its birth certificate to the extent that the 
selecting the child's name to her name, or with her and the fa 
father's or a combination of the two. See supra note 56. Sy 
been objected to, but not yet litigated. 
145. 430 N.E.2d 433 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). 
> mother is limited in 
Ither's consent, to the 
iich restrictions have 
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dren from revering his name.146 
The appellate court rejected the trial court's acceptance of the "er-
roneous presumption" that "a child should share the surname of 
its biological father as long as the father is contributing to its sup-
port."147 Unfavorable precedent148 decided only ^ year before by 
the same court was also rejected. 
In sum, women, who use their own surnames and have been 
married to their children's fathers, have often prevailed in cases 
concerning the at-birth naming of children of whom they have cus-
tody. Older children's names, however, remain almost completely 
subject to paternal control. 
VI. Disputes Between Parents Over Naming Older Marital Children 
Originally Given Fathers' Names 
This section analyzes the class of cases Which determine 
whether women have any real voice in naming children: those in-
volving older marital children (over three years qf age) originally 
given their fathers' surnames. 
Appellate courts in most states have articulated a standard 
for the resolution of disputes between parents of marital children 
originally given their fathers' surnames. All of the courts purport 
to consider the best interests of the children. Oareful review of 
the cases, however, demonstrates that this "standard" is not, in 
fact, employed by the courts in naming disputes. All states, except 
California,149 have actually accepted and followed the time-
honored primary right of the father over the mother to control the 
naming of children. 
The courts accept three presumptions, sometimes expressly, 
but most often indirectly: 1) that honoring the father's right 
serves children's "best interests"; 2) that using the father's name 
preserves or promotes the paternal/child bond; and/or 3) that un-
less the children have actually already changed their names by us-
ing another name for a long period of time, children's names 
should not be changed if the father objects. Most significantly, 
however, the courts do not employ a presumption that it is gener-
ally not in the best interest of children to not ch4nge their names. 
146. Id. at 434. 
147. Id. See supra note 71. G.L.A. was expressly followed }n Sullivan v. McGaw, 
134 111. App. 3d 455, 480 N.E.2d 1283 (1985). 
148. D.R.S. v. R.S.H., 412 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)] The mother did not 
appeal this decision, in part because the father had given up the child he won the 
right to name, and in part because the mother married ajid her new husband 
adopted the child. See supra note 71. 
149. See In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640, 620 P.2d 579, 169 0al. Rptr. 918 (1980). 
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In the cases where a custodial mother prevails over the fa-
ther's wishes, the father forfeits or waives his right by his own ac-
tions and the mother rebuts it by meeting a high burden of proof. 
The father forfeits his superior right only where he has utterly 
abandoned the child, has failed to pay child support, and/or is 
guilty of misconduct amounting to child abuse or I incarceration. A 
man can also forfeit his superior right by waiving it by failing to 
fashion.150 
of cases have in-
exercise his paternal right of naming in a timely 
Until recently, the overwhelming majority 
volved the choice between a natural father's naine and a stepfa 
ther's name that the mother has adopted. The cases of the 1970s 
and 1980s, however, have involved the mother's birth name,151 hy 
phenated names of the mother's and father's birth names,152 as 
well as remarried names.153 In Schiffman, and ajso in the Saxton 
dissent, distinctions were made expressly on the 
ticular names chosen by the mother or childreri 
have ruled against women and children by upholding rights of fa 
thers, by stating a preference for the paternal name, and by re 
sisting any change of minors' names from the patronymic without 
discussion of the alternative name.154 Most appel 
children reintegrating into a family with a stepfather whose name 
the mother has adopted. Consequently, making a distinction as to 
basis of the par-
Usually courts 
denied, 405 U.S. 975 
long while with the 
2d 385 (1984); In re 
Stone, 328 S.E.2d 346 
(Minn. 1981); In re 
150. E.g., Nellis v. Pressman, 282 A.2d 539 (D.C. 1971), cert.\ 
(1972) (teenagers known by their stepfather's surname for a 
knowledge of their father). 
151. In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640, 620 P.2d 579,169 Cal. ftptr. 918 (1980); Blasi 
v. Blasi, 648 S.W.2d 80 (Ky. 1983); Lassiter-Geers v. Reichentyach, 303 Md. 88, 492 
A.2d 303 (1985); In re Goldstein, 104 A.D. 616, 479 N.Y.S.: 
Fletcher, 145 Vt. 209, 486 A.2d 627 (1984) (unclear); Ex parte 
(S.C. 1985) (unclear); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 309 N.W.2d 303 
Schidlmeier, No. J. 27018-85, slip op. (Pa. Super. Aug. 9, 19851); Hurta v. Hurta, 25 
Wash. App. 95, 605 P.2d 1278 (1979); In re Harris, 160 W. V i 422, 236 S.E.2d 426 
(1977); Ogle v. Circuit Court, 89 S.D. 18, 227 N.W.2d 621 (1975) (petitioner withdrew 
her request for her child's name change). 
152. Laks v. Laks, 25 Ariz. App. 58, 540 P.2d 1277 (1975); In re Staros, 280 
N.W.2d 409 (Iowa 1979); In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1981), cert denied, 455 
U.S. 1034 (1982); In re Warschberger, 8 F.L.R. 2514 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Naussau County, 
June 21, 1982); Gershowitz v. Gershowitz, 491 N.Y.S.2d 356 (A^p. Div. 1985). 
153. All other appellate cases cited in supra notes 77-80. [ 
154. Most of the at-birth/infancy naming cases of marital children have involved 
the mother giving a child her name as opposed to a stepfather's. In Kirksey v. Ab-
bott, 591 S.W.2d 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) the mother of a nonirjarital child indicated 
that she wanted her daughter to have the same name as her 12-year-old marital son 
who bore her last name. She indicated that she would be marrying and changing 
her name. The opinion, however, does not make clear whether or not she intended 
to have the children also adopt her new name or the origin of her current surname. 
Compare cases of older children, In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1981), cert, 
denied, 455 U.S. 1034 (1982) giving deference to names used a long while. This def-
erence virtually precludes women who originally consent to their children bearing 
the father's name from having any say in controlling their names thereafter. 
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the names involved only makes it more difficult f<)r most women 
to secure naming rights. The issue is a woman's le^al right to con-
trol, as custodian, the naming of her children, not the particular 
name she may choose. 
Whether or not women have any real rights in naming chil-
dren will be determined in parental disputes over naming children 
originally given their fathers' surnames by the mothers and fa-
thers. The trial judiciary used to deny divorcing and divorced wo-
men the right to change their names, supposedly put of concern 
for children bearing different names than their custodial 
mothers.155 Now it greets women's assertion of the right to name 
their children with the same names (or any nonpaternal names) 
with sheer personal bias, obstinacy and male protectivism. A 
Maryland chancellor put it forthrightly in one case: 
Let me say this for the record. I felt very strongly about this 
case when it came up; in fact, I will say for the record that I 
just think that it is just horrendous that a parent who has been 
divorced from her husband would even attempt to change the 
child's name and, in a sense, cut off the parental rights of the 
father. I was very upset about it.156 \ 
This section discusses the procedural and substantive issues 
involved in securing women's right to name noninfant marital chil-
dren originally given the paternal name. Jurisdictional bases for 
courts to decide these disputes are discussed first. The second part 
discusses further the assumptions, acknowledged and unacknowl-
edged, behind courts' protection of fathers' primary naming right. 
It also examines the methods by which courts grant men the right 
to control children's names. The third part of this section dis-
cusses the burden of proof set up for mothers in naming disputes. 
A. Jurisdiction of Courts Over Children's Names 
In litigation, jurisdictional and procedural 
dren's names cases can become very technical. If a 
dispufc es in chil-
court does not 
155. All such cases were reversed on appeal. E.g., In re Banks, 42 Cal. App. 3d 
631, 117 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1974); In re Hooper, 436 So. 2d 401 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); 
In re Hauptly, 262 Ind. 150, 312 N.E.2d 857 (1974); Thomas v. ThUias, 100 111. App. 
3d 1080, 427 N.E.2d 1009 (1981); Piotrowski v. Piotrowski, 71 Mich. App. 213, 247 
N.W.2d 354 (1976); Egner v. Egner, 133 N.J. Super. 403, 337 A.2d 46 (1975). See also 
cases cited supra note 9. 
156. Hall v. Hall, 30 Md. App. 214, 216, 351 A.2d 917, 920 (1976)1. Such pronounce-
ments bring to mind the conclusion of early commentators: "With some notable ex-
ceptions, [judges] have failed to bring to sex discrimination cases those judicial 
virtues of detachment, reflection and critical analysis which have served them so 
well with respect to other sensitive social issues. . . . " John Johnston & Charles 
Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 675, 676 (1971). 
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so, 
157 
want to consider the controversial issue, one party 
suade the court that it has no jurisdiction to do 
the technical issues involved may prevent men 
ad litem from keeping names cases out of court. 
Courts exercise jurisdiction to determine children 
three situations: 1) pursuant to state general 
utes;158 2) in personal equity injunctive actions to 
personal interests in controlling the naming of 
in actions involving the care, custody and control 
may easily per-
Awareness of 
ind /or guardians 
his 
name 
s names in 
change stat-
^>rotect a fa thers 






157. For example, one Milwaukee, Wisconsin lower couift 
clined to take jurisdiction over a child's name pursuant to 
court declined jurisdiction on the grounds that the statutory! 
dure requires both parents to bring a petition for their childf 
appointed guardian ad litem had taken this position. The courjt 
order in sex neutral terms but the case involved the usual 
objecting to his child's name being changed from the 
court's refusal to take jurisdiction is to prevent women from 
judicate women's and children's naming rights if the father 
name on his children. In re Husmann and Birmingham, Noj, 
Circuit Court, Findings and Order, March 15, 1984). In an 
the Court of Appeals in 1981, the court ruled that it saw "no j| 
with family court judge entertaining a petition or entering an 
name of a minor child of the parents to an action for 
should exercise it "only where there is no adequate remedy al 
104 Wis. 2d 744, 314 N.W.2d 363 (1981) (an unpublished opinion 
and cannot be cited in most forums in Wisconsin). See also 
N.W.2d 823 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). Maintaining the status 
nique has also worked to the benefit of women. E.g., Hurta v. 
95, 605 P.2d 1278 (1979); Blasi v. Blasi, 648 S.W.2d 80 (Ky. 198|3) 
158. Carroll v. Johnson, 263 Ark. 280, 565 S.W.2d 10 (1978) 
App. 2d 135, 8 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1960); In re Trower, 260 Cal 
873 (1968); In re Worms, 252 Cal. App. 2d 130, 60 Cal. Rptr. 
Gehee, 147 Cal. App. 2d 25, 304 P.2d 167 (1956); In re Larsoij 
183 P.2d 688 (1947); Lazow v. Lazow, 147 So. 2d 12 (Fla. Dist. 
v. Wray, 139 Ga. App. 363, 228 S.E.2d 385 (1976); Tolbert v. 
388, 206 S.E.2d 63 (1974); Fulgham v. Paul, 229 Ga. 463, 192 S. 
son v. Coggins, 124 Ga. App. 603, 184 S.E.2d 696 (1971); Binforjd 
280, 63 S.E.2d 345 (1951); In re Meyer, 471 N.E.2d 718 (Ind. 
Wright, 263 Md. 297, 283 A.2d 401 (1971); Robinson v. Haniel, 
N.W.2d 138 (1974); In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1981)| 
1034 (1982); Marshall v. Marshall, 230 Miss. 719, 93 So. 2d 
199 Neb. 332, 258 N.W.2d 814 (1977); In re Lone, 134 N.J. 
(1975); W. v. H., 103 N.J. Super. 24, 246 A.2d 501 (Ch. Div. 
ham, 104 A.D.2d 721, 480 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1984); In re Newcomb|, 
472 N.E.2d 1142 (1984); In re Tubbs, 620 P.2d 384 (Okla. 
No. J. 27018-85, slip op. (Pa. Super. Aug. 9, 1985); In re 
112, 428 A.2d 597 (1981); Ex Parte Stull, 276 S.C. 512, 280 S.E.] 
v. Northcutt, 544 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); Eschri 
S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); Newman v. King, 433 S. 
Plass v. Leithold, 381 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Flowelrs 
237 S.E.2d 111 (1977); In re Harris, 160 W. Va. 422, 236 S.E.2^ 
159. Mark v. Kahn, 333 Mass. 517, 131 N.E.2d 758 (1956) 
Super. 284, 134 A.2d 598 (Ch. Div. 1957); Degerberg v. McCor|mick; 
184 A.2d 468 (1962). See supra note 76. 
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Hurta, 25 Wash. App. 
In re Malloy, 185 Cal. 
2d 75, 66 Cal. Rptr. 
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, 81 Cal. App. 2d 258, 
t. App. 1962); Wearn 
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eluding separation,160 divorce or dissolution,161 adoption,162 and pa-
ternity proceedings.163 Although appellate courts in Kentucky, 
Ohio, and Washington have declined jurisdiction oyer children's 
names m divorce matters,164 other courts have upheld jurisdiction. 
An Illinois Court of Appeals summarized the basis of a di-
vorce court's jurisdiction over naming children in 1991. "If the mat-
ter of a change of name of a minor child of divorced parents is a 
matter incidental to the custody of the child, and we hold that it is, 
then the court had the jurisdiction to entertain the (motion and to 
160 Eg , Webber v Parker, 167 So 2d 519 (La Ct App 1964)| 
La 886, 168 So 2d 269 (1964) The jurisdictional basis of Weh 
seded by La Rev Stat Ann § 40 34(l)(a)(West Supp 1983) 
svirname of a child from that required herem shall be by court 
for m R S13 4751 through R S 13 4755 " 
161 Norton v Norton, 268 Ark 791, 595 S W 2d 709 (1980), 
220 Ark 377 247 S W 2d 1015 (1952), Montandon v Montandon 
886, 52 Cal Rptr 43 (1966), In re Nguyen, 684 P2d 258 (Colo A| 
nied, 105 S Ct 785 (1985), Nelhs v Pressman, 282 A 2d 539 C 
writ refvised, 264 
has been super-
ny change in the 
•rder as provided 
mton v Morrow, 
242 Cal App 2d 
•p 1983) cert de 
C 1971), cert de 
nied, 405 U S 975 (1972), Solomon v Solomon, 5 111 App 2d 2&7, 125 N E 2d 675 
(1955), Weinert v Weinert, 105 111 App 3d 56, 433 N E 2 d 1158 C1982), In re Pres-
son, 102 111 2d 303, 80 111 Dec 294, 465 N E 2d 85 (1984), Burke 1/ Hammonds, 586 
S W 2d 307 (Ky Ct App 1979), overruled sub silentio by Blasi v Blasi, 648 S W 2d 
80 (Ky 1983), Dalton v Dalton, 367 S W 2d 840 (Ky Ct App 1963), Hall v Hall, 30 
Md App 214, 351 A 2d 917 (1976), Fuss v Fuss, 372 Mass 64, 368 N E 2d 271 (1977), 
Jacobs v Jacobs, 309 N W 2d 303 (Mmn 1981), Young v YourJg, 356 N W 2d 823 
(Minn Ct App 1984), Bruguier v Bruguier, 12 N J Super 350 79 A 2d 497 (1951), 
Gershowitz v Gershowitz, 491 N Y S 2d 356 (App Div 1985), Meadows v Meadows, 
312 N W 2 d 464 (N D 1981), Reed v Reed, 338 P2d 350 (Okla 1959), Walberg v 
Walberg, 22 Or App 118, 538 P2d 96 (1975), Pendray v Pendjay, 35 Tenn App 
284, 245 S W 2d 204 (1951), Jochec v Jochec, No 12,965 (Tex Ctv App 1979) (un-
published), In re Baird, 610 S W 2d 252 (Tex Civ App 1980), Brbwn v Carroll, 683 
S W 2d 61 (Tex Civ App 1984) Hurta v Hurta, 25 Wash App 95, 605 P 2d 1278 
(1979), Niesen v Niesen, 38 Wis 2d 599, 157 N W 2d 660 (1968) 
162 In re Thomas, 404 S W 2d 199 (Mo 1966), Arnett v Matthews, 259 So 2d 535 
(Fla Dist Ct App 1972) (name changes granted but not adoptions) Cf Korbm v 
Ginsberg, 232 So 2d 417 (Fla Dist Ct App 1970) Name changek pursuant to adop-
tions are routme and do not make caselaw All states accept the authority of adop-
tive parents to determme their children's names and no known case concerns an 
adoptive couple disagreeing on a child's name In practice many women have felt 
pressure to accept the father's surname for an adopted child or risk not gettmg the 
child An adoption agency's requirement that a couple use the same surname and/ 
or give the paternal name to an adopted child would be unconstitutional and sub-
ject to challenge if the agency is state funded 
163 Sullivan v McGaw, 134 111 App 3d 455, 480 N E 2d 1283 (1985) In re 
G L A , 430 N E 2d 433 (Ind Ct App 1982) D R S v R S H , 412 N E 2d 1257 (Ind 
Ct App 1980) Kirkse* v Abbott, 591 S W 2d 751 (Mo Ct Atip 1979) Compare 
Agee v Altice, 427 So 2d 667 (La Ct App 1983) 1 
164 Monteux v Monteux, 5 Ohio App 2d 34, 213 N E 2d 495 (1966), Dolgin v 
Dolgin, 1 Ohio App 2d 430, 205 N E 2d 106 (1965), Hurta v Hurtk, 25 Wash App 95, 
605 P2d 1278 (1979) See also Young v Young, 356 N W 2 d 823 (Mmn Ct App 
1984) and Blasi v Blasi, 648 S W 2d 80 (Ky 1983) However, the) Supreme Court did 
not expressly overrule Burke v Hammonds, 586 S W 2d 307 (Ky Ct App 1979) 
Burke held that the divorce court, pursuant to its jurisdiction oyer custody matters, 
could enjom a custodial mother from changing her children's names 
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enter the order involved in this appeal."165 
Cases pursuant to a divorce court's jurisdicti 
with respect to the enforcement of modification o: 
port awards and not at the time of divorce or disi 
women seek to change their children's names so: 
actual divorce and the establishment of a new hoi 
statutory authority for changing children's namej 
proceedings could actually serve to restrict a div< 
diction to determine children's names at a later 
its continuing jurisdiction over children. The ju: 
has nevertheless concerned several courts,167 an< 
prepare to litigate it. 
x>n usually arise 
custody or sup-
lolution.166 Most 




ate pursuant to 
idictional issue 
women should 
B. Father's Primary Right to Require Marfital Children to 
Continue Using His Name 
Consistent with the basic tenet of the cominon law that no 
one has such a property right in his or her personal name such 
that he or she can prevent another from using it,168 courts have 
expressly rejected the father's right in naming his marital children 
as a constitutional property right.169 They have, however, accepted 
the father's prerogative as a liberty right, similar to the rights ac-
jurisdiction to 
divorce decree. 
165. Solomon v. Solomon, 5 111. App. 2d 297, 125 N.E.2d 675 (1955). The Illinois 
Supreme Court recently stated: "We agree with Solomon that changing a child's 
name is a matter incident to custody of the child, and that the court which had ju-
risdiction over the divorce can entertain a petition enjoining the name change." In 
re Presson, 102 111. 2d 303, 465 N.E.2d 85, 87 (1984), reversing) 116 111. App. 3d 458, 
451 N.E.2d 970 (1983). 1 
166. But see In re Nguyen, 684 P.2d 258 (Colo. App. 1983), tert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 
785 (1985). 
167. E.g., J. Byrd concurring in In re Schiffman. The Minnesota Supreme Court 
in Jacobs v. Jacobs wrote: 
We do not decide at what point a trial court loses 
change a child's surname through modification of a I 
Since the child was not provided for in the original decree, the trial 
court had the authority to change the child's surname in the context of 
a petition to amend the divorce decree. 
Jacobs at 304 n.l. If Young v. Yoimg, 356 N.W.2d 823 (Minli. Ct. App. 1984) had 
been appealed, the court would have had the opportunity to decide this issue for 
Minnesota. In Blasi v. Blasi, 648 S.W.2d 80, 81 (Ky. 1983), the Supreme Court of 
Kentucky recently said that "[h]ad the General Assembly intended for the circuit 
court to have jurisdiction to effect a name change it would have specifically granted 
such jurisdiction." The Indiana court of appeals ruled against the mother's claim 
that the court did not have jurisdiction over names in a paternity proceeding. 
D.R.S. v. R.S.H., 412 N.E.2d 1247 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). See irJ/ra, note 148. 
168. See supra note 26. 
169. Fulgham v. Paul, 229 Ga. 463, 192 S.E.2d 376 (1972); In re Thomas, 404 
S.W.2d 199 (Mo. 1966); Newman v. King, 433 S.W.2d 421 (TeJc. 1968). 
1985] RIGHT OF WOMEN TO NAME THEIR CHILDREN 137 
corded parents in agreement in naming their offspring.170 The 
Oklahoma Supreme Court recently articulated the I nature of the 
father's primary right in American case law: "It is generally rec-
ognized that a father has a protectible claim in the continued use 
by the child of the paternal surname in accordance with the usual 
custom, even though the mother may be the custodial parent."171 
The highest courts of Arkansas, District of Columbia, Geor-
gia, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Virginia, and West Virginia have accepted the standard that the fa-
ther has a "primary," "protectable," "natural," or ' time-honored" 
right superior to that of the mother to name his children. He can 
forfeit that right by his misconduct, or by lack of objection. Even 
if the father fails to object, the mother must show that the chil-
dren's best interests are not served by their use of this name, and 
that "the substantial welfare of the child necessitates such 
change."172 
Appellate courts of Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, 
Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland New Jersey, 
Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, and Texas have likewise accepted this 
superior right.173 
In naming minors there is an almost irrebuttable presump-
tion that their surnames should never be changed irom the patro-
nymic if their fathers object. A Georgia appellate court articulated 
this presumption as: "Courts generally frown upon name changes 
of unemancipated minors where the objecting natural father sup-
ports them, and there is no substantial reason therefore other than 
personal preference."174 
Unlike the California Supreme Court in Schiffrnan, the Ne-
braska and Minnesota Supreme Courts in Cohee, Jacobs, and 
Saxton did not overrule existing precedent in their states which 
were based on the father's superior right. In the frequently cited 
case of Robinson v. Hansel ,175 the Minnesota Supreme Court in 
1974 had written: "A change in surname, so that a child no longer 
bears his father's name, not only obviously is of inherent concern 
170. Carroll v. Johnson, 263 Ark. 280, 565 S.W.2d 10 (1978); In\ re Tubbs, 620 P.2d 
384 (Okla. 1980). 
171. In re Tubbs, 620 P.2d 384 (Okla. 1980). 
172. In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298, 301 (Minn. 1981), cert de\nied, 455 U.S. 1034 
(1982) (quoting Robinson v. Hansel, 302 Minn. 34, 223 N.W.2d 138 (1974)). Young v. 
Young, 356 N.W.2d 823 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), followed this s{andard. See supra 
note 77. 
173. See supra note 77. 
174. Tolbert v. Tolbert, 131 Ga. App. 388, 206 S.E.2d 63 (1974k 
175. 302 Minn. 34, 223 N.W.2d 138 (1974). ] 
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to the natural father, so that he should have standing to object, but 
is in a real sense a change in status."176 
As justification for protection of the paternal right, the courts 
have adopted the additional presumption that a child's bond to his 
or her noncustodial father is served by or necessitated by preserva-
tion of the paternal name. The courts presume that what the fa-
ther wants is good for his children. Courts dp not consider 
convenience or embarrassment to the children in having a sur-
name different from the household in which they live sufficient to 
overcome this presumption.177 Whether framed as 1) the father's 
interest in naming his child; 2) preserving the bond between the 
father and children; or 3) the children's interests in being close to 
their father, the end result is the same: even if it embarrasses the 
children, a virtually irrebuttable presumption in favor of the fa-
ther's right to control the name. 
1. Duty of Support as the Basis of the Fatb^'s Primary 
Right to Control the Naming of Marital 
Children in Their Mother's Custody 
In 1922, Ruth Hale, advocate of women's right to determine 
their own names and co-founder of the Lucy Stone League, in dis-
cussing the basis for men's demand that women take their hus-
bands' surnames, articulated the underlying pasis of men's 
expectation that they have the absolute right to name their 
children: 
Custom said, too, that man owned what he paid for, and could 
put his name on everything for which he provided money. He 
wrote his name more often than a little boy with chalk signs 
his to a fence. He put it on his land, his house, nis wife and 
children, his slaves when he had them, and on everything that 
was his.178 
The legal basis of this right of ownership is 
support, which in turn derives from the man's traditional 
head of the household.179 The West Virginia Supreim 
marized the rule in 1977: "The weight of authority 
that absent extreme circumstances a father who 
rental rights has a protectable interest in his children 
surname and this interest is one quid pro quo of 
t^ he legal duty of 
status as 
e Court sum-




176. Id. at 35, 223 N.W.2d at 140. 
177. Kg., In re Worms, 252 Cal. App. 2d 130, 60 Cal. Rptr, 88 (1967). 
178. Ruth Hale, But What About the Postman?, 54 The Bocjkman 560, 561 (Feb. 
1922). 
179. Kathleen A. Ryan Carlsson, Surnames of Women and legitimate Children, 
17 N.Y.L.F. 852 (1971). 
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ligation of support and maintenance.'*180 
Unmarried fathers rely on this same duty to procure naming 
rights. In practice, the primary right of fathers serves as a power-
ful negotiating tool to keep support payments for both marital and 
nonmarital children low.181 
Ex-husbands often attempt to avoid their dMy of support 
when mothers change the children's names. Courts, however, do 
not accept a change of a child's name as grounds to avoid support 
obligations. Nor do courts accept failure to make support pay-
ments as grounds for automatically terminating a father's naming 
rights.182 Men's primary naming right provides little incentive to 
pay child support regularly whereas it does serve to deny women 
any real voice in naming their children. Further abandonment or 
misconduct on the part of fathers is necessary.183 Misconduct usu-
ally means felonious activity leading to incarceration or child 
abuse, not merely bad parenting.184 
Thus, a father's threat to beat his child if he used his 
mother's and stepfather's surname was not "the type of miscon-
duct which the law recognizes as foreclosing a father from com-
plaining of a change in his child's surname," according to a 
Delaware court.185 The father, the court explained, "was justified 
in insisting that his son use the paternal surname, and in threaten-
ing to punish him if he adopted another."186 
The misconduct an ex-husband must engage in to forfeit his 
naming rights must be heinous. In a recent case, the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court considered that murdering the man whose name 
the child was changing to constituted sufficient misconduct to for-
77). 
>p. i980), the lower 
ents if the child's 
ually state this fact 
180. In re Harris, 160 W. Va. 422, 427, 236 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1! 
181. In D.R.S. v. R.S.H., 412 N.E.2d 1257, 1279 (Ind. Ct. A] 
court judge indicated that he might reduce child support pa; 
name were not changed to that of the father. Courts do not 
of reality in opinions. 
182. E.g., Robinson v. Hansel, 302 Minn, at 34, 223 N.W.2d at 138; In re Krcelic, 
90 Misc. 2d 666, 395 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1977); Bilenkin v. Bilenkin, 78 Ohio App. 481, 64 
N.E.2d 84 (1945). But see In re Harris, 160 W. Va. 422, 236 S.E.2d 426 (1977). 
183. E.g., West v. Wright, 263 Md. 297, 283 A.2d 401 (1971). \n re Harris, 160 W. 
Va. 422, 236 S.E.2d 426 (1977). 
184. An Indiana trial court recently epitomized this thinking: 
I always point out that the man who is going to support the children 
should have the children in his name unless there is some valid strong 
reason, like he is a murderer or a criminal of some kind that would 
keep him from—the children from using his name anq carry it, you 
In re G.L.A., 430 N.E.2d 433, 434 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). 
185. Degerberg v. McCormick, 41 Del. Ch. 46, 52,187 A.2d 4p6, 440 (1963). 
186. Id. 
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feit a father's naming right.187 
In the rare instances where mothers have prevailed in older 
children's name disputes, the children have virtually always been 
using the mother's choice of name for a long while* Typically, the 
ex-husbands have long known about the children's {ise of the other 
name without objecting to its use.188 
Although today most judges would deny that fathers can 
purchase possessory rights in their children, courts continue to 
connect fathers' naming prerogatives with the duty to support chil-
dren, whether or not the fathers actually fulfill thijs duty. Women 
must prove extreme misconduct before ex-husb^nds forfeit the 
right to control the naming of their children. 
2. Requirement of Notice to the Father of Statutory Name 
Change Proceedings 
Courts further protect the father's right to control the nam-
ing of marital children by reading into name change statutes a re-
quirement of notice to the father. Such legal projection imposes 
requirements even where the statute does not require both parents 
to sign the petition, or to give notice to each other!189 Courts also 
avoid dealing with the issue by dismissing petitions brought by 
children themselves.190 Because a father is entitled to notice, he 
can usually cause a statutory name change to be voided for lack of 
187 In In re Chnstjohn, 286 Pa Super 112, 428 A 2d 597 (1981), the trial court 
took extensive psychiatric testimony as to the damage the murder did to the child 
And in W v H , 103 N J Super 24, 246 A 2d 501 (1968), incest and incarceration 
were sufficient to rebut the father's right Murder or incarceration, as reflected m 
New York lower court cases, are the usual misconduct standards In re Fern, 51 
Misc 2d 1012, 274 N Y S 2d 547 (1966), In re Yessmer, 61 Misc id 174, 304 N Y S 2d 
901 (1964) In re Calobnsi, 7 F L R 272 (Westchester City SuJ Ct July 21, 1981) 
But see In re Krcelic, 90 Misc 2d 666, 395 N Y S 2d 382 (Civ Ct Queens Co 1977), 
In re Petras, 123 Misc 2d 665, 475 N Y S 2d 199 (Civ Ct QueerJs Co 1984) 
Murdering one's father-m-law m reaction to his assertion that his child's name 
would be changed did not constitute "a sudden, violent and irresistible passion re-
sulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such a pasiion m a reasonable 
person" so as to reduce the charge to manslaughter according to the Georgia 
Supreme Court Perez v State, 249 Ga 767, 294 S E 2d 498 (1982) 
188 Nellis v Pressman, 282 A 2d 539 ( D C 1971), cert de\nied, 405 U S 975 
(1972) See Bilenkin v Bilenkin, 78 Ohio App 481, 64 N E 2d 84 (1945) 
189 Several states require both parents to sign a name change petition, or that 
notice be given the nonpetitioning parent See, e g , Carroll v Johnson, 263 Ark 280, 
565 S W 2d 10 (1978) See Op Atty Gen Hawaii (Oct 18, 1979) for a discussion of 
the national requirement of notice to noncustodial fathers even m the absence of a 
statutory notice requirement the notice requirement is not without exception In 
re Fletcher, 146 Vt 209, 486 A 2d 627 (1984) See statutory table m Comment, The 
Controversy Over Children's Surnames Familial Autonomy, Equal Protection and 
the Child's Best Interests, 1979 Utah L Rev 303 
190 Ex parte Stull, 276 S C 512, 280 S E 2d 209 (1981), cf In re Staros, 280 
N W 2d 409 (Iowa 1979) Compare In re Fletcher, 486 A 2d 627 (Vt 1974) 
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it.191 Men can even enforce their rights by enjoining women from 
using name change statutes which contain notice requirements.192 
In many states ex-husbands can enjoin their ex-wives from encour-
aging their children in any way to use a name other than the 
father's.*^ 
C. Burden of Proof Required to Rebut Father's Right and 
the Presumption That Marital Children 
Continue to Bear the Paternal Name 
Should 
Courts have saddled women with an extremely heavy burden 
in proving that marital children should not bear the paternal 
name. In asserting his right to have his children continue to bear 
his name, a father need only object. He does not even need to ap-
pear in court.194 However the dispute arises—in the context of a 
statutory name change to which he objects, or by injunction 
against the mother—the woman has the burden of proof. She 
must rebut the right of the father and the presumptions against 
children bearing a name to which the father objects. Under pres 
ent law she must rebut the right and presumptions not by assert 
ing an equal right to naming her children,195 put by virtually 
negating, with clear and compelling facts, that the 
ests are "substantially" served by usage of the 
name.196 She must usually show that her choice d>f name not only 
is in the children's best interests, but that their use of the father's 
children's inter-
natural father's 
Carroll v. Johnson, 
111. App. 3d 810, 408 
App. 1962); Eschrich 
Blasi v. Blasi, 648 
to change her child's 
, sub silentto). 
191. In re Larson, 81 Cal. App. 2d 258, 183 P.2d 688 (1947)^ i 
263 Ark. 280, 565 S.W.2d 10 (1978); Lawrence v. Lawrence, i 
N.E.2d 330 (1980); Lazow v. Lazow, 147 So. 2d 12 (Fla. Dist. Ct.L 
v. Williamson, 475 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); In re Tubbs, 620 P.2d 384 
(Okla. 1980); In re Harris, 160 W. Va. 422, 236 S.E.2d 426 (1977). 
192. Burke v. Hammonds, 586 S.W.2d 307 (Ky. 1974) (enjdining a woman from 
changing her child's name by court proceedings or otherwise); 
S.W.2d 80 (Ky. 1983) (refusing jurisdiction to require a woman| 1 
name by court proceeding; weakening, if not overruling, Burk 
193. Walberg v. Walberg, 22 Or. App. 118, 538 P.2d 96 (1975); Ouellette v. Ouel-
lette, 245 Or. 138, 420 P.2d 631 (1966); Degerberg v. McCormidk, 41 Del. Ch. 46, 187 
A.2d 436 (1963); Mark v. Kahn, 333 Mass. 517, 131 N.E.2d 758 (1956); Young v. 
Young, 356 N.W.2d 823 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). But see a New York trial court's lan-
guage in Collins v. Collins, 483 N.Y.S.2d 151 (Sup. Ct. Scheriectady Co. 1984) (fa-
ther's motion for change of name on birth certificate from mother's birth name to 
his granted, but court refused to order mother to call the child by such name. 
"How she refers to her daughter is the prerogative of the defendant.") Id. at 152. 
See also In re Presson, 102 111. 2d 303, 465 N.E.2d 85, 90 (1984) ("we cannot prevent 
Pamela from calling her son Kelly or by any other name or |: 
own living room."). 
194. E.g., In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1981), cert. I 
(1982). 
195. Laks v. Laks, 25 Ariz. App. 58, 540 P.2d 1277 (1975) rejected this argument 
as to older children first given their father's name. I 
196. In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1981), cert, denie^, 455 U.S. 1034 (1982). 
nickname within her 
denied, 455 U.S. 1034 
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name is not in their interests.197 
While a father must allege that his objection ik based on the 
child's interests, his burden of proof is virtually non-existent. All 
a father needs to offer is his own belief that the child's use of a 
different name will weaken the parental bond between them.198 
In contrast, the mother has to prove "not by a mere preponderance 
of the evidence, but by evidence satisfactory to the trial court ,"199 
that her name choice is in the child's best interests 
A national consensus as to what constitutes "satisfactory" evi-
dence has yet to develop. In the most frequently cited case on the 
burden of proof, Robinson v. Hansel ,200 the court declared: 
"[J]udicial discretion in ordering a change of a minor's surname 
against the objection of one parent should be exercised with great 
caution and only where the evidence is clear and compelling that 
the substantial welfare of the child necessitates such change."201 
This standard was reaffirmed by the majority in Saxton, but dis-
puted in a potentially important dissent by Justice Wahl who said 
that she would require only that a woman show that the name 
change "promotes" her child's interests when the name sought in-
cludes her own birthname and does not eliminate the other par-
ent's name.202 In Saxton the mother sought a name consisting of a 
hyphenation of the mother's and father's birth nam^s, rather than 
a new marital name.203 
Courts recognize children's preferences as material to the is-
sue but of no great importance or weight unless the children are in 
their teens.204 Courts have suggested the appointment of a guard-
197. Kg., W. v. H., 103 N.J. Super. 24, 246 A.2d 501 (1968) (effect of incest is 
shown to demonstrate that use of father's name would be detrimental to two 
daughters); In re Christjohn, 286 Pa. Super. 112, 429 A.2d 597 (1981) (evidence of 
effect on child of her stepfather's murder by her father necessaify to show that use 
of the father's name was detrimental to the child). 
198. Kg., Margolis v. Margolis, 338 Mass. 416, 155 N.E.2d 177 (1959). 
199. Plass v. Leithold, 381 S.W.2d 580, 581 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). Italics in the 
original. 
200. 302 Minn. 34, 223 N.W.2d 138 (1964). 
201. Id. at 36, 223 N.W.2d at 140. 
202. 309 N.W.2d at 298, 302-303 (Wahl and Amdahl, JJ., dissecting). The Minne-
sota Court of Appeals reaffirmed the woman's heavy burden of proof in Young v. 
Young, 356 N.W.2d 823 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), which involved |a child's use of his 
mother's new marital name. 
203. 309 N.W.2d at 302-03. In Robinson v. Hansel the motheil- sought to add her 
new husband's surname to the paternal name but not to include it as part of a hy-
phenated name. 
204. See e.g., In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1981), cer\t. denied, 455 U.S. 
1034 (1982). Recently, in In re Meyer, 471 N.E.2d 718 (Ind. Ct. 1pp. 1984) the Indi-
ana Court of Appeals overturned the trial court's award of a name change to the 
mother on the grounds that the child wanted the name, stating that there was "no 
showing" of the four and one half year old girl's "maturity" to have a preference as 
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ian ad litem to represent children's interests,20^ yet a series of 
Texas cases rejected such a requirement.206 The advisability of us-
ing a guardian ad litem depends largely on the particular jurisdic-
tion and attitudes of the bench and bar. The wrong guardian ad 
litem can harm women's and children's interests by failing to con-
front the relative rights involved in a dispute over children's 
names.207 The right guardian, however, can effectively challenge 
the traditional male power system. A statutory or judicially im-
posed requirement of the appointment of a guardian ad litem 
would thus probably be counter-productive, but iipi the right case a 
guardian can be very effective. 
As courts awaken to the fact that women and children are as-
serting constitutional rights in this area, they frame men's right to 
oppose women's right to name children in neutral terms. The 
Oklahoma Supreme Court, for example, in In re Tubbs ,208 re-
phrased the father's right: "Every divorced parent—custodial or 
not—whose paternal or maternal bond remained unsevered, has a 
cognizable claim to having his/her child continue to bear the very 
same legal name as that by which it was knowji at the time the 
marriage was dissolved."209 
In direct reaction to the fear that fathers ifciight lose control 
over naming marital children, the Indiana legislature passed a stat-
ute in 1979 to give a rebuttable presumption in statutory name 
changes proceedings to an objecting noncustodial parent if the par-
ent pays support.210 In a recent decision interpreting the statute, 
to her name. See also In re Presson, 102 111. 2d 303, 80 111. I[)ec. 294, 465 N.E.2d 85 
(1984) 
205. Id. In M.M. v. R.R.M., 358 N.W.2d 86 (Minn. Ct. Apb. 1984) the court cited 
Saxton as supporting the appointment of a guardian in a custody dispute stating 
that "custody is a more significant issue" than the one addressed in Saxton and thus 
warranted the appointment. 
206. Brown v. Carroll, 683 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984); Scucchi v. Woodruff, 
503 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Bennett v. NorthcuttL 544 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1976); Newman v. King, 433 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. 1968), noted in Family 
Law—Failure to Appoint Guardian Ad Litem for Minor Not Fundamental Error, 
22 Sw. L.J. 649 (1968). 
207. See, e.g., supra note 137. 
208. 620 P.2d 384 (Okla. 1980). 
209. Id. at 385. The 1979 American Law Reports annotation likewise neutralizes 
the gender of the "objecting parent." Annot. "Rights and Remedies of Parents In-
ter Se With Respect to the Names of Their Children," 92 A L.R.3d 1091 (1979). 
210. Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-6-4(d) (Burns Supp. 1985): 
In deciding on a petition to change the name of a I minor child, the 
court shall be guided by the best interest of the child. . . . However, 
there is a presumption in favor of a parent of a minor child who: 
(1) Has been making support payments and fulfilling other duties in 
accordance with a decree . . . and (2) Objects to the proposed name 
change of the child. 
In my comments to the bill I expressed that the bill: 
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the Indiana Court of Appeals wrote: 
[T]he presumption created by the legislature is it is in the best 
interest of the child to retain the name of the parent who 
makes support payments and fulfills other duties uijposed by a 
dissolution decree, if such parent objects to the proposed name 
change. To prevail m such an action, then, the petitioning 
party must overcome that presumption This is ndt to say, as 
Blank posits, such presumption must be overcome before the 
best mterest of the child is relevant Rather, the bfest mterest 
of the child is always the primary concern with merely a pre-
sumption the supporting parent's position is m the best inter-
ests of the child 211 
In no known case has a custodial mother sought to change 
her marital child's surname from her birth name to the father's 
name or to another name. Nor is there any reported case of a non-
custodial father attempting to change his marital child's surname 
from the parental to the maternal or another I 
courts' attempts to appear neutral amount to sheer 
risy. An English commentator tactfully wrote: Hit is submitted 
rarely is the fa-
to insist on the 
that this is a somewhat unreal situation, since only 
ther likely to wish for a name change, but rather 
children retaining their original surname, his oWn."212 Neutral 
language cannot conceal the appallingly disparate purden of proof 
imposed upon women in these names cases. 
The lower and higher courts of Minnesota iiji Saxton, citing 
approvingly to its earlier case of Robinson, thinly 
continued acceptance of the father's right and the mother's heavy 
burden of proof. The noncustodial father in Saxton insisted that 
his children use only his surname, alleging that th^ children's best 
interests would be served by his name and because his son was his 
"only male heir." The trial referee recommen ded the father's 
surname. The 
judicial hypoc-
appears to be patently designed to prevent women with children in 
their custody from statutorily changing their children's names if the 
father objects and contributes any support for the child and is in 
obeyance with a decree issued pursuant to IC 31-1-11 5 
While this discrimination is phrased as a presumption, it appears, 
though "neutrally" worded, to clearly be written to give men the pre-
dominant naming rights of children 
Letter to Lesley DuVall, Chair, Indiana Senate Judiciary Committee (March 5, 
1979) I 
211 In re Meyer, 471 N E 2d 718 (Ind Ct App 1984) Neither the constitutional-
ity of the pretextually sex neutral language of the statute, nor any other constitu-
tional issue, was raised by either party before the trial or appellate courts To rebut 
the presumption m favor of the noncustodial parent's preference, the evidence 
must be "clear and convincing," the court stated It rejected thle finding of the trial 
court that the new name would be good for the child as being enough to rebut the 
presumption I 
212 Evelyn Ellis, The Choice of Children's Surnames, 9 Anglo-AmL Rev 92 
(1980) I 
Audrey Davis 
to support the 
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choice of surname. He cited the father's right, the standard cases 
to protect it, and the contention that the mother had not met her 
burden of proof. The referee failed, however, to admit that he was 
deferring to the father's choice: "In other words, the Court is not 
so much imposing partriarchal custom and tradition upon the chil-
dren, but rather, securing and maintaining the parent's under-
standing and agreement when they first named their children at 
birth."213 The Minnesota Supreme Court stated that either par-
ent's choice of name would serve the children's interests. It then 
broke the tie between the two names to that name (paternal) used 
over a long period of time.214 In the companion case, Jacobs v. Ja-
cobs , the court enunciated a co-equal right of parenis to name chil-
dren at birth. The court, nonetheless, rejected 
Saxton's claim that this distinction causes courts I 
patrilineal naming system. 
The petitioner in Saxton married in 1969, a time when few 
women knew their rights or deviated from custom by not changing 
their names at marriage. She divorced in West Virginia when its 
statutes still prohibited a divorced woman with! 
changing her name pursuant to the divorce decree, 
name had been the idea of her son, Robert, and discussed by them 
and her daughter, Jessica, over a long period of time. The father 
had at first agreed, then withdrawn his consent. As Ms. Saxton's 
attorney I unsuccessfully wrote the United States Supreme Court: 
The Petitioner before this Court is typical of the victims of 
prejudice and discrimination against women determining their 
own names. "Caught between a rock and a hard place," first 
having to fight and litigate simply to not change their names, 
or to change them if they had children or might have children, 
they are now being slapped in the face again by being told that 
it is only right that they be denied participation in the naming 
of the children in their custody over the fathers' objection be-
cause they consented to naming the children with | the father's 
name in the first place!215 
The United States Supreme Court will have Ito be convinced 
that the issue of naming children raises substantial federal ques-
children from 
The change in 
tions and is important and widespread enough for it to render gui-
dance to the state courts.216 Until then, women must continually 
213. In re Saxton, No. 755270 (Dist. Ct. Hennepin Co., Minn., July 16, 1979), 
Memorandum of Referee Thomas F. Haeg (citing to Laks v. Laks, 25 Ariz. App. 58, 
540 P.2d 1277 (1975)). 
214. See supra note 120. . 
215. Reply of Petitioner to Response of Respondent to Petition for A Writ of 
Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Minnesota, Saxton v. Denpiis, No. 81-959 (U.S. 
S. Ct., 1981). 
216. It is unlikely that the Supreme Court will hear any children's names case 
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attack and overcome this high burden of proof before they will 
have any voice in naming their noninfant children! 
VII. Resolving Disputes Over Naming Children at Bifth or 
Thereafter—The Developing Custodial Parent Presumption 
With the law stacked against women obtaining any right of 
participation in the naming of their marital children when the ex-
husband objects, attorneys in the mid-1970s began arguing that the 
law should recognize a presumption in favor of the custodial par-
ent's judgment. Attorneys have made this argument in most of 
the recent successful at-birth naming disputes.217 ]New Hampshire 
recently adopted the presumption statutorily as a ikieans to resolve 
disputes over naming newborn marital children on their birth cer-
tificates.218 Pennsylvania promulgated and published regulations 
to such effect in 1975.219 
which involves any factual dispute over individual children's 'best interests " See 
supra note 120 
217 "Absent a showing of abuse or neglect, the custodial parent should be pre-
sumed to show good judgment m his or her decision regarding the child and the 
court should not dictate his or her action " Brief for Appellant by Evergreen Legal 
Services, Hurta v Hurta, 25 Wash App 95, 605 P 2d 1278 (1979) "The choice of a 
surname should rest with the parent, male or female, who will take custody of the 
newborn child and make day-to-day decisions affecting the child's life and best in-
terests " Brief for Appellant, In re Schidlmeier, No J 27018-85, slip op (Pa Super 
Aug 9, 1985) Attorneys argued the concept m In re Schiffmak 28 Cal 3d 640, 620 
P 2d 579,169 Cal Rptr 918 (1980), Jacobs v Jacobs, 309 N W 2d 303 (Minn 1981), In 
re Saxton, 309 N W 2d 298 (Minn 1981), cert denied, 455 U S 1034 (1982), and Co-
hee v Cohee, 210 Neb 855, 317 N W 2d 381 (1982), as well as ill several unreported 
lower cases In Jacobs the Minnesota Supreme Court was obviously disturbed by 
the fact situation of a mother seemingly attemptmg to "bastardize" her child by 
getting impregnated by her ex-husband after divorce proceedings were filed or fi-
nalized Given such a fact situation the court was unlikely to remand with a pre-
sumption m favor of the custodial parent See supra notes 114-148 and 
accompanying text for discussion of at-birth naming law In In re Schidlmeier, No 
J 27018-85, slip op (Pa Super Aug 9, 1985), the mother appellant unsuccessfully 
argued that a noncustodial father should not have standing to petition to change 
the name of a child m its mother's custody except as part of a petition to change 
custody 
The NOW LDEF wrote as amici curiae m the unsuccessful Cohee case "When 
parents are unable to gree on the child's surname, the law should presume that it is 
m the child's best mterests to bear the surname chosen by the) custodial parent 
the custodial parent is the head of the household and, as custodian, has the ultimate 
responsibility for decisions regarding the child While it may be desirable to en-
courage the participation of the non-custodial parent m the various phases of the 
child's upbringing, the custodial parents should be the final arbiter " Brief of Amici 
Curiae, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund joined by the National Center on 
Women and Family Law and the (smce defunct) Center For A Woman's Own 
Name 
218 N H Rev Stat Ann § 126 6-A(I)(a) (1984) ("the choice of surname rests 
with the parent who has actual custody following birth") 
219 28 Pa Admin Code § 1 7(b) (Shepard's 1975) ("If the parents are divorced 
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The custodial parent presumption was not neKv. It had ap-
peared in disputes over marital children's names particularly in 
California.220 A mother's right to name nonmarital children is 
based on her right as guardian and custodian.221 Parental rights 
claimed by joint custodians in ongoing marriages to name their 
children against the state are also based on the presumption.222 
Adoption of the presumption follows logically from the divorce 
courts' exercise of jurisdiction over the naming of children as inci-
dental to children's care, custody, and control.223 Excellent law re-
view commentary has also discussed the presumption favorably.224 
Cases involving parental disputes over children's names have, 
however, traditionally carved out, as a singular exception to custo-
dial mothers' rights to rear children, the right to name the chil-
dren. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals once stated that 
"evaluating the evidence bearing upon the real issue, the views of 
the mother are also entitled to consideration."225 Until recently, 
this represents the most recognition any court has |made of a wo-
or separated at the time of the child'd birth, the choice of s u r n W rests with the 
parent who has custody of the newborn child ") This regulation was cited by Jus-
tice Mosk m his concurrmg opinion advocatmg the custodial parent presumption in 
In re Schiffman, 28 Cal 3d 640, 620 P 2d 579, 169 Cal Rptr 918 (1980) It was inter-
preted for the first time m In re Schidlmeier, No J 27018-85, slip op (Pa Super 
Aug 9, 1985) See supra note 133 and infra notes 231-234 and accompanying text 
220 Reed v Reed, 338 P 2d 350 (Okla 1959), In re Trower, 260 Cal App 2d 75, 
66 Cal Rptr 873 (1968), In re Cohn, 181 Misc 1021, 50 N Y S 2d 279 (Sup Ct N Y 
County, 1943), Webber v Parker, 167 So 2d 519 (La Ct App 1964), writ refused 
264 La 86, 168 So 2d 269 (1964), stopped short of recognizing a custodial parent's 
right 
221 Supra notes 98-100 and accompanying texty Op Att'y \Gen Wis (Oct 7, 
1974) 
222 Supra notes 81-96, 102-113 and accompanying text In cases of joint custody, 
if the child actually lives with both parents, the naming right khould remain mu-
tual with neither parent having a greater burden of proof to establish that her or 
his choice of name should be used by the children 
223 See supra notes 160-167 and accompanying text 
224 Note, The Controversy Over Children's Surnames Familial Autonomy, 
Equal Protection and the Child's Best Interests, 1979 Utah L Rbv 303, M Hannah 
Leavitt, Surname Alternatives in Pennsylvania, 82 Dick L Re^ 101, 115-16 (1977) 
See Kathryn Urbonya, No Judicial Dyslexia The Custodial Parent Presumption 
Distinguishes the Paternal Right to Name a Child, 58 N D L Rev 793 (1982) (au-
thor worked on In re Dengler, 287 N W 2d 637 (Mmn 1979), appeal dismissed, 446 
U S 949 (1980), with Prof Thomas Lockney of the University of North Dakota 
School of Law), Laura A Foggan, Parents' Childreanng Authority and the Selec-
tion of Children's Surnames, 51 Geo Wash L Rev 583 (1983) (as a law student 
author worked on an amicus curiae brief for the Washington, E) C Women's Legal 
Defense Fund m Miller v Leavitt, No Civ 82-369-E (WD Okl Dec 24, 1982) 
(Journal Entry of Judgment)) and filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the 
F und m support of the Application To Suspend the Rules To Rehear and Recon-
sider the Appeal and Decision m Overton v Overton, 674 P 2d 1089 (Mont 1983) 
225 Nelhs v Pressman, 282 A 2d 539 (DC 1971), cert denied, 405 U S 975 
(1972) I 
148 Law and Inequality [Vol. 3:91 
men's right to make decisions about naming children in her cus-
tody when she is not alleging paternal misconduct. In no other 
area of childrearing do courts intervene to the extent of even en-
joining or ordering a parent to do what even thp court acknowl-
edges may embarrass the child.226 
California Supreme Court Justice Mosk, iii his pathsetting 
and thorough concurring opinion in Schiffman, urged the adoption 
of the presumption in favor of the custodial parent in naming mat-
ters. Because the custodial parent has been awarded custody of a 
child on the basis of the child's best interest, it should be pre-
sumed, he wrote, that the 
parent with custody . . . has acted in the child's| best interest 
in selecting the name. . . . Just as the noncustodial parent can 
seek a corrective order if the child's health, education or con-
trol are deleteriously affected by the abuse of custodial care, so 
the selection of name can be contested on the ground that it is 
not in the child's best interest. The burden, however, would 
be on the noncustodial parent to establish the intrusion on the 
child's best interest.227 
To the extent that a custodial mother usually desires the chil-
dren in her custody to bear in whole or part the same surname she 
does, the presumption itself can be said to be based on a presump-
tion that children's best interests are served bv using the same 
name as their custodial parent.228 However, attorneys and com-
mentators appropriately found the presumption primarily on the 
legal right to determine what name is in a child's best interests, 
not on the specific name selected by the custodian. They base the 
169 Cal. Rptr. 918, 923 
Surname is Different 
226. "Whatever the nature of the 'harassment' of the children by their peers, it 
would seem that it was in this case surely no more severe than [that] faced by 
thousands of other similarly situated children in a day when broken homes have 
become commonplace." Robinson v. Hansel, 302 Minn. 34, 37, 223 N.W.2d 138, 141 
(1974). See also Niesen v. Niesen, 38 Wis. 2d 599, 157 N.W.2d 660 (1968); In re 
Worms, 252 Cal. App. 2d 130, 60 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1967); Degerberg v. McCormick, 41 
Del. Ch. 46, 187 A.2d 436 (1963). 
227. In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640, 648, 620 P.2d 579, 584 
(1980) (Mosk, J. concurring), noted in Cox, When a Childs\ 
From the Custodial Parents, 10 Colo. Lawyer 1651 (July, +981), and discussed in 
Urbonya, supra note 224. 
228. E.g., in Niesen v. Niesen, 38 Wis. 2d 599, 157 N.W.2dl 660, 663-64 (1968), the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court wrote: 
There are cases . . . when the use of the stepfather's! surname by the 
child avoids not only difficulties but embarrassment to the child who 
is unable to explain to his playmates that he is a tragic victim of di-
vorce. Even though the social evil of divorce is widespread, children 
and many adults still do not accept as convenient or natural a different 
surname for a child and his mother. 
See also Pintor v. Martinez, 202 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App.[l947); Don v. Don, 142 
Conn. 309,114 A.2d 203 (1955); Kirksey v. Abbott, 591 S.W.2d 751, 752 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1979). 
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presumption on the authority of the custodial parent to rear her 
children without interference of the noncustodial! parent.229 As 
one commentator characterized it: 
The relationship between the custodial parent and child . . . is 
built upon the custodial parent's right to direct the child's de-
velopment—psychological, educational, and religious. Because 
a name can have psychological, educational and religious sig-
nificance, a custodial parent should also determine a child's 
name. The selection of a name would thus be one aspect of 
the custodial parent's duty to direct the development of a 
child's identity.230 
In a recent decision, In re Schidlmeier,231 the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court interpreted the state's regulation giving the choice 
of surname for a newborn to the custodial parent for the first time 
in the context of a noncustodial father petitioning to change the 
surname of an infant child from her mother's name to his. The 
trial court had dismissed the regulation as irrelevant and found for 
the father. The appellate court reversed, cited Jlustice Mosk's 
opinion, and stated: 
The policy embodied in Section 1.7(a) fairly and practically al-
locates the responsibility for choosing a newborn child's sur-
name. The custodial parent generally has the right to make 
major decisions affecting the best interests of a minor child.232 
The court equated the term "custody" with 'legal custody." 
After thus ruling that the initial naming had been done pursuant 
to valid public policy by the parent with the legal right to custody, 
it treated the father's request to change the birth certificate name 
of the child eighteen months after her birth as a name change, put 
the burden of going forward with the evidence that the proposed 
change was in the best interests of the child and stated: 
In the case of a contested petition to change a child's name, the 
court must carefully evaluate all the relevant factual circum-
stances to determine if the petitioning parent has Established 
229. See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein, Annal Freud & Albert J. Solnit, Beyond the 
Best Interests of the Child (1973). It is particularly consistent with the theory that 
children's best interests are served by being in the custody of the caretaking parent. 
See Women's Legal Defense Fund, Representing Primary Caretaker Parents in 
Custody Disputes (1984) for a discussion of the law developing tpwards custody be-
ing awarded to the caretaking parent. 
As attorney for Ms. Saxton I wrote to the U.S. Supreme Court: "As custodial 
parents of their children women now expect to be created not as babysitters of 
male property, branded with the male name, but as fully responsible and mature 
heads of household with no exception carved out for the naming of their children." 
Reply of Petitioner to Response of Respondent to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 
to the Supreme Court of Minnesota at 11. 
230. Urbonya, supra note 224, at 815. 
231. No. J. 27018-85, slip op. (Pa. Super. Aug. 9, 1985). 
232. Id. 
150 Law and Inequality [Vol. 3:91 
that the change is in the child's best interests. This the court 
must do without according a presumption in favor of either 
parent.233 
Although it did not expressly adopt the custbdial parent pre-
sumption in the case of infants, by shifting the burden to the non-
custodial parent, the court effectively prevented noncustodial 
fathers from undermining the policy of the regulation to give the 
custodial parent the right to name newborns. The court, unfortu-
nately, failed to discuss the policy in broader terms. 
The court also failed to articulate the burden of the parent to 
prove that a proposed name change is in a child's best interests. 
Because the trial court had ruled in the father's favor on the basis 
of "tradition and custom," and because the father only alleged that 
it would be in the child's best interests to bear the parental name, 
the court held for the mother stating that the father's "allegation 
does not meet his burden of proof" and that the trial court's ra-
tional was not "legally sufficient to sustain a conclusion that the 
name change appellee seeks is in the child's best interests."234 
Appellate courts have not expressly adopted the custodial 
parent presumption, and one court to which it has been argued has 
expressly rejected it.235 Georgia and Louisiana have provisions 
similar to the Indiana statute giving an express presumption in 
favor of a marital child's continued use of the noncustodial par-
ent's name.236 In direct contrast, the Virginia legislature amended 
its law to provide that a change of name of a minor shall be denied 
only if the "change of name is not in the best interest of the mi-
nor."237 A similar new Minnesota statute was construed in Saxton 
as not changing the burdens of proof established by the 1974 deci-
sion in Robinson v. Hansel .238 Several trial judges have accepted 
the custodial parent preference as a viable means of resolving dis-
putes between parents, especially when the children are very 
young or even unborn.239 Recently, the Colorado Court of Ap-
233. Id. 
234. Id. 
235. Cohee v. Cohee, 210 Neb. 855, 317 N.W.2d 381 (l|982). The Nebraska 
Supreme Court, however, did say that custody should be considered, but it gave no 
explanation as to how. 
236. Ga. Code Ann. § 19-12-1 (1982); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:4751(B) (West Supp. 
1985). See Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-6-4(d) (Burns Supp. 1985) an^i supra notes 200-201 
and accompanying text. 
237. Va. Code § 8.01-217 (1984): 
[T]he court, shall, unless the evidence shows that the Change of name 
is sought for a fraudulent purpose or would otherwise infringe upon 
the rights of others or, in case of a minor, that the change of name is 
not in the best interest of the minor, order a change of name. . . . 
238. 302 Minn. 34, 223 N.W.2d 138 (1974). 
239. Kg., In re Miles, No. 80DR2859 (Dist. Ct. El Paso Ck Col. Nov. 14, 1980); 
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peals, although not expressly adopting the presumption, upheld a 
trial court order based partially on it.240 
With the demise of the tender years doctririe, which pre-
sumed that mothers of young children should have custody, arose 
the nationwide standard of awarding custody according to a child's 
best interests. The custodial parent presumption oners a sex-neu-
tral standard by which disputes can be resolved. 
I believe that trial courts will experiment withl and soon tire 
of, hyphenated names as resolutions for naming disputes over 
newborns.241 This will occur as trial and appellat^ courts, along 
with state legislatures, move towards recognizing naming as an in-
cident of childrearing entrusted to the custodial parent over new-
born or very young children.242 I also think it is clear that the 
presumption will develop from cases where the mother uses her 
birth given surname or a surname not assumed because of a mar-
riage, and does not seek to give her child the surname of another 
man. Whether the presumption will gain acceptance as a standard 
in disputes over naming older children, however, depends upon ac-
tive and strategic advocacy during the next decade. 
Reed v. Reed, No. 1590 (Super. Ct. Tolland Co. Conn. Nov. 23, 1973). In State v. 
Tedeno, 101 Misc. 2d 485, 421 N.Y.S.2d 297, 300 (Sup. Ct. 1979) a New York trial 
court wrote: 
[TJhe significant consideration is that the mother has custody and it is 
she who will be the primary caretaking figure and who will make the 
major decisions for Alexandria. Moreover, the Court recognizes that 
children, as they grow older, generally prefer to use the name of the 
parent with whom they live. 
240. In re Nguyen, 684 P.2d 258 (Colo. App. 1983), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 785 
(1985). 
241. Cohee v. Cohee, 210 Neb. 855, 317 N.W.2d 381 (1982). Seel supra notes 14-15 
and 128-230 and accompanying text. A hyphenated surname is not necessarily good 
for a child, especially if it is imposed when the child is older, and is not often the 
choice of either parent in a naming dispute. One commentator advocates a rebutta-
ble presumption in favor of a hyphenated surname but without i 
the mother, father (and child) would rebut the presumption and 1 
the court would then choose between the choices of the parents 4s being in the best 
interests of the child. Note, Like Father Like Child: The Rights of Parents In their 
Children's Surnames, 70 Va. L. Rev. 1303, 1347-48 (1984) 
242. New Hampshire and Pennsylvania recognize the presumption by statute 
and administrative regulation. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 126:6(11)(a) reads "if the par-
ents are separated or divorced at the time of the child's birth, the choice of sur-
name rests with the parent who has actual custody following birth." 28 Pa. Admin. 
Code § 1.7(b) (1975): "If the parents are divorced or separated Jat the time of the 
child's birth, the choice of surname rests with the parent who (has custody of the 
newborn child." The Pennsylvania Superior Court, however, ik interpreting this 
regulation, in In re Schidlmeier, No. J. 27018-85, slip op. (Pa. Super. Aug. 9, 1985), 
shied away from expressly articulating the presumption. See supra notes 231-234 
and accompanying text. A requirement that one parent, on the basis of her or his 
sex, sign a state form for a minor is a violation of equal protection. Johnson v. 
Hodges, 372 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Ky. 1974) (driver's license). Most states provide 
that either or both parents sign a birth certificate. 
discussion of how 
by what standard 
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VIII. Legal Recognition That a Name Does Not Imply Illegitimacy 
or Paternity 
One of the spoken and unspoken objections tjo recognizing a 
child's right to bear its mother's surname has be^n that, because 
customarily nonmarital children are known by the\r mothers' sur-
names, society will stigmatize marital children as ^illegitimate" if 
they also carry their mothers' surnames. Charlotte Perkins 
Gilman wrote in 1913: "As to illegitimate children, the term will 
disappear from the language. . . . When women have names of 
their own, names not obliterated by marriage . . . mere will be no 
way of labeling a child at once, as legitimate or otherwise."243 
Now that women increasingly have names of their own, society 
cannot, and should not, label children as "illegitimate" or "legiti-
mate." The notion that use of a woman's birth name will impose a 
"badge of ignobility" on a child has been accepted py several lower 
court jurists. Only one appellate court, however, had given the no-
tion any credence until May, 1985.244 Until May 14, 1985 no appel-
late no court had accepted the notion as reason to deny a child its 
mother's name.245 
In Doe v Dunning,246 the Washington Stat^ Registrar de-
clined to issue conventional birth certificates to rkonmarital chil-
dren, assuming that listing the father's name on a conventional 
certificate along with the mother's different surname was "indica-
tive of a probability of illegitimacy."247 The Registrar based the 
policy on the "custom" of marital children taking their father's 
names. The Washington Supreme Court held that "disclosure of 
the fact that a child bears the mother's surname is not necessarily 
a fact from which illegitimacy can be ascertained.']248 While some 
might suspect illegitimacy in looking at the child's pirth certificate, 
the court wrote, "[ojthers might view it as an adoption of an 
emerging social trend."249 
In another case,250 the trial court denied a Roman's petition 
243. Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Illegitimate Children, 4 Tl[e Forerunner, 295, 
297 (1913). 
244. In re Harris, 160 W. Va. 422, 236 S.E.2d 426 (1977). 
245. E.g., In re Toekles, 97 Idaho 406, 545 P.2d 1012 (1976); Doe v. Dunning, 87 
Wash. 2d 50, 549 P.2d 1 (1976). In Lassiter-Geers v. Reichenb^ch, 303 Md. 88, 492 
A.2d 303, 307 (1985) the court upheld a chancellor's application of the "best interest 
test to the facts of this case." the chancellor had concluded from the bench that 
"some people and a lot of people may well infer this child was born out of 
wedlock." 
246. 87 Wash. 2d 50, 549 P.2d 1 (1976). See supra, note 2 and accompanying text. 
247. Id. at 52, 549 P.2d at 2. 
248. Id. at 52, 549 P.2d at 3, 
249. Id. at 52, 549 P.2d at 4. 
250. In re Toekles, 97 Idaho 406, 545 P.2d 1012 (1976). 
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to change the name of her nonmarital child froni the father's 
name to hers on the grounds it "would make her a bastard on the 
fact of the record."251 The appeals court reversed, saying that the 
order would "only have determined the name by which the child 
would be known thereafter. It would not have any effect upon the 
child's legitimacy."252 
Still, in the West Virginia case of In re Harris,?53 the major-
ity said "as the circuit judge in one of the cases before us so ably 
pointed out, a child's bearing a woman's maiden name does give 
fair indication that the child is illegitimate."254 Were a father to 
forfeit his legal right to name the child by disgracing his name or 
abandoning the child, the court noted, then a child's name might 
be changed to the mother's. The court did not clarify whether the 
child would be labeled any less "legitimate'3 under such 
circumstances. 
In Cohee v. Cohee, the trial court stated that ai common sur-
name of a custodial mother and child is "usually accomplished by 
the mother keeping her prior name."255 The lower court stated 
that it may be "easier on the child to have the same name as the 
head of the house of the parent, but also easier on the child to 
have the name of the father to prevent any implication in later 
years that the child was an illegitimate child."256 The trial judge 
expressed no concern about birth status implied from different 
surnames of a custodial mother and child. The issue, however, was 
dealt with by the Nebraska Supreme Court in one sentence: "We 
consider and reject the trial court's reasons that the status of legit-
imacy would necessarily be raised by different surnames of mother 
and son."257 None of the courts which have denied women the 
right to name their marital children have suggested that a child's 
bearing the paternal name while its mother bears fyer own name 
implies that the child was illegitimate.258 
251. Id. at 407, 545 P.2d at 1013. 
252. Id. 
253. 160 W. Va. 422, 236 S.E.2d 426 (1977). 
254. Id. at 427, 236 S.E.2d at 429. 
255. Cohee v. Cohee, Tr. 4:5-6. 
256. Tr. 4:12-17. . 
257. Cohee v. Cohee, 210 Neb. 855, 860-61, 317 N.W.2d 381, 384 (1982). 
258. In Nellis v. Pressman, 282 A.2d 539, 541 (D.C. 1971), certl denied, 405 U.S. 
975 (1972), the father, who objected to his children continuing to bear their 
mother's remarried name, said that "it is not natural for children to carry their 
mother's name." He did not, however, suggest that their birth status would be 
questioned. New Jersey Rules 8:2-l.l(a)4 provides that "since a choice of the op-
tions for recording the surname of a child can result in such surname being differ-
ent from that of its father, the agreement or difference of the two surnames is not 
an indication of legitimacy or illegitimacy." The presence and introduction of ma-
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More often it is argued that a woman's naminjg her child with 
the putative father's name is evidence of paternity In Doe v. Han-
cock County Board of Health, Justice Hunter of the Indiana 
Supreme Court in dissent stated: "[I]t is clear that the use of a 
name does not legally imply that a biological relationship exists 
between persons with that same name. The only legal purpose 
served by a name is to identify the particular individual who uses 
it for that purpose."259 The Massachusetts Supreme Court in Com-
monwealth indicated that if there has been no acknowledgment or 
adjudication of paternity, there is the "possibility of a dishonest 
purpose to harass the alleged father" in naming a| child for an al-
leged father.260 
Although courts may refer to a name representing member-
ship in a family unit,261 the courts do not hold that a person's 
name itself evidences, in law, one's parentage or birth status. The 
law recognizes women's increasing use of their own names, and is 
gradually declining to stigmatize children as "legitimate" or "ille-
gitimate." Legal recognition of women's right to name their chil-
dren will result in more respectful treatment of children. 
IX. The Need for Legislation, Constitutional Challenges and the Equal 
Rights Amendment to Guarantee Women Rights in Naming 
Children Where the Fathers Disagree 
an 
A. Legislation 
Legislation on naming children, proposed or 
past dozen years, has not followed a coherent pi; 
of strategy arises from the lack of knowledge 
movement about the law of naming and its failure 
naming children as a pressing women's issue, 
which has been enacted attempts to resolve twol 
specification of the names parents may give newporn 
nonmarital children on their birth certificates (or 
such specifications), and 2) allocation of the contlrol 
passed over the 
This absence 
in the women's 
to recognize 
The legislation 
basic issues: 1) 
marital and 
Conscious lack of 
over naming 
i ma ternal grandparents at oral argument helps courts to view the ternal name with 
respect. 
259. Doe v. Hancock County Board of Health, 436 N.E.2d 1791, 794 (Ind. 1982). 
See also In re Dillon, 283 Pa. Super. 26, 423 A.2d 426 (1980). 
260. Secretary of the Commonwealth v. City Clerk of Lowell, 373 Mass. 178, 192, 
366 N.E.2d 717, 726 (1977). This is narcissistic, but it is also a cdmmon fear and neg-
ative supposition about women among men and probably the basis of the laws 
which require the biological father's consent or a determination of paternity for a 
child to bear its father's name on its birth certificate. The same presumed intent to 
harass could be manifested, moreover, by giving a child a man'si name as a first and/ 
or middle name. 
261. E.g., In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d at 647, 620 P.2d at 583, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 923. 
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children between parents, married or unmarried. Beyond unsuc-
cessful attempts to maintain the custom of marital children bear-
ing their fathers' names or to limit parental options,262 legislation 
attempting to impose state control over naming chldren has been 
minimal. Except for the repeal of the Louisiana, Nebraska, North 
Carolina, and Tennessee limitations on names to be given marital 
children at birth, no legislation should be necessary to guarantee 
that married parents have the right to name their children with 
any name if general common law principles are followed. Statutes 
which simply codify the common law and state that parents have 
the right to name their children as they wish, such as those in 
Michigan and New Hampshire, are technically not necessary. Stat-
utes mandating that a nonmarital child bear a certain surname on 
its birth certificate depending on its birth status or jhe relationship 
between the parents need to be repealed or invalidated by 
litigation. 
New Hampshire provides an example of positive legislation 
which would be useful to guarantee women rights in naming chil-
dren. The statute specifies that if parents are divorced or sepa-
rated at the time of birth, the choice of name rests 
having actual custody.263 
Iwith the parent 
I, it codifies Wis-A proposal in Wisconsin goes further.264 First, 
consin's recognition of the common law right of parents who are 
married to each other and not separated, to register the given 
name(s) and surname of a child.265 Then it provides that if the 
parents are separated or divorced at the time of birth, the given 
name(s) and surname shall be registered by the parent with actual 
262 In Iowa the state registrar supported a bill which provided: "The custodian 
shall not give the child a name which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, or 
otherwise potentially harmful to the future of the child" and gave the registrar the 
authority to refuse to register such names. 1973 Iowa S B 201 Michigan's similar 
name change statute was amended m the mid 1970s 
Several states have considered at-birth name selection statutes such as the Lou-
isiana, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Tennessee statutes Eg , 1979-80 H B 639 
(Ohio) (marital child to be registered m name mutually agreed upon by parents, 
and if they do not agree, a hyphenated surname with mother's name first, 
nonmarital child in mother's name unless both sign, then according to both parent's 
agreement), N C S B 306 (1979) (marital child given either pkrent's name or hy-
phenated name), N J.A B 3368 (April 28, 1975) (birth certificate to mclude "sur-
names of the mother, the father, and the child, which names need not necessarily 
be the same") 
263 N H Rev Stat Ann § 126 6-a(I)(a) (Supp 1983) P« 
hshed regulation to such effect See supra, notes 62, 218, 231-2 
text 
264 No 1677/7 Leg Ref Bureau Conversations with Ra; 
Registrar of Vital Statistics, Edward Steichen, Bureau Chief 
Legislative Attorney (June, 1985) 
265 63 Op Atty Gen Wis 501 (Oct 7, 1974). 
lylvania has a pub-
and accompanying 
tond Nashold, State 
d Kenna del Sol, 
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custody. If, however, a court has awarded custody tb another, the 
names selected by such person shall be registered. 
If the parents were not married to each other] from concep-
tion to birth, the bill provides for the mother to register the child's 
names unless a court has granted legal custody to another in which 
case that person selects the given and last names. 
The proposal further provides that upon an acknowledgment 
of paternity (signed by both parents), the mother, or the father if a 
court has granted him legal custody, can change the names of a 
child under seven years of age. If the parents marry each other 
following the birth, the parents have the mutual right to change a 
child's name on its birth certificate, again if the child is under 
seven.266 
Additionally, where the children are age seven br older, legis-
lation could provide that children's preferences regarding any 
name change be admissible and that at age fourteen require their 
consent. Such provisions would give children a longLoverdue voice 
in proceedings that purport to determine their best interest.267 
Because of the spoken and unspoken fear that women will, as 
men have, impose their surnames on children irrespective of the 
children's best interests, it appears highly unlikely that legisla-
tures will adopt a comprehensive custodial parent presumption.268 
Legislatures should be encouraged to accept the presumption for 
the naming of infants, such as New Hampshire anq Pennsylvania 
266. The provision could go even further and provide for birth certificate name 
change by a custodial parent or person until a child reaches seven years. 
Oregon and Maryland have considered statutes specifically providing for name 
changes of children at the time of divorce to the custodial parent's name. Ore. H.B. 
2102 (1979); Md. S.B. 961 (1977) (only in cases of child legitimized by marrige being 
dissolved). 
267. My experience with litigants indicates that children over jseven years of age' 
should be listened to. Because parents and children should openly discuss the issue 
I do not believe that their testimony should be sealed. To putj children at ease, 
however, judges should generally interview children in chambers instead of open 
court, with parents and attorneys present unless the children object. For an in-
depth discussion and analysis of questioning children in the context of custody and 
visitation proceedings, see Cathy Jones, Judicial Questioning oj\ Children in Cus-
tody and Visitation Proceedings, 18 Family L.Q. 43 (1984). 
268. Indeed, legislatures have proved to be reactionary. Seel e.g., Louisiana's, 
North Carolina's, and Tennessee's recent legislation protecting tne husband's con-
trol over naming at birth, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:34(a)(l) (West 1984); N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 130A-101(e) (Supp. 1983); Tenn. Code Ann. § 53-445 (SupJ. 1982), and Geor-
gia's, Indiana's, and Louisiana's protection of men in state name change proceed-
ings, Ga. Code Ann. § 19-12-1 (1982); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-6-4(d) (Burns Supp. 
1982); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:4751(B) (West Supp. 1985). Similarly, in interpreting 
Pennsylvania's regulation providing for the custodial parent to name newborns, an 
appellate court fell short of adopting a custodial presumption for statutory name 
change petitions. In re Schidlmeier, No. J. 27018-85, slip op. (Pa. Super. Aug. 9, 
1985). See supra notes 231-234 and accompanying text. I 
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have. Because the courts are giving such minimal support to wo-
men, legislatures must also be asked to address the custodial par-
ent presumption as a solution to resolving disputes between 
parents over their children's names. 
B. Constitutional Challenges and the Equal 
Rights Amendment 
The right of women to name themselves is supported by cen-
turies of common law and the fact that there is no case on record 
requiring a married woman to have the consent of her husband to 
use her own name. Children's names, however, bring to current 
litigation a virtually unblemished history of judicial encourage-
ment of the perpetuation of the patrilineal naming system and of 
men's power to name marital children in parental dispute 
situations. 
State and federal constitutional rights of Women to name 
their children have only been raised in a few of the children's 
names cases involving disputes between parents,p69 The courts 
have recognized a constitutional right of fathers to protect their 
"time-honored" superior naming right,270 and parents to name 
their children against state interference where they are in agree-
ment.271 The courts have not been receptive to recognizing in-
dependent women's or children's constitutional rights in this 
area.272 At most, the courts express that parents have an equal 
right in naming children at birth. 
If litigants successfully force the courts to de&l with constitu-
tional issues, the failure of the Equal Rights Amendment may not 
have much effect. Courts should invalidate any superior naming 
269. E.g., In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1034 
(1982); Laks v. Laks, 25 Ariz. App. 58, 540 P.2d 1277 (1975); In\ re Warschberger, 8 
F.L.R. 2514 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Naussau County, June 21, 1982); Ovdrton v. Overton, 674 
P.2d 1089 (Mont. 1983) (particularly Application To Suspend the Rules to Rehear 
and Reconsider the Appeal and Decision). In re Schidlmeier, |No. J. 27018-85, slip 
op. (Pa. Super. Aug. 9, 1985). 
270. In re Tubbs, 620 P.2d 384 (Okla. 1980); Carroll v. Johnson, 263 Ark. 280, 565 
S.W.2d 10 (1978). 
271. E.g., Sydney v. Pingree, 564 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. Fla. 1^82) (Order granting 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment); O'Brien v. Tilsok 523 F. Supp. 494 
(E.D.N.C. 1981); Jech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714 (D. Hawaii 1979); Doe v. Hancock 
County Board of Health, 436 N.E.2d 791 (Ind. 1982) (Hunter, j(, dissenting). 
272. But see Jones v. McDowell, 53 N.C. App. 434, 281 S.E.2d 192 (1981) (invali-
dating a statute mandating that a child's surname automatically change to its fa-
ther's at legitimation over the mother's objection and irrespective of the age of the 
child); Laks v. Laks, 25 Ariz. App. 58, 540 P.2d 1277 (1975); O'Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. 
Supp. 494 (E.D.N.C. 1981); Doe v. Hancock County Board of Health, 436 N.E.2d 791 
(Ind. 1982) (Hunter, J., dissenting). Saxton, 309 N.W.2d at 29p, expressly rejected 
constitutional right of women to name their children. 
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right of the father over marital children. In Kirchberg v. Feen-
stra,213 the United States Supreme Court held tnat a Louisiana 
statute giving the husband exclusive control over community prop-
erty violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The 
Louisiana, North Carolina, and Tennessee birth naming statutes 
are ripe for challenge on this basis. These statutes represent the 
type of gender-based discrimination that the United States 
Supreme Court could be expected to strike down on equal protec-
tion grounds. 
Under existing standards of equal protection,27^ courts should 
eliminate men's superior right to name marital children. How-
ever, as Ruth Hale pointed out fifty years ago,275 men do not give 
up the right to brand what they consider their property easily. Lo-
cal family lawyers are apt not even to fight for a woman client's 
desire to name her children over the father's objection. Courts at 
all levels rarely evidence a judicial detachment in ruling on the is-
sue. To the contrary, they all but openly express their clear desire 
to retain the traditional presumption of the paternal surname, par-
ticularly where children are older. The failure of the Equal Rights 
Amendment will consequently make achievement pf equal rights 
in naming children considerably more difficult. 
Unquestionably, the Equal Rights Amendment276 would in-
validate any superior naming right of the father oyer children of 
any age. It should invalidate any presumption that continued use 
of the father's name, when the father wants it retained, is in the 
children's best interests. Acceptance of criteria to determine chil-
dren's interests which protect the father's traditional right would 
similarly become invalid. Until the federal amendment becomes a 
reality, state equal rights provisions should be employed to invali-
date the power of men to name children. 
273. 450 U.S. 455 (1981). 
274. Id.; Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.SJ 718 (1982); Kirch-
berg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Craig 
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Frjmtiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 
420 U.S. 636 (1975); Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U S . 142 (1980). 
275. Hale, supra note 6 (referring to men imposing their nam^s on their wives as 
property). 
276. "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied 6r abridged by the 
United States or any state on account of sex." Proposed Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, Section 1, S.J. Res. 8, S.J. Res. 9 and H.R.J. |Res. 208, 92d Cong. 
1st Sess. (1971). 
See The Impact of the Equal Rights Amendment Hearings on S.J. Res. 10 
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Commi on the Judiciary, 
98th Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess., Part 2, 375-77 (1984) (letter to Senaior Orrin G. Hatch 
from Priscilla Ruth MacDougall, August 5, 1983). 
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X. Conclusion 
The right of women to determine their children's names is at 
a crossroads. After the landmark case of In re Schiff man, a news-
paper editorialized: 
Sure it smacks of discrimination to require that al woman as-
sume her husband's surname upon marriage and that children 
she bears also go by her husband's name. But it is tidy. In a 
culture that developed as a male-dominated society, it was nat-
ural that the family name follow the male line of descent. . . . 
[W]hy don't we leave well enough alone and hope the Califor-
nia Supreme Court ruling becomes a forgotten | footnote in 
legal history?277 
Forbush had to become a footnote in legal history in order 
for women to have the right to control their own names. Schiff 
man should become a guiding light for the future in order for wo-
men to have any bona fide right to name their children. Whether 
it will or not depends on the next decade of advocacy. 
277. What to Call What's-His-Name, Virginian Pilot, Jan. 5,11981, at A-10, col. 1. 
